



FINAL REPORT

INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO GEORGIA



**PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS**

26 OCTOBER 2024

FINAL REPORT

INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO GEORGIA

26 October 2024 parliamentary elections



FINAL REPORT

INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO GEORGIA

26 October 2024 parliamentary elections

Bul. Josipa Broza 23A, 81000 Podgorica

e-mail: info@enemo.eu

www.enemo.eu

Published by:

ENEMO- European Network of Election Monitoring Organization

Editors:

Zlatko Vujović
Kristina Kostelac

Authors:

Zlatko Vujović
Kristina Kostelac
Dubravka Popović
Beatrix Boonekamp

Print:

Smart Print doo, Podgorica

Circulation:

30

Year of Publication:

2025

*The content of this document is the sole responsibility of ENEMO.
The English version of this document is the only official version.*

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	6
INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	11
I. BACKGROUND AND POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS	12
BACKGROUND	12
POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS	13
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM	16
LEGAL FRAMEWORK	16
ELECTORAL SYSTEM	18
III. ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES	19
CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION (CEC)	19
DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS (DECS)	21
PRECINCT ELECTION COMMISSIONS (PECS)	22
IV. ELECTION TECHNOLOGIES	25
V. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS	28
VI. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION	30
VII. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE	32
ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN	32
CAMPAIGN FINANCE	34
VIII. MEDIA	38
TRADITIONAL AND ONLINE MEDIA	38
SOCIAL MEDIA	40
IX. GENDER REPRESENTATION	42
X. NATIONAL MINORITIES	45
XI. INCLUSION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES	47
XII. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS	49
XIII. ELECTION DAY	52
OPENING	52
VOTING	52
CLOSING AND COUNTING	54
TRANSFER OF MATERIALS TO THE DECS	54
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS BY THE CEC	54
XIV. OBSERVERS	55
DOMESTIC OBSERVERS	55
GONGOS	56
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS	59
XV RECOMMENDATIONS	60
ABOUT ENEMO	67
ANNEXES	70

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia, held on 26 October, represented a critical juncture in the country's political and electoral landscape. These elections, conducted under a list-proportional (PR system) electoral system for the first time, marked the culmination of reforms initiated in 2017. While intended to enhance proportionality and inclusivity in representation, the reforms coincided with significant political tensions, societal polarization, and a crisis of trust in the electoral process.

The 2024 parliamentary elections occurred in a restrictive environment, undermining inclusivity, transparency and fairness. Critical violations included violence against opposition members, widespread voter intimidation, smear campaigns against observers, and extensive misuse of administrative resources. The cumulative impact of observed shortcomings significantly compromised the democratic integrity of the election process.

The competitiveness of the electoral process was limited as a result of restrictive implementation of campaign regulations, significant pressure on civil society and the media, and reduced space for criticism of the incumbent political powers. The shrinking space for democratic accountability, including through elections, was further highlighted by restrictive interpretations of access to free airtime and political advertisements, as well as actions undermining civil society and concerns about the CEC's independence and impartiality.

While these elections demonstrated progress in areas such as electoral technology and voter participation, they also exposed enduring challenges. A commitment to meaningful, comprehensive, and inclusive reforms and constructive dialogue of ruling parties and opposition is essential to ensure the stability and inclusivity of Georgia's democratic processes moving forward.

To prevent strong authoritarian tendencies that are endangering Georgia's democratic consolidation, it is crucial to organize the next parliamentary elections in significantly more fair and free surroundings.

Pre-Election Context and Political Environment

The pre-election environment was shaped by intense political polarization and a deepening lack of public trust in state institutions. Since the Georgian Dream party's rise to power in 2012, confrontational rhetoric and governance controversies have increasingly dominated the political landscape. The highly charged atmosphere surrounding the 2024 elections was further exacerbated by lingering irregularities from the 2020 parliamentary elections, which opposition parties widely denounced as flawed.

A key source of tension was the Georgian Dream government's adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence in May 2024. The law mandated that civil society organizations receiving over 20% of their funding from foreign sources register as "foreign agents". This legislation provoked widespread domestic and international criticism, sparking protests and allegations of government interference in civil society activities. Consequently, the unfolding events fueled a narrative of declining democratic standards and strained relations with Georgia's Western allies, deepening political polarization.

Additionally, the electoral campaign was marred by reports of harassment and intimidation targeting opposition members, civil society activists, and media representatives. Accusations of administrative resource misuse and bias in the judiciary added to an already fraught political environment. In this context, the ruling Georgian Dream framed the 2024 elections as a choice between stability and chaos, while opposition parties presented them as a referendum on Georgia's pro-European trajectory versus alignment with Russia.

Electoral Legal Framework and Amendments

The legal framework for the elections provided a structural foundation but was undermined by frequent and fragmented amendments in the lead-up to the elections. These changes included the abolition of gender quotas for candidate lists, a measure implemented for only one election cycle before being rescinded in 2022. The lack of continuity and excessive amendments—25 in total since the 2020 elections—contributed to stakeholder confusion and weakened public confidence in the electoral process.

Amendments to the Election Code undermined the independence and impartiality of the CEC by reducing the parliamentary majority required to appoint CEC members and eliminating the role of an opposition-nominated deputy chair. These changes, adopted without meaningful stakeholder consultations, were perceived as consolidating the ruling party's influence over the electoral process.

While some reforms addressed recommendations from international observers, such as improving recount procedures and expanding observer rights, the absence of a comprehensive, participatory reform agenda left systemic gaps unaddressed. Key issues, including the misuse of administrative resources, lack of impartial campaign finance oversight, and media regulations, remained unresolved, hindering alignment with international democratic standards.

Electoral Administration and Technology

Elections were administered by a three-tiered structure of the election management bodies: the CEC, 73 District Election Commissions (DECs), and over 3,000 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs). While the CEC generally met legal deadlines and demonstrated technical competence, concerns about transparency and impartiality persisted.

The 2024 elections marked the nationwide implementation of voter identification devices (VIDs), optical ballot scanners (PCOS) as well as electronic vote transmissions system. These technologies aimed to enhance the integrity of the voting process by reducing human error and quickly providing preliminary results. However, election technologies were met with skepticism, with many stakeholders expressing concerns about potential manipulation and breaches of voter secrecy. Reports of misuse, such as the manual input of voter data with the intention of bypassing the VIDs, further eroded trust in these technologies.

Even though new election technologies were implemented without major technical difficulties, a lack of robust public awareness campaigns and transparent auditing mechanisms limited their effectiveness in building public confidence. Mock elections and training sessions were held to familiarize voters and election staff with the new devices. However, persistent misconceptions about their functionality and reliability highlighted the need for greater public outreach and education.

Electoral Campaign and Media Environment

The electoral campaign officially began on 27 August and was characterized by polarized rhetoric and an uneven playing field. Georgian Dream leveraged its incumbency advantages, including access to state resources and favorable media coverage, while opposition parties faced significant obstacles.

Allegations of voter intimidation, vote-buying, and pressure on public sector employees to support the ruling party were reported throughout the campaign period. Civil society organizations documented cases of misuse of administrative resources, including the deployment of public officials in campaign activities and the use of government-funded programs for electoral gain.

The media environment reflected broader societal divisions, with traditional outlets and online platforms showing explicit biases. Pro-government media amplified the ruling party's narrative of stability and development, while opposition-aligned outlets framed the elections as a struggle for Georgia's democratic future. The lack of equal media access and imbalanced reporting further disadvantaged opposition parties, raising questions about the fairness of the campaign environment.

Election Day and Immediate Aftermath

Election Day proceeded peacefully in most areas, with a reported voter turnout of 56.8%. ENEMO observers noted that the voting and counting processes were generally well-administered and conducted following legal procedures. However, significant issues were reported and observed, including breaches of voter secrecy, inconsistent application of procedures at polling stations, and allegations of organized pressure on voters.

Preliminary results announced on the evening of 26 October indicated a clear majority for Georgian Dream, which secured 54.23% of the vote, compared to 37.44% collectively garnered by opposition parties. Opposition leaders immediately rejected the results, citing widespread irregularities and systemic biases. Protests erupted in the aftermath, with demonstrators demanding reforms and a repeat of the elections.

The political crisis deepened when President Salome Zourabishvili refused to convene the new parliament's first session, citing concerns over the legitimacy of the election results. In response, Georgian Dream proceeded to assemble the parliament without presidential approval, exacerbating tensions and highlighting constitutional ambiguities.

Complaints and Appeals

The complaints and appeals process during the 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia highlighted significant procedural and institutional deficiencies, raising questions about the fairness and accessibility of electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. Although Georgia's legal framework provides for a multi-tiered system for filing complaints and appeals, numerous shortcomings undermined its effectiveness and the confidence of electoral stakeholders.

One of the key issues was the overly formalistic approach to processing complaints, where minor procedural errors often resulted in cases being dismissed without substantive review. This rigid interpretation of procedural requirements disproportionately affected opposition parties and civil society actors, limiting their ability to seek redress for alleged electoral violations. Moreover, there is no provision for complainants to correct deficiencies in their filings, which could otherwise enhance fairness and inclusivity of the process.

Another critical concern was the limited impartiality of decision-making bodies, particularly at the lower levels of election administration. DEC and PECs, which handle the majority of complaints, were widely viewed as lacking independence due to their composition and perceived alignment with the ruling party. This perception discouraged many stakeholders from filing complaints and contributed to a broader erosion of trust in the system.

The transparency of the complaints process was also called into question. While decisions by election management bodies and courts were generally published,

stakeholders criticized delays in their dissemination and the lack of detailed reasoning in some rulings. Inconsistent and non-uniform practices across different electoral districts further exacerbated confusion and perceptions of bias.

Significant attention was drawn to post-election complaints, particularly those concerning voter intimidation, breaches of secrecy, and alleged manipulation of electoral technologies. Opposition parties and civil society organizations raised concerns about the inadequate investigation of these claims, with many complaints being dismissed on procedural grounds without thorough examination.

Post-Election Developments and Broader Implications

The post-election period was marked by intensified protests and a breakdown in political dialogue. Opposition parties boycotted parliamentary sessions, and civil society organizations reported escalated crackdowns on activists and journalists. The ruling party's announcement to suspend EU accession talks until 2028 further polarized the political landscape, fueling public discontent and raising questions about Georgia's international commitments. Key international actors strongly expressed their concerns and dissatisfaction, with some promptly imposing sanctions on Georgian Dream's leadership and the government.

The broader implications of the 2024 elections extend beyond the immediate political crisis. The erosion of democratic norms, coupled with the government's increasingly anti-Western rhetoric, has strained Georgia's relationships with its key international partners. The elections also underscored the fragile state of the country's institutions and the urgent need for comprehensive and inclusive reforms to restore public trust and political stability.

INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In September 2024, the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) officially deployed an International Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Georgia to observe the 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections. The mission closely monitored the political and electoral environment, including electoral rights, election management, campaigning, gender equity, voting, tabulation, and dispute resolution. ENEMO's assessments are based on international democratic standards and Georgian law.

ENEMO deployed a total of seven Core Team (CT) experts based in Tbilisi, who coordinated the mission's activities and conducted comprehensive analysis across all stages of the electoral process. In addition, eight Long-term Observers (LTOs) were deployed in four multinational teams across the country, based in Tbilisi, Gori, Kutaisi, and Zugdidi.

On Election Day, ENEMO deployed 44 multinational teams composed of eight LTOs and 80 Short-term Observers (STOs). These teams observed the preparation and opening of polling stations, the voting and counting processes, as well as the transfer and intake of election materials by DEC. Observation teams monitored the opening procedures in 44 polling stations, voting in 482 polling stations, and closing and counting in 44 polling stations. Additionally, the mission observed the intake of election materials and the tabulation of results in 44 DEC.

Leading up to Election Day, ENEMO's CT experts and LTOs conducted 366 meetings, including 131 with election management bodies, 59 with political parties and candidates, three with state officials, 23 with media representatives, 43 with domestic civil society organizations, and 31 with other domestic and international election observation missions. The mission also observed over 40 election management body sessions and trainings, 14 campaign activities (meetings or rallies), and 25 other meetings with voters and various interlocutors.

An Interim Report was issued by the mission prior to Election Day, while a Preliminary Statement was released on 27 October, summarizing the findings from the pre-election period and Election Day. The mission followed events in Georgia until the conclusion of the electoral process to monitor the post-election environment, including electoral complaints and appeals, following all the developments until 27 December 2024.

ENEMO expresses its deep gratitude to all interlocutors, including election management bodies, political parties, civil society organizations, media representatives, voters, and the international community, for their cooperation and openness throughout the mission. The mission extends special thanks to the citizens of Georgia, whose participation in the electoral process demonstrates a strong commitment to democracy.

I. BACKGROUND AND POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS

BACKGROUND

The parliamentary elections were called on 11 April 2024 and took place on 26 October 2024, as part of the regular electoral cycle. Georgia has been having multi-party elections since 1991. Over the last 12 years, its politics have been dominated by the Georgian Dream party which was in power since 2012. The last parliamentary elections were held in October 2020, when GD won 90 out of 150 seats in the parliament, under a mixed system that allocated 120 seats through proportional representation and 30 seats through majoritarian elections.

The 2024 parliamentary elections were the first elections Georgia held through the system of list proportional representation. In 2017, Georgia introduced a gradual reform of the electoral system by amending the Constitution to prescribe a transition to the proportional system, as well as the introduction of the 30% quota for representation of the less represented gender in electoral lists. Since then, there have been many significant changes to the electoral system in 2022, 2023 and 2024 that have negatively impacted the stability of the electoral law in the run up to the election. In addition to changes to campaign finance regulations and oversight, gender quotas for electoral lists were abolished after being implemented in just one electoral cycle, despite not having resulted in expected representation of women in the Parliament.¹ Furthermore, the 26 October elections were the first where voter identification and vote counting technologies were used on a large scale.

The election campaign took place in a highly polarized context, following a deep political crisis over opposition political parties challenging the 2020 parliamentary elections results. Political tensions were additionally fueled by the Georgian Dream's introduction of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which stipulates that civil society organizations which receive over 20% of their funds from outside of Georgia must register as foreign agents, acting for the interest of foreign powers who fund them. Following two attempts at adoption of the Law, the Parliament passed it in May 2024 which triggered large anti-government protests, followed by large-scale reports of intimidation and harassment of activists, politicians and their families. The events around the protests, hardening of anti-western and anti-democratic rhetoric invoked a strong reaction of the international community. Several Western countries froze their financial aid to Georgia, de facto halting Georgia's EU path, and a number of sanctions against Georgian officials were imposed by the US. The 2024 parliamentary elections were framed as a choice between war and peace by the ruling Georgian Dream, and as a choice between Europe and Russia, by the opposition political parties.

¹ See more in the *Gender Representation* section.

LGBT+ rights have been another factor of societal tensions ahead of the 26 October election. In July 2021, media representatives who were to cover a Pride march suffered severe physical injuries from attacks by violent counter-protesters and a significant number of these cases remain unprosecuted². In 2024, the Parliament passed the Government's Law on Protection of Family Values and Minors despite large-scale criticism by international organisations of its discriminatory purpose.

In the run up to the election, President Salome Zourabishvili initiated the process of uniting the fragmented opposition political parties into a joint platform which commits them to forming a joint government in the aftermath of elections and a pro-European foreign policy direction. Most opposition political parties joined the platform, but continued to run separate campaigns, while Zourabishvili's profile grew among opposition voters.

POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS

Preliminary results were announced on 26 October³, two hours after closing of the polling stations, indicating that the Georgian Dream won a clear majority of votes (54.23%) in contrast to the opposition parties who reached 37.44% altogether. Four key opposition electoral lists⁴ announced they would not accept the election results and communicated plans for protesting against the outcome of elections immediately in the run up to Election Day. The main issues raised by opposition political parties included violations of the secrecy of the vote⁵, organised pressure on voters to support Georgian Dream, and concerns about manipulation of voter identification technology⁶.

The preliminary results were also denounced by President Salome Zourabishvili, who announced she would refuse to schedule the first meeting of the Parliament, as required by Article 78 of the Constitution. Distrust in election results sparked large-scale protests in the lead up to the announcement of official results.

On 16 November 2024, the CEC announced official results of the elections⁷. Georgian Dream decided to organize the first meeting of the Parliament without the President having called for it, which led opposition political parties to attempt resigning their MP

² Human Rights Watch have flagged in their 2023 Report for Georgia that prosecutions were lacking for organized violence against the Pride march/media covering the march. More available here: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/georgia#1a9a8>

³ The preliminary results were published by the CEC and are available here: https://results.cec.gov.ge/#/en-us/election_57/tr/dashboard

⁴ Coalition for Change, Unity, Strong Georgia and Gakharia - for Georgia all denounced the election outcome, citing systemic violations of the electoral process.

⁵ Large-scale compromise of the secrecy of vote due to visibility of the ink used to mark the ballot through the ballot paper was one of the most significant and best evidenced violations of the electoral process, observed by ENEMO as well. See more in the *Complaints and Appeals* section.

⁶ ENEMO had not observed first-hand violations of the voter identification technology. Reports from local NGOs detail use of passports as means of bypassing voter identification machine by manual inputting of voters' data into the system, in some cases without photo identification.

⁷ According to the official results, Georgian Dream won 53.93% votes (89 seats), Coalition for Change won 11.03% votes (19 seats), Unity won 10.17% votes (16 seats), Strong Georgia won 8.81% votes (14 seats), while Gakharia - For Georgia won 7.78% votes (12 seats).

seats before authority of two thirds of the Parliament could be recognized⁸. Following the first session of the Parliament held on 25 November, the CEC accepted the applications for revocation of candidate lists.

Shortly after conducting the first meeting of the Parliament, Georgian Dream announced that they would be halting EU accession talks until 2028. This shift triggered large-scale protests of heightened intensity, as Georgian Dream diverged from its campaign rhetoric supporting EU accession, leading to significant public discontent and negative reactions from the international community, as well as resignations from the civil service, including several ambassadors of Georgia⁹. The protests started on 28 November and continued every night until the end of the reporting period of this document (27 December). The Government used tear gas, water cannons and physical force to disperse the protests, with its use being excessive and unjustified in numerous cases. There was significant evidence of excessive use of repressive measures against political parties and activists. Leaders of several opposition political parties, who were threatened with banning of their operations in the aftermath of the elections by the Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, were arrested over their role in organizing the protests. The threats and repressive measures against activists and political leaders constitute a significant infringement on political freedoms and jeopardize respect for Article 21 of the ICCPR¹⁰. Raids of activists' and political parties' offices took place, alongside targeting and beating of individuals and journalists¹¹, as well as attacks and searches for protesters by unidentified groups of masked men.

As of 27 December 2024, 61 out of 150 MPs are not taking part in parliamentary sessions, pending Parliament's acceptance of their resignations, raising concerns about the election of the President of Georgia through an Electoral College which requires the participation of all 150 MPs. The presidential election was scheduled for 14 December and Georgian Dream-dominated electoral college elected their candidate Mikheil Kavelashvili as the President, while the incumbent President Zurabishvili announced she would not be resigning her seat until new parliamentary elections are called. The Constitution of Georgia does not provide for an anti-deadlock mechanism over such possible executive-legislative gridlock, raising further concerns over deepening of the current political and constitutional crisis.

⁸ As required under Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia, in order for the Parliament to acquire full powers.

⁹ Georgia's ambassadors to the United States, Italy, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Lithuania resigned since the announcement of halting the EU accession talks.

¹⁰ Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that "the right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (*ordre public*), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

¹¹ TV Praveli journalist and cameraman were attacked while covering the protests on 7 December, by a group of masked men. See more at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/c07ggrnxx45o>

ENEMO recommends cross-party dialogue, mediated by external parties, to agree on resolving the current crisis. The dialogue should focus on:

- 1. establishing a pathway to address the key causes of distrust in the October 26 parliamentary election process, and*
- 2. identifying steps to ensure the legitimacy and transparency of future parliamentary elections.*

ENEMO urges Georgian state authorities to refrain from retaliating against individuals and organizations advocating for repeat elections through peaceful protests, emphasizing that safeguarding freedom of assembly and expression is crucial for fostering meaningful political dialogue.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The legal framework for Georgia's 2024 parliamentary elections provided a solid structural foundation for electoral processes; however, several shortcomings and gaps remained, preventing full alignment with international standards and key recommendations from international and domestic observers.

ENEMO notes that legal shortcomings became particularly evident after the elections, as numerous stakeholders expressed strong distrust in both the legislation and the decision-making processes, citing concerns about fairness and impartiality. Despite incremental improvements, the legal framework continues to reflect a fragmented and reactive approach, which undermines its ability to comprehensively address systemic electoral challenges.

The Constitution of Georgia (1995) and the Election Code (2011) serve as the primary legal instruments governing Georgia's electoral processes. Additional laws, such as the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens, the Law on Broadcasting, the General Administrative Code, and the Criminal Code, complement this framework. Normative acts issued by the CEC further regulate specific aspects of the election administration.

Since the 2020 parliamentary elections, an excessive number of amendments to the Election Code has been made, reaching a total of 25 changes until as recent as May 2024¹². While some of them addressed recommendations by ENEMO and the Venice Commission, such as enhancing impartiality in lower-level election commissions, expanding citizen observer rights, and improving recount procedures, the reforms overall lacked coherence and a strategic vision. Key recommendations aimed at addressing systemic gaps, including the appointment of election administration members, prevention of misuse of administrative resources, campaign finance oversight, media regulations, and electoral dispute resolution, were either partially implemented or fully disregarded.

Recent reforms to the CEC's composition and decision-making processes raised particular concerns. Amendments lowered the parliamentary quorum required for electing CEC members, eliminated the opposition-appointed deputy chairperson role,

¹² On 29 May 2024 the parliamentary majority introduced additional reforms, proposing the establishment of Delegates. Under these amendments, a party can nominate a candidate as a delegate for one of the 30 districts, whose geographical mandate aligns with the same majoritarian districts that were used in the 2020 parliamentary elections.

and curtailed the President's involvement in the selection process.¹³ Furthermore, decision-making rules were altered to allow a simple majority to approve decisions after the first vote, reducing the need for cross-party consensus. These changes, adopted without broad stakeholder consultations, favored the ruling party and diminished the perception of impartiality within the election administration.

The legal framework also faced criticism for its rushed and opaque legislative processes, with reforms frequently adopted close to election dates, limiting opportunities for meaningful stakeholder input and public consultations. While some amendments reflected negotiated agreements, such as those following cross-party consultations in 2022,¹⁴ recent reforms lacked such consensus. Enforcing key legislative changes often and close to elections leads to confusion among electoral stakeholders and undermines the stability and predictability of the electoral legal framework.¹⁵ The expedited and unilateral nature of these changes raises questions about their legitimacy and their negative effect on fostering trust in the electoral process.

Despite some progress such as improving clarity of procedural rules and expanded opportunities for citizen observers¹⁶, these advancements are insufficient to offset the fragmented and inconsistent nature of the reforms. The absence of a systematic, participatory, and comprehensive reform agenda significantly constrained the ability of the legal framework to meet international standards of transparency, fairness, and inclusiveness.

To enhance public trust and strengthen the integrity of Georgia's electoral processes, ENEMO recommends conducting a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform incorporating broad public consultations. Future electoral reform should address key systemic gaps, limiting widespread amendments to the Election Code.

Reform should address problems such as low political participation of women, insufficient impartiality of election management bodies, and preventive measures and provisions to avoid possible executive-legislative gridlocks. Reforms should fully align with international standards and recommendations from impartial

13 The amendments shifted the responsibility for the nomination of non-partisan members, including the chairperson, from the president to the speaker of parliament, and abolished the position of the opposition-nominated deputy chairperson.

14 Some of the amendments to the Election Code have often emerged from high-stakes political negotiations and agreements, such as the Charles Michel Agreement of 19 April 2021, which sought to address political polarization and set the stage for reforms to strengthen Georgia's electoral framework.

15 The 2002 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission emphasizes in Section II.2.b that key elements of electoral law, including the electoral system, composition of election commissions, and constituency boundaries, should not be amended less than one year before elections. The accompanying explanatory report further warns against actions that may create even the appearance of manipulation. However, the 2024 Revised Interpretative Declaration on the Stability of Electoral Law allows for amendments within a year of elections, provided they adhere to international electoral standards, are reached through consensus between the government and opposition, and are based on broad public consultation.

16 See more in the *Observers* section.

international election experts (such as the Venice Commission, ENEMO, ODIHR, and others) and reputable domestic electoral stakeholders.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia marked the first implementation of a list proportional electoral system. This system is based on a nationwide closed-party list constituency for 150 parliamentary seats. The framework prohibits pre-election coalitions and individual candidacies, requiring political parties to secure at least 5% of valid votes to qualify for mandate allocation.

While the reformed system aimed to enhance proportionality and inclusivity, the level of competitiveness was, in fact, hindered for smaller parties by the 5% electoral threshold and the prohibition of pre-election coalitions. Parties adapted to these constraints by forming unified electoral lists, effectively functioning as alliances under the guise of single electoral subjects.¹⁷ While this approach allowed them to meet legal requirements, it sometimes came at the cost of dispersed political identity, lower autonomy¹⁸, and campaign coherence.¹⁹

17 The leaders of several political parties, including the "Christian-Democratic Movement," "Conservative Party of Georgia," "People's Power," "Republican Party of Georgia," "Aleko Elisashvili – Citizens," "Yes Europe – Strategy Aghmashenebeli," "Elene Khoshtaria – Droa," "Ana Dolidze – For the People," and "Girchi – More Freedom," formally resigned from their positions as chairmen and party membership.

18 Under these new provisions, parties are now restricted from including candidates on their electoral lists who are affiliated with other political parties. Specifically, any candidate who is a member of another party, registered under the Georgian Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens, will have their candidacy rejected. In cases where such a candidate has already been registered, the CEC chairperson is authorized to revoke their registration.

19 Recent legislative amendments have imposed stricter rules on party registration and candidate lists, restricting parties from including candidates affiliated with other political parties in their lists and limiting flexibility in party branding.

III. ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES

The election process in Georgia is managed by a three-level election administration composed of the CEC, 73 DECs²⁰, and 3,111 PECs²¹.

Following the 2020 political crisis and the 19 April 2021 political agreement (so-called “Charles Michel Agreement”), several amendments to the Election Code were adopted in June 2021. The amendments foresaw changes in the composition and appointment mechanisms of all commissions, with the aim of increasing the level of professionalism and public confidence in the election administration. Following this reform, all commissions were composed of up to 17 members: eight non-partisan members, selected based on their professional experience, and up to nine members nominated by the political parties with parliamentary representation.²²

CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION (CEC)

The CEC is designed to be a permanent and independent body, whose members are appointed for a five-year term. Controversial amendments to the Election Code, adopted in February 2024 without broad consensus and despite a negative opinion from the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission²³, have altered the composition and appointment mechanism of CEC members, undermining the consensus-based nomination process.²⁴ The nomination power for its professional members, which was previously vested in the President of Georgia, was transferred to the Speaker of the Parliament, while the position of Deputy Chairperson, previously nominated by the opposition, was abolished. Furthermore, the amendments established the possibility for the professional members to be elected by a simple majority, if a three-fifths majority could not be reached in the first vote. These changes have increased the ruling party’s influence over the appointment process of CEC members, and decreased the overall trust in the institution’s independence and impartiality. The CEC Chairperson and three non-partisan members were elected in April 2024, for a five-year term, by a simple majority.²⁵

²⁰ 76 DECs are established across Georgia, including three DECs covering the occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region. Elections were not organized in the occupied territories.

²¹ Out of which 3,044 PECs were located in Georgia, including 13 special polling stations (12 located in penitentiary institutions and one in a mental health center, and 67 polling stations have been established abroad, across 53 cities in 42 countries.

²² Each political party with parliamentary representation could appoint one member per commission.

²³ [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2024\)010-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2024)010-e)

²⁴ The amendments were adopted by 81 votes in Parliament. The President of Georgia vetoed the amendments, but her veto was overridden by the Parliament (78 votes).

²⁵ The current Chairperson, Giorgi Kalandarishvili was elected with 85 votes in favor, and 16 against.

To strengthen the CEC's independence and impartiality, ENEMO recommends reintroducing the election of the CEC Chairperson and non-partisan members by a qualified majority and reinstating the position of an opposition-nominated Deputy Chairperson.

Recent amendments to the Election Code have also modified the decision-making process within the CEC, weakening the culture of collegiality within the institution. The amendments allow for the CEC decisions to be adopted by a simple majority, if a two-thirds majority cannot be attained after the first round of voting. Furthermore, the Election Code vests considerable powers in the hands of the CEC head officials, allowing important decisions to be taken without being discussed in open plenary sessions²⁶. Opposition-nominated CEC members cited unequal treatment and difficulties in accessing information²⁷.

To promote collegiality and consensus-based decision-making within election management bodies, ENEMO recommends introducing provisions requiring the CEC to make decisions in open plenary sessions by a qualified majority, and revoking the anti-deadlock mechanism.

Overall, the election process was well-administered. The CEC operated efficiently and met all legal deadlines. It held regular sessions, which were announced in a timely manner on the institution's website, broadcast live, and open to accredited observers, party representatives, and the media. Summaries of the sessions and the decisions adopted were published promptly on the institution's website. However, the CEC's actions were not consistently transparent, occasionally failing to publish key information in a timely manner, despite repeated requests from stakeholders²⁸.

The 2022 amendments to the election code introduced a mandatory certification for all non-professional commission members, aiming at increasing their level of professionalism. From September 2023 to July 2024, the CEC Training Center organized a series of exams for DEC and PEC members across the country²⁹, including eight municipalities densely populated with ethnic minorities. Domestic observers were able

26 This includes, inter alia, the registration (and potential cancellation) of parties and candidate lists, the rejection of complaints regarding DEC decisions, and the review of alleged violations of the Election Code.

27 CEC members nominated by opposition political parties mentioned, notably, not being involved in, or informed about, important procurement decisions (e.g. ballot paper and special markers), or not being provided contact information for the IT specialists responsible for the new election technologies, despite several requests.

28 Most notably, the decision to organize the distribution of functions between PEC members on 18 October was not publicly announced, limiting the ability of observers to monitor the process. The number of voters registered abroad was not communicated in a timely manner, despite repeated requests from CEC members and political parties.

29 In 2024, the CEC Training Center organized two certification exams for the positions of election administration officials, with 12 examination centers opened in 11 municipalities, leading to the certification of 818 individuals. A total of 37 examination centers were opened in 34 municipalities throughout the country for the certification of PEC members, with nine exams being conducted between September 2023 and July 2024, allowing for the certification of 33,995 individuals.

to observe the certification exams, and generally assessed them as well-organized. However, the certification requirement does not apply to commission members appointed by political parties.

To enhance the professionalism of election management bodies, certified training sessions should be provided for all commission members, including party appointees, with mandatory participation.

As a result of the 2024 parliamentary elections, five political parties will be represented in the Parliament, which will affect the composition of the election management bodies. All election management bodies will be composed of up to 13 members, increasing the imbalance between non-partisan members (8) and political-party appointees (5).

To achieve greater balance within election management bodies, legal provisions should be revised to prevent the dominance of any political group—even in cases of an overwhelming electoral majority. Well-balanced EMBs at all levels are essential for administering elections collegially and transparently, preventing one-sided decision-making, and ensuring a system of checks and balances.

DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS (DECS)

DECs are permanent bodies, composed of five non-partisan members. During the pre-election period, they are supplemented by three additional non-partisan members selected by the CEC, and up to nine additional members nominated by political parties with parliamentary representation.

The selection process of non-partisan DEC members was conducted transparently, with live broadcasts of candidate interviews. However, ENEMO notes that the limited number of applications hindered the competitiveness of the selection process. Overall, the CEC received a total of 261 applications, for 219 vacant positions. For 41 DECs (56%), only three applications were received for the three vacant positions. Most DEC members were appointed by a simple majority, showing a lack of consensus within the CEC. Concerns regarding their impartiality were raised by the vast majority of ENEMO interlocutors, alleging that most non-professional members were public sector employees, with close ties to the ruling party³⁰.

DECs concluded their tasks efficiently, meeting all legal deadlines. These included the selection of PEC members, their training and the supervision of their work, which was conducted in a professional manner. PEC members generally reported good communication and working relationships with DECs. The distribution of all election materials was assessed by ENEMO observers as highly organized, and allowing for smooth election preparations. However, several DEC members appointed by opposition

30 Cases of non-partisan DEC members who had previously been Georgian Dream supporters, or who were openly supporting the ruling party on social media, were reported to observers in the districts of Kutaisi, Tsageri, and Sachkhere, raising serious doubts regarding their impartiality.

parties reported a hostile working environment, mentioning unnecessary obstacles to access information³¹, or being excluded from the use of DEC resources³².

DEC sessions were usually not announced to observers in advance, which limited transparency. ENEMO observers were not always granted easy access to DEC premises and, in some cases, faced a lack of cooperation³³. However, minutes of DEC sessions and decisions were published on the CEC website in a timely manner, contributing to transparency.

Supplementary measures should be implemented in order to enhance the DEC's overall transparency further.

PRECINCT ELECTION COMMISSIONS (PECS)

PECs are temporary bodies composed of up to 17 members established 30 days before election day. For these elections, 3,044 PECs were established in Georgia, and 67 PECs were established abroad.

The DEC completed the selection of non-partisan PEC members on 10 September, in line with the legal deadlines. However, the number of applications submitted to the DEC was very low, requiring several calls to be re-issued, which negatively impacted the competitiveness of the process³⁴. The CEC attributed the low number of applications to the extensive restrictions placed on non-partisan members and the new mandatory certification, which were introduced by the 2022 amendments to the Election Code, in order to improve the level of professionalism of PEC members³⁵. However, ENEMO interlocutors believed that the lack of trust in the impartiality of the commissions, combined with the climate of intimidation prevailing in the country, most likely contributed to the low number of applications.

31 Several DEC members nominated by opposition parties reported having to send official letters in order to access information, which they deemed cumbersome and contributing to a negative working environment. Such cases were reported in Krtsanisi, Tskaltubo and Dmanisi districts.

32 Opposition party representatives reported not being granted access to DEC resources such as wi-fi, receiving differential treatment regarding fuel, travel allowances or phone credit, which further strained the working environment.

33 ENEMO observers reported a lack of cooperation from the DEC in Zugdidi; similar difficulties were mentioned by other observer groups in Samtredia, Khoni and Lanchkhuti.

34 A total of 24,425 applications were received, for 24,240 vacant positions. This includes 9,111 applications for 9,090 head positions, and 15,314 applications for 15,150 commission member positions (0,76 more candidates than the vacant positions). After the first call, 193 positions remained vacant. By comparison, in 2018, 29,797 applications were submitted for 21,822 vacant positions, which represented a 36,55% surplus of candidates

35 The Election Code specifies that non-partisan PEC members cannot be: members of the state administration, the military, the government or the parliament; a candidate or candidate's representative; an observer; a media representative; if served as a party representative during the two previous elections process, or have donated to a political party during the two years preceding the elections. Additionally, all professional PEC members must pass certifying exams.

Although most political parties entitled to nominate PEC members did so within the established deadline, some reported difficulties in finding enough members for all commissions, sometimes having to recruit members from the capital to serve in the regions³⁶. A recently adopted CEC decree exacerbated existing disparities by creating a discrepancy in the salaries between professional PEC members, and those appointed by political parties. This undermined equality among commission members and further complicated political parties' efforts to recruit sufficient candidates³⁷. ENEMO observers reported that many political party nominees refrained from participating in PEC activities. The atmosphere of intimidation and threats additionally contributed to a significant number of opposition-nominated members resigning in the weeks leading up to election day.

A five-stage training program was organized by the CEC Training Center, covering essential procedures and new election technologies. ENEMO observers assessed the training sessions as comprehensive, interactive and conducted in a professional manner. However, the level of attendance among professional and party-appointed members varied greatly. While over 80% of head officials and non-partisan members participated, the average attendance rate of the political party appointed members was 46%³⁸. In addition to that, many PEC members were replaced after the training was completed, resulting in an even lower competency rate of party-affiliated PEC members.

The process of distribution of key functions between PEC members³⁹, which was previously organized on election day, took place eight days before election day (18 October), as a result of a controversial CEC decree, which contradicted the Election Code⁴⁰. The chosen date for the lotteries was not announced publicly, considerably hindering the transparency of the process, and further diminishing the overall trust in the election administration. ENEMO observers reported that the lotteries were not always carried out according to the regulations⁴¹.

36 Georgian Dream was the only political party which appointed members to all PECs (3,031), closely followed by UNM (3,024) and Strong Georgia (3,015). Girchy only appointed members in 1,295 PECs.

37 A decree adopted by the CEC established that the monthly remuneration for professional members would be 390 GEL, compared to 260 GEL for party-appointed members. UNM filed an appeal against this decree, which was rejected by Tbilisi City Court.

38 According to the statistics shared by the Training Center, the first phase of the training (designed for Head Officials) had an attendance rate of 85% to 90%. During the second phase (designed for non-partisan members and political party representatives), the attendance rate of non-partisan members was 82%, while the average of political party representatives' attendance rates was 46%. The political parties with the lowest attendance rates were Girchi (15%), Citizens (28%) and Strong Georgia (36%), contrasting with the high attendance rate of Georgian Dream's representatives (77%), and European Socialists (71%).

39 Key functions are: registrars, voter flow clerks and mobile ballot box handlers. According to the Election Code, the function of registrar can only be exercised by non-partisan members.

40 Article 61 of the Election Code stipulates that the distribution of functions between PEC members should take place on election day. In August 2024, the CEC adopted a resolution (32/2024) stipulating that this process would be organized no later than seven days before election day. The appeal presented by the political union "Lelo for Georgia" in front of the Tbilisi City Court, was rejected.

41 The CEC resolution 32/2024 stipulates that all PEC members should participate in the lottery, regardless of their physical presence. In 50% of cases observed by ENEMO, only the PEC members present were included in the lottery process.

To increase transparency and public trust in the electoral process, consideration should be given to organizing the distribution of functions between PEC members on Election Day. The function of registrar should be opened to all PEC members instead of limiting it to non-partisan members.

IV. ELECTION TECHNOLOGIES

The 2022 amendments to the Election Code introduced the use of election technologies, with the aim of increasing public trust in the election process and reducing the possibility of fraud and human errors. The introduced election technologies are:

1. Voter identification devices (VID), to verify voters' identities and register them for voting using personal identification documents (ID card or passport).
2. Optical ballot scanners (PCOS) to count and categorize valid and invalid ballots, allowing preliminary results to be available shortly after the voting process concludes; and
3. Electronic system for transmitting the voting results and summary protocols directly to the CEC, through tablets.

The company Smartmatic was contracted to provide 7,526 voter identification devices and 4,865 PCOS, which were used in 2,263 polling stations nationwide (74,6%), covering approximately 89% of voters⁴². Tablets were used in all polling stations to transmit the results to the CEC at the end of the counting process.

Most ENEMO interlocutors welcomed the introduction of new technologies and expressed trust in the devices, which had already been piloted during eight local and by-elections since 2018⁴³. Although the law does not mandate independent certification of election technologies, two compliance audits were completed by the internationally certified company Pro V&V. The first audit process was completed in 2023, which did not find any major issues or deficiencies⁴⁴. Another three-stage compliance audit was conducted in October 2024⁴⁵, again with no issues detected by the company⁴⁶. However, the audit reports were only made available on the CEC website in November 2024, and stakeholders mentioned that the process lacked transparency.

⁴² Election technologies were not used in polling stations with less than 300 voters and/or located more than 20 km from the DEC premises (a total of 768 polling stations).

⁴³ Electronic technologies were piloted during eight previous elections: the midterm elections of the Zugdidi Municipality Sakrebulo (13 May 2018), and the midterm elections of the Sakrebulo in Tkibuli and Tskaltubo (19 May 2019), local self-government elections in 2021, the midterm elections of the Parliament of Georgia and the municipal council on April 2 2022, the midterm election of the Senaki municipality council on 1 October 2022, the by-elections held on 29 April 2023, and the by-elections on 1 October 2023.

⁴⁴ Cf. [PRO V&V Audit Report, 2023](#).

⁴⁵ In the first phase (software updates), Pro V&V performed source code verification. In the second phase (configuration of elections), the company conducted a configuration audit and reviewed all necessary files to certify the process. In the third phase (election observation), the company observed the conduct of the elections, including the precinct commissioners, precinct technicians (individuals responsible for technical support of the machines) as well as the voters themselves.

⁴⁶ <https://cesko.ge/en/saarchevno-eleqtronuli-sashualebebis-saertashoriso-auditis-angarishi2024>

To enhance transparency and public trust in election technologies, ENEMO recommends legally mandating periodic audits of all implemented technologies and planned technological solutions. These audits should be carried out by independent and impartial experts, ensuring the process remains free from external influence or pressure.

The CEC conducted large-scale information voter campaigns, starting in June 2023, and claimed that approximately 600,000 voters were trained during that period. Mock elections were held on 11 September in 598 electoral precincts, further allowing voters to familiarize themselves with the new technologies⁴⁷. However, ENEMO observers reported some persistent misconceptions about the new devices, notably that the optical ballot scanners could compromise the secrecy of the vote, by recording the voters' choice which could then be accessible in the devices' database.

From a technical point of view, the implementation of the new technologies countrywide was successful. The devices functioned properly and the majority of PEC members appeared to be sufficiently trained. However, in a context of significant distrust towards the election administration, both devices were perceived as an additional instrument to manipulate the election results, decreasing trust in the overall process.

Many interlocutors expressed mistrust towards the VIDs, underlining that the devices could be used to facilitate different types of rigging schemes, ranging from multiple voting to impersonation of voters. Concerns were raised regarding the lack of transparency of the voter lists uploaded to these devices, with opposition representatives expressing frustration over their inability to verify these lists independently. The early allocation of PEC positions, and notably the positions of registrars, contributed to generating mistrust. On election day, the layout of a significant number of polling stations did not allow for observers and political party representatives to monitor the work of the registrars, casting further doubts on the integrity of the process.

The purpose of the PCOs was to accelerate the transmission of results from PECs to the CEC, concurrently contributing to transparency, even though the votes would still be counted manually, and only the manual count would be legally binding⁴⁸. On election day, the secrecy of the vote was significantly compromised in polling stations using PCOS. The markers provided to the voters to mark their ballot bled-through the ballot paper, making the voters' choice potentially visible to individuals standing in the proximity of the ballot boxes, especially considering that the frame envelope provided did not fully cover the ballot, and that a significant number of voters required assistance to properly place their ballot into the PCOS⁴⁹.

47 According to the CEC, 122,864 voters took part in the exercise.

48 Cf. CEC Resolution n°7/2023

49 In polling stations observed by ENEMO observers, over a third of voters (34,4%) needed assistance from PEC members to place their ballot into the PCOS.

Institutions responsible for the implementation and oversight of election technologies should make serious efforts to enhance public trust in the system by increasing transparency.

- 1. Firstly, the public should be provided with a clear explanation of how all election-related technologies operate, enabling a full understanding of their electoral purpose.*
- 2. Information on cybersecurity and safeguarding mechanisms implemented to protect sensitive and personal data collected and analyzed by election technologies should be publicly available, regardless of whether such concerns have been raised by the public.*
- 3. Finally, any potential or identified technical shortcomings that occurred before or on election day must be openly addressed and discussed by the competent authorities, fully disclosing possible or expected impact, etc.*

Until voters gain confidence in any newly introduced election technologies, the devices' performance should also be cross-checked and confirmed.

V. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

The right to vote is granted to all citizens over 18 years old, with the exception of those serving a sentence for a particularly grave crime, and those who have been declared legally incapacitated by a court decision and placed in institutional care. ENEMO notes that the deprivation of voting rights based on intellectual disability is contrary to international standards⁵⁰.

To ensure universal suffrage, the denial of voting rights of persons recognized by a court to lack legal capacity on the grounds of mental disability should be reconsidered.

Voter registration is passive, centralized, and continuous. The CEC is in charge of compiling the unified list of voters (ULV), based on information provided by the Public Service Development Agency (PSDA), and several other state agencies. The voters' list is updated four times per year and ahead of elections. The final number of voters on the voters' list was 3,508,294. The majority of ENEMO interlocutors did not raise significant concerns regarding the accuracy and inclusiveness of the ULV, though some mentioned that deceased persons were not always removed in a timely manner. Voters staying or residing abroad are indicated as such on the ULV, while still being registered at their last place of residence in the country, which was highlighted as a cause of concern by interlocutors, potentially facilitating the impersonation of voters de facto abroad.

Publicly available excerpts from the Unified List of Voters should ensure higher personal data protection. For example, information about voters' current whereabouts—particularly those abroad during elections—could be misused to compromise their safety or interfere with the voting process through impersonation.

Voters with valid identification documents (electronic or non-electronic ID cards or passport) are automatically included based on their current or previously registered address. In December 2023, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a law canceling the validity of the so-called "laminated" identity cards issued before July 2011, which were prone to falsification, as of July 2024⁵¹. Following this decision, the Ministry of Justice enabled free replacement of the outdated identification documents⁵². However,

50 The 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 29, states that steps should be undertaken to "ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others, directly or through freely chosen representatives, including the right and opportunity for persons with disabilities to vote and be elected". Furthermore, the 2013 CRPD Committee Communication No. 4/2011, par. 9.4, emphasizes that "an exclusion of the right to vote on the basis of a perceived or actual psychosocial or intellectual disability, including a restriction pursuant to an individualized assessment, constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability, within the meaning of article 2 of the Convention".

51 As of 15 December 2023, 266,915 citizens of Georgia possessed the so-called "laminated" ID cards.

52 According to the data provided by the Public Services Development Agency, 100,464 people applied to the agency to change their active non-electronic identity card from 15 December 2023 to 10 June 2024.

according to the PSDA, a total of 199,109 voters did not possess valid ID documents as of 30 September 2024 and were thereby disenfranchised, which is cause for serious concern.

In order to ensure universal suffrage, relevant authorities should urgently initiate a widely available, simple and efficient protocol for requesting and replacing citizens' expired identification documents.

Voters are required to vote at the polling location assigned to their permanent address in the civil registry, which can be burdensome for voters residing in areas different from their permanent place of residence (e.g. students). There is currently no mechanism in place to allow voters to temporarily change their place of residence.

For national elections, efforts should be made to provide voters with the possibility to temporarily change the location of their polling station.

Voters had several ways to verify their correct inclusion in the voters list and request corrections, including on the CEC's website, through a dedicated mobile application and quick payment machines⁵³. The preliminary voter lists were published at the PEC level on 26 September for public scrutiny, and voters could request corrections until 8 October. The unified voters' lists were also made available to registered political parties and monitoring organizations⁵⁴.

Voters residing abroad had the possibility to register until 7 October 2024 in diplomatic representations or consulates. A total of 95,910 voters registered for out-of-country voting, which represents a 45% increase compared to the previous parliamentary elections⁵⁵. The CEC efficiently reacted to the issue faced by citizens from the occupied territories residing abroad, enabling them to be included in the special voters' lists⁵⁶. The CEC decided on the establishment of 67 PECs in 42 countries, including 5 countries where elections would be held for the first time, complying with its legal obligations⁵⁷. This decision was however strongly criticized by opposition parties and civil society organizations, who advocated for the establishment of polling stations in additional cities, instead of limiting their opening to Embassies and consulates' premises.

53 According to the CEC, voters checked their information in the unified voter list 1,311,773 times via the CEC website and mobile app, and 29,277 times through quick payment machines.

54 Throughout the election year, four political parties and two non-governmental organizations requested the unified voters' list from the election administration.

55 A total of 66,217 voters had registered for the 2020 parliamentary elections. 50 PECs were opened in 38 countries.

56 Voters living abroad, whose registration address is in the occupied territories or unknown according to the PSDA database, were not included on the voters' list. The CEC adopted a decree on 7 October, allowing to add such voters in the Embassies and consulate's special voters' list.

57 Article 27.7 of the Election Code: "Electoral precincts abroad shall be set up by the CEC [...] for not less than 50 and not more than 3,000 voters."

VI. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

The right to stand as a candidate is granted to Georgian citizens over 25 who have lived in Georgia for at least 10 years, unless they have been deprived of their voting rights or sentenced to imprisonment. The lengthy residency requirement is at odds with international standards and good practice⁵⁸. The current electoral system does not permit candidates to stand independently, which also contradicts international obligations and standards for democratic elections⁵⁹.

Undue restriction on the right to stand should be removed from the legal framework. The residency requirement for candidates should be significantly reduced or lifted.

Different conditions apply for registering political parties with and without parliamentary representation. Political parties without parliamentary representation had to apply to the CEC before 15 July, and present 25,000 signatures supporting their application⁶⁰. A total of 30 political parties submitted their applications, of which the CEC registered 17. The CEC dismissed two applications⁶¹, and rejected 11 lists which did not meet the legal requirements⁶². While the law foresees a three-day period for corrections and adjustments, none of the political parties submitted corrected documents within the established deadline.

Political parties with parliamentary representation could submit their applications to the CEC until 30 August and were not required to present signatures. Ten political parties applied and were registered by the CEC.

Out of the 27 registered electoral subjects, 19 submitted party lists before the legal deadline (26 September), and 18 lists were registered by the CEC⁶³. Candidates were not allowed to run on another party's list, without formally changing or suspending their party membership beforehand. ENEMO notes that while the party and candidate

58 ICCPR, GC 25: "Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation." ; Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, I.1.1 c. iii : "a length of residence requirement may be imposed on nationals solely for local or regional elections"

59 Paragraph 7.5 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document ; ICCPR, GC 25: "The right of persons to stand for election should not be limited unreasonably by requiring candidates to be members of parties or of specific parties."

60 Which represents less than 1% of voters, in line with international standards (Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters).

61 In one case, due to the cancellation of the political party's registration; in the second, due to the termination of powers of the party's chairperson.

62 Four political parties had not submitted the required 25,000 signatures, and five political parties had submitted supporters' lists containing errors. In two cases, the powers of the political parties' Chairperson were terminated at the time of submitting the applications.

63 The list submitted by the Social-democratic party of Georgia contained deficiencies, which were not corrected within the legal deadline.

registration process was transparent and inclusive, this restriction hinders freedom of association.

Candidates should be able to run on the party list of their choice without disclosing their party affiliation, following the right to freedom of association. The provision preventing candidates from running on any party list should be repealed.

VII. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE

ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

According to the Election Code, the campaign officially starts 60 days before the polling day. The 26 October election campaign officially started on 27 August 2024 and ended on 26 October 2024. The Election Code does not prescribe electoral silence, other than restrictions placed on publications of exit polls and opinion polls in the run-up and during the Election Day⁶⁴. The legislative framework generally provides for equal campaigning opportunities for parties with a parliamentary status and prohibits use of hate speech or incitement of violence and inter-ethnic hatred during the campaign.

The main tools of campaigning for all political parties were door-to-door activities, rallies and billboards, while smaller parties relied almost exclusively on social media. Billboards were used disproportionately by the ruling party, with instances of the main billboard company disputing content of opposition political parties' ads⁶⁵. Campaign activities predominantly took place in the regions, while the campaign intensified during the week ahead of elections in Tbilisi. Large scale rallies were organized by the ruling party and NGOs⁶⁶. There were substantive reports⁶⁷ of organized attendance by civil servants at the Georgian Dream's rally on 23 October, as well as large-scale presence and visibility of opposition political parties at the rally organized by civil society on 20 October.

The election campaign was highly polarized. Geopolitical topics were central to both opposition and ruling party's messaging, with the opposition framing the election as a choice between Russia and the European Union, and the ruling party framing it as a choice between war or peace. The Russian invasion of Ukraine⁶⁸, scrutiny of civil society

64 According to Article 50 of the Election Code, no opinion polls' results can be published in the 48 hours before the polling stations open until the polling stations are closed, and no exit poll results can be published during the Election Day, until the polling stations are closed.

65 The United National Movement reported to ENEMO that the billboard company Alma initially refused to put UNM billboards saying "Get rid of Bidzina Ivanishvili" up. UNM subsequently informed ENEMO that the issue was overcome.

66 The rally held on 20 October 2024 was organized by NGOs My vote for EU, Sapari, Georgia's European Orbit, Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, Civil Society Foundation, Georgia's Future Academy, EuroClub Kvareli, Transparency International Georgia, Civic Movement for Freedom, Democracy Defenders and the Georgian Court Watch.

67 ENEMO observed organized transportation of civil servants from the municipal building in Gori to the GD campaign rally during working hours.

68 Georgian Dream's billboard ads contrasted images of destruction of infrastructure, religious sights and schools from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with images of Georgian infrastructure, religious sights and schools.

organizations⁶⁹ and LGBT+ rights⁷⁰ were instrumentalized to support the anti-Western narratives of the ruling party, alongside the threat of banning the leading opposition political party after the election⁷¹. ENEMO deems this rhetoric fueled the existing societal tensions and increased stakes for opposition political parties, as well as civil society leaders during the campaign.

While the campaign was largely peaceful, there were multiple isolated incidents of harassment of political parties' campaign activists, as well as attacks on political parties' premises, which set a very negative tone for the campaign⁷². Widespread reports of intimidation of voters persisted throughout the election campaign and culminated on Election Day when cameras were installed in a large number of polling stations, alongside the presence of unknown groups outside polling stations, as observed by ENEMO. Allegations of confiscation of citizens' IDs, a practice which directly contravenes international standards⁷³ and violates citizens' voting rights, further undermined confidence in the electoral process and citizens' ability to make their choice without fear.

The election was marred by a worrying amount of reports of misuse of administrative resources for campaigning purposes by the ruling political party. ENEMO observed cases of pressuring civil servants to attend ruling party campaign rallies, along with reports of extensive use of the education sector to organize and pressure voters⁷⁴. Announcements of new infrastructure projects and the involvement of local administration in ruling party campaigns were prevalent, most notably the transport sector⁷⁵. Furthermore, the use of social services for exerting pressure on voters⁷⁶ was reported to the mission, which raises significant concerns about the exploitation of vulnerable groups for electoral purposes.

ENEMO recommends strengthening the electoral legislation to more effectively address the misuse and abuse of administrative resources for campaign purposes, including campaigning by high-level officials.

69 Georgian Dream's video ad portrayed photos of civil society leaders and activists as examples of 'moral degradation' of Georgian society

70 The Law on Protection of Family Values and Minors was adopted on 17 September, in spite of the negative opinion provided by the Venice Commission. Among other things, the Law prohibits the right to adoption or foster care other than for married couples and heterosexual persons, it prohibits medical interventions aimed at change of sex and allows for marriage only between biological males and females. See [Venice Commission Opinion CDL-AD\(2024\)021](#) on the Draft Law, published on 25 June 2024.

71 In his interview with TV Imedi, Bidzina Ivanishvili reiterated he intends to ban the "collective UNM" if GD secures a constitutional majority. See more at: [Civil.ge](#)

72 Several political parties reported to ENEMO instances of harassment of their activists by unknown groups presumably affiliated with the Georgian Dream, as well as targeting of their premises and posters, which was also reported by Georgian Dream

73 See Venice Commission [Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters](#)

74 The Public Defender has [published an overview of cases investigated](#) by 7 October 2024, that included numerous reports of abuses in the education sector. This was also raised by multiple ENEMO interlocutors across all areas of deployment of ENEMO long-term observers.

75 Among other examples, ENEMO observed attendance of GD representatives at the opening of a cable car by the Mayor of Tbilisi and distribution of free transport tickets in Zestafoni.

76 ENEMO observed examples of this practice in Kharagauli.

Three qualified opposition political parties, Citizens, European Georgia and Strategy Aghmashenebeli, had their access to campaigning through free airtime restricted. The three political parties were found to be campaigning for another electoral subject⁷⁷ for videos criticizing the ruling party, after they announced that they would be joining other electoral lists. However, due to the ban on pre-election coalitions, they were not recognized as an entity within the electoral lists either, effectively losing their access to free airtime acquired on the basis of their parliamentary status. The legal status of these parties had not changed and they were therefore still in a position to submit an electoral list at the time their free airtime was restricted. ENEMO deems that the restriction was unjustified and had the effect of suppressing criticism of the government. Furthermore, it reduced the space for opposition political parties to campaign.

ENEMO emphasizes that regulatory bodies should refrain from excessively narrow interpretations of legal provisions related to pre-electoral alliances. Specifically, they should avoid treating any electoral list as a pre-electoral coalition. Such restrictive interpretations harm the electoral environment and limit the already constrained democratic space.

Another political party, For Georgia, had their access to free airtime denied despite having met the legal conditions to obtain qualified status⁷⁸. ENEMO deems that, in this case as well, the practice of disregarding the rights of electoral contestants was both disproportionately applied to opposition political parties and had the impact of reducing space for criticism of the ruling party.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

The Election Code of Georgia allows for private and public financing of election campaigns. Regular funds of political parties can be used for campaign purposes and are available to qualified electoral subjects⁷⁹. Non-qualified political and emerging parties do not have access to public financing. All political parties that acquired parliamentary status in the 2020 elections, apart from Lelo and the Labour Party⁸⁰, enjoyed access to state financing. New political parties reported difficulty raising campaign funds and

⁷⁷ Article 186(6) of the Election Code prohibits subjects from placing an advertisement on the broadcaster that serves the agitation goals of another electoral subject within the advertising time.

⁷⁸ According to the Article 186(9) of the Election Code, the broadcaster shall be authorized to recognize a political party as a qualified electoral subject, if according to public opinion polls, the party enjoys the support of at least 4% of voters in at least five polls in the election year or a poll conducted within one month before the Election Day. See more in the *Media* section.

⁷⁹ Political parties are considered qualified if they obtained over 1% of votes in the latest election. The amount of funding is determined proportionately to the number of votes a party received: for the first 50,000 valid votes, the party receives 15 GEL per vote, and for every additional valid vote, it receives 5 GEL per vote.

⁸⁰ Lelo and the Labor Party lost state funding in 2022 as a result of a 2020 legislative change which introduced the rule that political parties should be ineligible to state financing if their representatives had not taken part in at least half of the plenaries of the previous session of the Parliament (Article 30 of the Law on Political Associations). Lelo lost access to state financing as a result of one of its MPs being convicted in a criminal case and another MP terminating their MP status through a personal appeal, while the Labor Party's MP boycotted the work of the Parliament.

relied on donations from individuals, capped at 60,000 GEL.

Amendments to campaign finance regulations in 2024 prohibited donations from legal entities, in addition to existing prohibitions of donations from foreign entities and individuals, public institutions and anonymous sources. Extensive limitations are placed on all modes of financing of election campaigns from non-state sources, as well as expenditures. While the limitations help level the playing field when it comes to private financing sources, the use of public funds for campaigning purposes benefits larger political parties and reduces space for smaller political parties to compete in elections.

ENEMO recommends thoroughly revising the system for allocating public funds to political parties to ensure more equitable access to campaign finance. Alternatively, limits on donations from private entities should be reviewed and increased.

The legislation provides for a sufficient array of sanctions for violations of campaign finance regulations. These include mandatory return of the total amount of illegal donations to the state budget, including double the amount in certain cases⁸¹, fines ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 GEL, as well as a freeze on assets in cases of non-compliance with oversight body requests. While the legislation is mostly aligned with international standards, third-party financing remains under-regulated.

Campaign finance legislation needs to be revised to address the currently underregulated third-party financing. The revised legislation should consider and regulate recently developed and introduced digital financial platforms and systems. Furthermore, it should anticipate the inevitable evolution of the financial sector, allowing for swift adjustments to existing oversight tools to accommodate new developments.

Following amendments to the Election Code, the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) was established as the main regulatory body in charge of campaign finance oversight. The ACB has limited investigative powers and can issue protocols in cases of violations of campaign finance regulations, that are then subject to a review by the courts⁸². The ACB oversees campaign finance through the reports provided by political parties and its internal monitoring mechanism.

All political parties submitted their reports on campaign costs to the ACB, who published them in a timely manner⁸³. The ACB carried out extensive in-house monitoring of expenditures of electoral contestants and requested a large volume of data, including a report on financing of political parties from 1 January – August 2024, which was partly outside the campaign period. Girchi – More Freedom did not submit

⁸¹ This sanction is applicable to cases of making, receiving or concealing a donation prohibited by the electoral legislation.

⁸² The only exception to this is the freeze of political parties' assets, which the ACB can impose with immediate effect, pending a court decision.

⁸³ The highest donations were reported by the Coalition for Change at 9.5m GEL, followed by GD 8.7m GEL, Strong Georgia 8.1m GEL, Unity 3m GEL and Gakharia for Georgia 0.35m GEL.

the report and were fined for it. Several political parties reported to ENEMO excessive oversight of their financial data by the ACB, raising concerns of selective pressure on electoral contestants. The ACB carried out verifications of donations received by political parties, including 100% of all donations received by Georgian Dream. However, the implementation of the sanctions policy remained limited throughout the election period, bringing its effectiveness into question.

ENEMO recommends improving and modernizing the analytical tools for scrutiny and oversight over campaigning financing, which would allow more efficient detection of violations and enable effective implementation of the sanctions.

Furthermore, the ACB implemented monitoring of campaigning activities before the elections had been called and declared two individuals as subjects with a declared electoral goal - prior to scheduling of the elections or the start of the electoral campaign. The implementation of campaign finance regulations outside of the campaign period carries a significant risk of instrumentalization of power for political oppression.

ENEMO strongly recommends further clarifying the ACB's mandate to clearly distinguish its role during the election campaign from its responsibilities outside of it. This distinction should help prevent any potential misuse of campaign finance regulations to target individuals and entities outside the electoral period.

ENEMO further recommends that the scope of the ACB's monitoring function regarding the financing of election campaigns be clearly defined and limited to the period from the announcement of elections until the end of the campaign period.

The ACB also applied the legal provision which allows non-electoral contestants to be recognized as 'subjects with a declared electoral goal'⁸⁴ to non-governmental organizations as well. Transparency International, its Executive Director, "Vote for Europe", its Executive Director and all Board members were declared "subjects with a declared political goal"⁸⁵ on the basis of statements and events aimed at increasing voter turnout. Even though the law requires subjects to declare an intention⁸⁶ to take part in the elections, the ACB suggested that these movements and organizations were campaigning for opposition political parties. Arbitrary interpretation of what constitutes campaigning for another political subject, led to self-censorship among other non-governmental organizations, effectively infringing upon freedom of expression during the 26 October parliamentary election.

84 Pursuant to Article 261(1) of the Political Associations Law, "the restrictions determined under this Chapter with respect to a party shall also apply to persons who have declared electoral goals and who use relevant financial and other tangible resources to achieve such goals."

85 See Decision 03/028-24 adopted by the Anti-Corruption Bureau on 24 September 2024, available here: <https://acb.gov.ge/ka/news/antikoruftsiuli-biuros-ufrosis-2024-tslis-24-sektembris-gadatsqvetileba>

86 Article 71 of the Law provides the following definition of the "declared electoral goal": A declared electoral goal is a factual situation where a specific subject has an evident desire to come to power by taking part in elections. Such a declaration shall be made publicly and be directed towards the formation of public opinion.

ENEMO recommends removing or suspending the provision regarding subjects with a declared electoral goal from the legislation, as its potential negative impact on human rights during elections far outweighs its benefits for financial oversight.

Alternatively, should the provision remain in place, ENEMO recommends excluding non-governmental organizations from applying Article 261, given that the nature of non-governmental organizations fundamentally contradicts the key condition for declaring individuals or entities subjects with a declared electoral goal, i.e. the intention to take power.

The ACB later revoked the Decision⁸⁷ on declaring TI Georgia and Vote for Europe along with associated individuals, subjects with a declared electoral goal following a statement from the Prime Minister⁸⁸, reinforcing the concerns raised by ENEMO interlocutors that the ACB does not operate independently from the Government.

87 The ACB announced revoking of its Decision on 2 October 2024.

88 The Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze urged the ACB to revoke its decision to protect 'the interests of the state', while reinforcing the notion that the Decision was fully legal.

VIII. MEDIA

The Georgian media landscape is diverse, but not independent from political influence. Most private media outlets have owners or shareholders that are also main donors of political parties⁸⁹. The environment is not conducive to the financial sustainability of privately owned media outlets who have all reported having experienced significant reduction in commercial income following rapid legislative reforms⁹⁰ over the last few years. The pre-election media environment was heavily influenced by political developments preceding the election, including reports of harassment of journalists⁹¹ and limited track record on prosecuting cases of violence against journalists⁹². Across the board, media have reported being comfortable with not complying with legislation over fighting for 'greater good'⁹³ and have acted as the main instruments of political fight between electoral contestants.

TRADITIONAL AND ONLINE MEDIA

The right to free airtime for political advertisement of political parties was partially respected. Several media outlets refused to air a Georgian Dream ad⁹⁴, after their legal teams assessed it contained hate speech. Some media proactively sought clarification from the regulator as to whether the ads contained hate speech. Initially, the media outlets were fined twice for refusing to air the ads, while in the second case⁹⁵ the regulator claimed that it does not have a mandate to proactively assess compliance of individual ads with campaign regulations.⁹⁶ Media self-regulation is aimed at reducing hate speech in the media environment. Therefore, the practice of imposing financial

89 Examples include Mtavari TV, Formula TV, PosTV and TV Imedi, whose owners are also known to have donated to political parties. More information about the ownership structures of the privately owned media is available on the [Public Registry website](#).

90 Ban on commercial ads involving gambling, that were introduced over a month instead of gradual implementation to allow time for media to adapt their financial models.

91 See [the statement](#) made by the fact-finding mission of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) consortium.

92 See more in the Human Rights Watch reporting, available here: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/20/georgia-violent-attacks-government-critics>

93 Media outlets self-identified as aligned with Georgian Dream defined the fight as preventing UNM from coming back to power, while media outlets aligned with the opposition defined the fight as countering the government in absence of other effective accountability mechanisms (e.g. ineffective response of the judiciary in cases of violence against journalists, targeting of NGOs through the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, etc.).

94 Mtavari TV, TV Pirveli and Formula TV refused to air the Georgian Dream ad. They informed ENEMO that this decision was based on the legal analysis of the GD ad by their in-house legal teams, who found the ad to be in breach of hate speech regulations.

95 Formula TV, Mtavari TV and TV Pirveli [sought clarification from ComCom](#) as to whether the ads GD was requesting them to air contained hate speech or inciting violence or inter-ethnic hatred.

96 ComCom informed ENEMO that, even though they have a legal obligation to regulate use of hate speech in election campaigns, they had made a decision not to proactively act in these cases until they had received feedback from the EU Commission on the Guidelines they produced for this purpose.

sanctions on the media outlets for refusing to air content they consider hate speech provides a negative incentive for future scrutiny of hate speech.

ENEMO recommends that ComCom assume a proactive role in regulating hate speech in the media. ENEMO further suggests that, within this mandate, ComCom define an effective route for media to obtain legal advice on hate speech violations prior to applying financial sanctions against them.

Political parties that had legal grounds to request a qualified status necessary for free airtime based on opinion polls' polling results, were denied the allotted time. Namely, ComCom issued an administrative protocol against Formula TV for allocating free time to the political party Gakharia – For Georgia after opinion polls indicated a 4% support⁹⁷ during the election year and in the month ahead of the election campaign. ComCom did not challenge the methodology of the opinion poll at the time of its publishing. However, once the poll was launched, ComCom failed to fulfill its legal obligation to review the poll's methodology and assess its compliance with relevant legal provisions. This retroactive compliance check ultimately led to ComCom's unjust denial of free airtime to Gakharia – For Georgia⁹⁸.

ENEMO recommends that ComCom establish clear guidance on conditions for admissibility of opinion polls as the grounds for acquiring free airtime well in advance of future elections and ensure media outlets implement it uniformly and non-discriminatorily.

Access to paid advertising was only partially respected. Imedi and Rustavi 2 TV denied access to paid advertisements to all political parties, claiming that they attempted to balance the variety of political advertisements on their TV channel and across the board.

All required media outlets but the National Broadcaster failed to organize pre-election debates. The regulator, ComCom, does not have effective legal means of incentivizing the organization of debates, as the law only prescribes for the first warning to be issued in the aftermath of the election. ENEMO emphasizes the essential importance of debates between electoral contestants for an informed decision of voters on Election Day.

ENEMO recommends expanding ComCom's sanctioning mechanisms to enforce stricter and more consistent penalties on media outlets that fail to comply with debate-related obligations. The current sanctions, limited to warnings, have proven insufficient to encourage a change in practice.

97 Gakharia - For Georgia informed ENEMO they were basing their claim on the Edison Research polls commissioned by Formula TV, and the Gorbi polls commissioned by the Imedi TV, both of which had met the legal conditions for recognizing a political party as qualified. ComCom have raised concerns with ENEMO that providing For Georgia with a qualified status, would reduce free airtime available to other parties who qualified on the basis of their parliamentary status.

98 The Labour Party informed ENEMO they had also requested Formula TV to grant them qualified status on the basis of opinion poll results, however Formula found that the party had not met the legal conditions.

Since the start of the election campaign, ComCom implemented quantitative and qualitative monitoring of 55 general broadcasters. It initiated protocols⁹⁹ upon ten complaints from political parties and in sixteen cases based on internal monitoring, mostly related to breaches of free airtime and refusal of media outlets to air paid political advertisement. While the work of ComCom was largely transparent, the decisions to deprive qualified parties from free airtime and restrict non-qualified parties from obtaining a qualified status, resulted in disproportionate restrictions on opposition parties, raising questions about ComCom's independence from the government.

SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media was one of the most prevalent means of campaigning for the 26 October parliamentary elections. Political parties' expenditure on social media political advertisements amounted to 671,009 USD throughout the 90-day-campaign period leading up to Election Day, out of which over 77%¹⁰⁰ was spent in the final 30 days of the campaign¹⁰¹. Georgian Dream and the Coalition for Change spent the most on social media advertising, while some political parties decided to entirely rely on social media due to lack of state financing¹⁰². Facebook was the most dominant social media platform, followed by TikTok which was used for reaching out to the younger population¹⁰³.

In addition to political actors, social media boosting was used by media outlets as well. Post TV and TV Imedi spent a total of 74,770.00 USD¹⁰⁴ on social media posts predominantly related to statements of GD members, anti-Western rhetoric, anti-opposition posts and conservative content. The activity on social media remains unregulated, however local actors established cooperation with Meta to tackle disinformation. Local NGO ISFED flagged coordinated inauthentic behavior to Meta, whose Threat Report¹⁰⁵ confirmed the existence of a network of 76 accounts, 30 pages and 11 Instagram accounts operating from Russia, attempting to influence political views of Georgian social media users. The network was taken down in August 2024. On election day, MythDetector flagged four social media posts for containing false information and five posts for instances of information manipulation¹⁰⁶.

99 ComCom explained it can only draft administrative protocols while final decisions must be made by the courts to be enforced. Court decisions have not deviated from the ComCom assessments.

100 518,286 USD was spent during the final 30 days of the campaign.

101 The data includes social media spending reports available on the [Meta Ad Library](#), for the following electoral contestants: Coalition for Change, Georgian Dream, Strong Georgia, Unity, Girchi, Gakharia - For Georgia and the Labour Party.

102 Labour Party and Gakharia - For Georgia, reported relying entirely on social media for their campaigns, due to lack of state financing.

103 For example by the Labour Party, Gakharia - For Georgia and the Coalition for Change.

104 The data includes social media spending reports available on the [Meta Ad Library](#), for the last 90 days.

105 Meta [confirmed existence and operation of the network](#) aiming to influence political events in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Georgia specifically, the network focused on criticizing protests against the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence and expressed support for the government.

106 Most cases were related to falsification of quotes, manipulation of videos, as well as misinformation on ballots and opinion polls.

Disinformation was prevalent during the elections and predominantly locally driven, with several stark examples of disinformation originating from Russia. There were several local disinformation narratives, the most dominant one being the existence of a “Global Party of War”, designed to reinforce Georgian citizens’ fear of war as part of the ruling party’s campaign strategy. Other significant narratives included attempts to discredit local and international election observation, through statements of representatives of the ruling party¹⁰⁷ and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service¹⁰⁸. Finally, there have been reports of widespread rumors that the secrecy of the vote would not be respected due to the use of technology in elections.

ENEMO emphasizes that the ability of voters to make free and informed choices is a fundamental principle of democratic elections. Coordinated misinformation and disinformation efforts deliberately seek to distort voters’ perceptions and influence their behavior. Therefore, ENEMO strongly urges the government and political parties to refrain from promoting or reinforcing false narratives and actively discredit any identified attempts.

Media outlets are encouraged to take joint action to uphold journalistic integrity and promote credible information by actively tackling and fact-checking false narratives intended to manipulate Georgian citizens.

107 For instance, the [Speaker of Parliament Shalva Papuashvili questioned ENEMO’s credibility](#), using false information about the organization. Similarly, [Givi Mikanadze of Georgian Dream raised concerns](#) about the impartiality of election monitoring organizations. He claimed that 26 of the 49 registered local monitoring groups were affiliated with political parties. He further accused ENEMO members for public opposition to the ruling party, Georgian Dream, and “urged” international missions to rely on objective, evidence-based reports rather than biased sources.

108 See more at: <https://civil.ge/archives/623606>

VIX. GENDER REPRESENTATION

In Georgia, men have traditionally maintained a dominant role in social, economic, and political spheres, leaving women underrepresented and often marginalized. This disparity is particularly stark in the political arena, where women occupied only 19% of parliamentary seats at both national and local levels prior to the 2024 parliamentary elections¹⁰⁹. Additionally, systemic issues such as violence against women and girls, including femicide¹¹⁰, highlight deep-seated gender inequality. Female politicians face significant barriers, often subjected to derogatory, sexist narratives perpetuated by both ruling and opposition parties, which further discourages women's active engagement in politics.

Historically, women's political participation in Georgia has been constrained, despite the efforts to bridge the gender gap through the introduction of quotas. By 2020, women held a mere 20% of seats in the Georgian Parliament, with a modest increase to 27% in local councils following the 2021 municipal elections¹¹¹. To address these disparities, the 2020 amendments to the Election Code of Georgia established gender quotas for proportional representation. These measures included a 1/2 gender quota in local council elections and a 1/4 quota in parliamentary elections, ensuring a minimum representation of women on party lists. By 2021, the quota for local self-government elections was revised to 1/3, further bolstering efforts toward gender balance. Crucially, the legislation also stipulated that MPs replaced during a parliamentary term must be of the same gender, reinforcing the intent to maintain equitable representation.

However, in 2023, legislative amendments proposed the removal of said gender quotas, prompting widespread criticism from women's rights organizations and international stakeholders. President Salome Zourabichvili vetoed the amendments, underscoring that dismantling quotas would erode the progress made in increasing women's participation in politics. Nevertheless, the Georgian Parliament overrode this veto in May 2024, effectively abolishing the quotas.

The elimination of gender quotas marks a significant regression for gender equality in Georgia. Without quotas, political parties are no longer bound by a minimum threshold for female candidates, potentially diminishing women's presence in future elections.

109 According to [IPU Parline](#) analysis of the 2020 parliamentary elections, conducted in 2022.

110 From 2018 to 2022, 183 cases of murder and attempted murder of women were identified, out of which 66 were qualified as femicide, as reported by [Civil.ge](#).

111 Georgian Institute for Politics: [Barriers to Women's Political Participation and Ways to Solve Them](#) (2022)

This legislative rollback not only jeopardizes the hard-fought progress toward gender parity but also contravenes both the Georgian Constitution—which mandates special measures to ensure gender equality¹¹²—and the Council of Europe’s recommendations¹¹³.

Reintroducing gender quotas with stricter enforcement mechanisms, such as penalties for non-compliance—including rejecting candidate lists that fail to meet the required representation of the less-represented gender—would ensure that political parties nominate an adequate number of women for high-ranking positions. The implementation and impact of such measures should be closely monitored to assess progress and ensure alignment with constitutional principles and international standards on gender equality.

The repercussions of this legislative shift are already evident. Compared to the 2020 parliamentary elections, when 44.3% of proportional party list candidates (3,049 out of 6,882), and 21.75% of majoritarian candidates (107 out of 492) were women, the 2024 parliamentary elections saw a significant decline in women’s representation, with only 29% (344 out of 1,185) of women candidates on party lists. Several parties included an alarmingly low number of women in their party lists, often placing them in low-ranking positions, thereby effectively denying them meaningful political participation and equitable representation¹¹⁴. For example, on Georgian Dream’s proportional list, the representation of women among the top 60 candidates plummeted from 15 (25%) in 2020 to just eight (13.3%) in 2024.¹¹⁵¹¹⁶

Compared to the 2012 parliamentary elections, where women won only 17 out of 150 seats (11%), and the 2020 elections, which saw an increase to 30 women (20%) elected to parliament¹¹⁷, the 2024 elections have not shown further progress, with 30 women again elected¹¹⁸. However, the distribution of seats in the 2024 elections highlights a troubling trend. Among Georgian Dream’s 89 mandates, only 11 women were elected, indicating a

112 Article 11(3) of the Constitution of Georgia states, that “the State shall provide equal rights and opportunities for men and women. The State shall take special measures to ensure the essential equality of men and women and to eliminate inequality.”

113 The Council of Europe’s Recommendation Rec(2003)3 on balanced participation of women and men in political and public decision-making urges member States, including Georgia, to implement effective mechanisms to ensure equal access to political, economic, social, and cultural resources for both women and men, in order to address persistent gender inequality. According to the Recommendation, balanced participation is defined as ensuring that the representation of either gender in any political or public decision-making body does not drop below 40%.

114 For instance, the Labor Party and the Alliance of Patriots each included only one woman among their top 20 candidates, while Girchi’s list featured just two women in its top 20 priority positions.

115 Social Justice Center: [The representation of women and ethnic minorities in the lists of electoral subjects remains disproportionately low](#) (October 2024)

116 Nino Tsilosani, chair of the Georgian Dream party’s women’s chapter and the Parliament’s Gender Equality Council, defended the removal of gender quotas, asserting that they had “to some extent, already achieved their main task.” Notably, Tsilosani herself seems to have been marginalized in the party’s electoral list, placed only 61st on the party’s list.

117 In 2020, this improvement was attributed to the introduction of gender quotas, with 29 women elected through party lists, but only one through the majoritarian system. However, this still fell short of the quota’s target of 25%. (Georgian Institute of Politics)

118 REE/RL: [Who will become a member of the parliament in the 2024 convocation?](#) (October 2024)

reduced commitment to gender inclusivity within the ruling party. This decline reflects a broader trend among political parties in Georgia, highlighting persistent reluctance to nominate women for prominent positions, as well as strong antagonism towards a more active political engagement of women.

This turn of events underscores the need for renewed commitment and advocacy to uphold gender equality in Georgian politics, aligning with both constitutional principles and international standards. Without such measures, the risk of reversing gains in women's representation looms large, threatening the broader democratic development of the country.

ENEMO encourages the development of long-term strategies to integrate gender equality into Georgia's political and electoral framework. This includes mandatory gender-sensitive training for political parties and election officials and incentives for parties that actively promote gender-balanced candidate lists.

Such incentives should encompass media campaigns to challenge societal stereotypes, targeted capacity-building initiatives to empower female candidates, and legal protections against harassment and violence directed at women in political and public life. ENEMO emphasizes that these measures are essential to creating an environment where women can fully participate in the political process without fear of marginalization or abuse.

Despite this serious setback, ENEMO acknowledges the CEC's initiatives to foster women's involvement in electoral processes. The CEC actively organized training sessions for female party representatives to enhance their understanding of electoral rights and opportunities, aiming to encourage broader participation of women in politics¹¹⁹. These efforts, while commendable, face significant challenges in the absence of binding mechanisms such as gender quotas to ensure sustained progress in women's political representation.

119 For instance, one such event was organized in Batumi on 4 October.

X. NATIONAL MINORITIES

The Constitution of Georgia guarantees the rights of minorities, including their political participation, and is further reinforced by legislation such as the Law on General Education¹²⁰, which supports education in minority languages, and the State Strategy on Civic Equality, which is intended to promote inclusivity in practice¹²¹.

Although the Georgian legislative framework acknowledges minority rights, including political participation, the practical implementation of these rights remains inconsistent. Despite the existence of such legal provisions, Georgia lacks explicit mechanisms to guarantee sufficient representation of national minorities in political and legislative bodies, leaving their inclusion largely unaddressed.

ENEMO recommends the creation of formal mechanisms to ensure the consistent and effective representation of national minorities in political and legislative bodies.

Ethnic minorities in Georgia encounter substantial barriers to political participation, as existing legal and institutional frameworks often fail to ensure consistent and effective representation in legislative and decision-making bodies. The absence of formal quotas or constitutionally mandated consultative bodies leaves minority inclusion largely at the discretion of political parties, whose engagement with minority communities is often dictated by strategic considerations rather than a genuine commitment to inclusive governance. This lack of structured representation results in an inconsistent and ad hoc approach to addressing the political needs of minority groups.

Despite ethnic minorities constituting 13.2% of Georgia's population, their presence in political institutions remains significantly underrepresented. Efforts such as the introduction of bilingual electoral materials, multilingual staff, and targeted information campaigns have been implemented, yet these measures have yielded limited results. For instance, only 2% of DEC members are drawn from minority communities¹²². While the CEC launched an awareness campaign in October 2023, which included demonstrations and broadcasts in minority languages, these initiatives have not fully addressed the challenges of ensuring meaningful inclusion for national minorities in the electoral process.

Training programs for PEC members from minority groups revealed significant gaps in preparation. For instance, in Dmanisi and Ninotsminda, training materials were provided

¹²⁰ [Law of Georgia on General Education](#)

¹²¹ [State Strategy on Civic Equality](#) is [criticized](#) for its vague and general approach to implementation, lacking clear, actionable plans for ethnic minority education and integration policies. This lack of specificity makes it difficult to evaluate the strategy's potential effectiveness and raises concerns, particularly given the long-standing efforts in this area.

¹²² Out of 1,241 total DEC members, 24 were Armenian and one Azerbaijani.

only in Georgian, causing widespread confusion and exposing a critical oversight in inclusivity measures. In other minority areas, trainings were conducted in Russian, despite some participants being unable to follow the sessions in that language. This failure to provide resources in minority languages undermines the preparedness of election workers and contradicts claims of extensive planning by the election authorities, raising concerns about the depth of commitment to a truly inclusive electoral process.

ENEMO calls for a comprehensive strategy to address the barriers to political participation faced by ethnic minorities. This should include outreach programs to engage minority communities, capacity-building initiatives to empower minority candidates, and collaboration with political parties to promote the nomination of minority representatives.

To ensure higher-quality training for PEC members and avoid preparation gaps, ENEMO recommends training materials in minority languages and employing multilingual trainers to facilitate better understanding. Additionally, election authorities should conduct thorough needs assessments and pilot training sessions to identify and address potential inclusivity challenges before implementation, ensuring a more inclusive and effective electoral process.

Local media outlets have criticized the CEC for failing to adequately inform ethnic minorities about the electoral process. They have called for greater dissemination of election-related information in minority languages and closer collaboration with local media to address discriminatory practices. Although some innovative steps, such as youth-oriented electoral programs targeting minority communities, have been introduced, the persistent lack of effective communication in minority languages remains a major barrier to their full political participation in Georgia.

To add to these challenges, the role of pro-government media in perpetuating ethnically discriminatory rhetoric has further intensified the situation. Ahead of the October 26 elections, Armenophobic narratives were employed as part of a nationalist strategy to discredit opposition candidates. This exploitation of ethnic identity for political advantage not only erodes civic equality but also deepens societal divisions and fosters intolerance. Such practices highlight the critical need for stronger media accountability and robust safeguards against hate speech in the political sphere.

Overall, these systemic issues underscore the pressing need for more robust and inclusive strategies to address the marginalization of ethnic minorities in Georgian politics. Without substantive reforms, these challenges risk perpetuating inequalities and eroding trust in the democratic process among minority communities.

XI. INCLUSION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

Georgia has made significant progress in promoting the political participation of persons with disabilities through progressive legal measures. The Election Code requires polling stations to be accessible to individuals with disabilities and provide accommodations such as accessibility ramps, sign language translations for political advertisements¹²³, and the possibility to re-register at accessible polling stations¹²⁴. Additionally, tactile ballot guides and magnifying sheets have been introduced to assist voters with visual impairments¹²⁵. These measures are designed to ensure that persons with disabilities can engage in political campaigns and cast their votes independently and with dignity. Furthermore, the CEC conducted informational meetings with visually impaired voters and trained sign language interpreters to support hearing-impaired voters at polling stations¹²⁶.

Despite legal advancements, the implementation of accessibility measures for persons with disabilities remains inconsistent, particularly in rural areas where polling stations often lack adequate infrastructure, creating significant barriers to participation. Similarly, the inclusion of persons with disabilities in election management bodies remains notably limited. In some areas, no persons with disabilities were observed serving as DEC or PEC members, a gap often attributed to persistent misconceptions about their ability to effectively contribute to such roles.

ENEMO calls for actively including persons with disabilities in election management bodies, such as DEC and PECs, to enhance their representation and contribute to more inclusive electoral processes. This can be achieved by addressing misconceptions about their capabilities through targeted awareness campaigns and training programs to equip persons with disabilities with the skills needed to participate effectively in election administration. Including PWDs in decision-making roles will improve inclusivity and help address the unique barriers they face during elections.

123 Article 50 of the Law of Georgia on Broadcasting: "When broadcasting a political/pre-election advertisement, the screen corner shall display the inscription 'paid political advertising' or 'free political advertising'. Such advertisements shall have to be accompanied by the sign language translation which shall be arranged for by the electoral subject presenting the advertisement."

124 Article 200 of the Election Code of Georgia: "A wheelchair user voter may participate in the parliamentary elections of Georgia as well as elections of the municipality bodies at any adapted electoral precinct within the territory of a respective local majoritarian electoral district, for which purpose, he/she must apply to a respective DEC or PEC not later than the 11th day before the polling day."

125 Article 63.2 of the Election Law of Georgia: "For electoral precincts, the CEC shall ensure the use of technologies (tactile ballot guide, magnifying sheets) that allow voters with vision impairment to complete a ballot paper independently."

126 [One such training](#) was carried out mid-September in cooperation with the Union of the Deaf of Georgia and with the financial support of IFES.

On election day, ENEMO reported that only 48.6% of polling stations were fully accessible to individuals with disabilities. Another 23.2% were deemed accessible with minor assistance, while a significant 28.2% were entirely unsuitable for use by persons with disabilities, highlighting considerable barriers to inclusivity. Furthermore, 9.5% of polling stations lacked tactile ballots¹²⁷, which are crucial for visually impaired voters. Nationwide, only 25 wheelchair users were registered to vote at polling stations suitable for voters with mobility challenges¹²⁸. These findings highlight a significant gap between legislative provisions and practical enforcement, particularly outside urban centers, where limited resources and oversight hinder full electoral inclusion for persons with disabilities. Moreover, political parties demonstrated a noticeable lack of attention and meaningful engagement in addressing the needs and concerns of this community, further exacerbating the challenges they face in exercising their democratic rights¹²⁹.

ENEMO recommends prioritizing the consistent implementation of accessibility measures for persons with disabilities, particularly in rural areas, by upgrading polling station infrastructure, ensuring the availability of tactile ballots, expanding re-registration options for accessible stations, and establishing monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance.

Whenever possible, persons with disabilities should be empowered to participate in elections and cast their votes independently, ensuring the confidentiality of their choices and preventing any potential external influence on their decision-making.

127 The CEC informed ENEMO that tactile ballots for visually impaired voters were distributed to all polling stations.

128 The deadline for registration of persons with disabilities to vote in an accessible polling station was 11 days before elections, on 15 October 2024.

129 The Strong Georgia coalition organized the only notable event addressing marginalized groups, held at their Kutaisi headquarters. Coalition leaders, including a member with a disability, highlighted challenges faced by Georgia's 114,000 PWDs, such as inadequate state support, economic difficulties, and inaccessible polling stations. They pledged to improve conditions for PWDs if elected, and the event received coverage from several national TV outlets.

XII. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS

The legal framework governing election dispute resolution in Georgia is designed to ensure a structured and hierarchical process, avoiding parallel jurisdictions. When a lawsuit or complaint is submitted to the courts, the respective DEC or the CEC is promptly informed of its receipt and the decision once it is rendered. Electoral disputes may be appealed to the relevant election commission or court, and decisions made by election commissions can be challenged only before higher election commissions or the judiciary, following the procedures and timelines set out in the Election Code.

The law grants electoral parties, initiative groups, their representatives, and observer organizations the right to file complaints. However, voters may submit complaints only when their personal rights are directly affected. While this framework allows for broad access to dispute resolution, it remains complex and demanding, with numerous formalities and procedural requirements. Many election disputes are subject to expedited timelines to ensure prompt resolution and maintain the overall pace of the election process. However, these short deadlines, particularly at the Court of Appeals level, have raised concerns, as previously noted by the Venice Commission. The law provides only two days for filing and hearing appeals in courts and one additional day for appeals to the Court of Appeals, which must then deliver a decision within two days. Such tight deadlines often hinder the ability of stakeholders to collect evidence and prepare comprehensive cases, especially for more complex disputes.

While the framework generally ensures timely resolution, most complaints are handled by the chairpersons of the CEC or DEC, rather than by the commissions as collegial bodies. This practice has been criticized for undermining transparency and limiting the collective nature of decision-making. Local observer organizations reported instances where their representatives were obstructed or prevented from submitting complaints, to PECs raising further concerns about the inclusiveness of the process. Additionally, while some political actors demonstrated an understanding of the complaints mechanism and the ability to comply with formal requirements, others lacked the necessary knowledge or experience. This, combined with the pro-ruling party environment at the PEC level, contributed to a passive attitude towards the process, discouraging active engagement in dispute resolution.

According to the CEC, 1,170 complaints were submitted at the DEC level by local observer organizations and electoral subjects during the electoral period. These post-election disputes, among others, included 544 disputes over recounts/annulments, 482 requesting imposition of disciplinary liability measures, and 151 pertaining to assignments of actions. DEC reviewed most complaints on their merits and adhered to the prescribed legal deadlines. Despite this, the majority of complaints were rejected.

Significant cases brought by observer organizations illustrate the challenges within the system. For instance, NGO coalition MyVote submitted 246 complaints demanding the annulment of results from 246 precincts across 29 districts, alleging violations that compromised the voting secrecy and free expression of the will. GYLA sought the annulment of results from all 2,263 precincts where electronic voting was implemented, citing systematic breaches of vote secrecy¹³⁰, and called for disciplinary measures against precinct officials accused of procedural violations. These cases, however, were dismissed by DEC and courts.

ENEMO observed that judicial oversight was widely perceived as weak. Although courts mostly reviewed complaints in accordance with legal deadlines, decisions often failed to provide effective remedies for electoral violations. In exceptional cases where complaints were upheld, such as in Tetrtskaro and Gori district court, appellate courts overturned the rulings following an extraordinarily lengthy deliberation of nearly 24 hours further diminishing trust in the judiciary's impartiality. The Tbilisi Court of Appeals consolidated all complaints from polling stations across eastern Georgia into one case and ultimately dismissed all 26 cases filed by GYLA and My Vote.¹³¹ Similarly, the Kutaisi Court of Appeals considered complaints from polling stations in western Georgia but also rejected the GYLA's claims¹³². Additionally, GYLA criticized the unusual length of hearings at the Tbilisi Court of Appeals, arguing that the court had violated the constitutional principle of a fair trial and procedural deadlines for issuing a decision.

As in previous elections, allegations of voter suppression, harassment, and intimidation were not adequately investigated, reinforcing perceptions of impartiality of the law enforcement institutions and weak judicial oversight. ENEMO notes that trust in law enforcement, the election administration, and the judiciary to effectively and impartially address politically sensitive disputes remains low.

During the pre-election period, courts issued several rulings on key issues such as free airtime allocation, recognition of qualified electoral subjects, and voting abroad. These decisions raised concerns about judicial interpretations. ENEMO observed that the courts appeared to apply broad interpretations when imposing restrictions while adopting narrow and formalist reasoning when the protection or expansion of rights was at stake. This trend suggests that the judiciary, rather than acting as an independent check on executive authority, often facilitated decisions aligned with the interests of the regulatory bodies.

130 The GYLA sought to annul the official results from all polling stations across the country where voting was conducted using electronic devices. The watchdog argued that the ballot secrecy had been violated because the paper was so thin that it revealed on the other side, which party a citizen was voting for.

131 With this ruling, the Tbilisi Court of Appeals also overturned the earlier decision of Tetrtskaro City Judge Vladimer Khuchua, who was the only judge to agree with GYLA's claims and confirm that the secrecy of the ballot had indeed been violated. Khuchua has been [targeted](#) by Georgian Dream-affiliated media, anonymous websites and social media accounts as biased and has become the subject of a discrediting campaign.

132 Had the Courts confirmed ballot secrecy violations, the majority of the votes would have been annulled, raising the need to hold new elections.

The issue of vote secrecy remained at the center of post-electoral disputes, culminating in constitutional complaints challenging the validity of the 2024 parliamentary elections. On 19 November, Georgian President Salome Zurbishvili filed a constitutional lawsuit alleging that the 26 October elections violated two fundamental principles enshrined in Article 37 of the Georgian Constitution: the secrecy of the ballot and universal suffrage¹³³. In parallel, 30 opposition members of the outgoing Parliament filed their own constitutional lawsuit, also seeking to declare the election results unconstitutional. The President's constitutional lawsuit had direct procedural implications for the newly elected Parliament, preventing the recognition of mandates and the commencement of parliamentary activities¹³⁴. Despite the pending constitutional complaint, the ruling party proceeded with the first session of Parliament as scheduled on the grounds that while the lawsuit had been registered by the Constitutional Court, its admissibility had not yet been decided.

The Constitutional Court ultimately rejected the complaints on admissibility grounds only later on 3 December, preventing further consideration of the substantive issues raised. ENEMO observes that this decision occurred amidst ongoing street protests, when constitutional oversight could have served as a crucial mechanism to channel grievances within a legal framework, maintaining order and trust in institutional processes. The refusal to substantively address the complaints not only missed an opportunity to reinforce judicial independence in a politically tense environment but also raised concerns about adherence to procedural safeguards and the ruling party's commitment to respecting legal processes. Furthermore, the Court's inability to act swiftly on electoral disputes exacerbates uncertainties in the post-electoral process, potentially undermining trust in the judiciary and electoral institutions.

ENEMO advocates for greater transparency and inclusiveness in complaints handling by strengthening the role of election commissions as collegial bodies balancing the overly centralised role of chairpersons in the resolution of complaints to enhance transparency and collective decision-making. Additionally, it should be ensured that all stakeholders, including observers and political actors, are able to submit complaints without obstruction and participate meaningfully in the process.

ENEMO advocates for judicial reforms to enhance independence and impartiality.

Courts should avoid overly restrictive or formalist interpretations that undermine the protection of electoral rights.

133 Specifically, the President cited widespread concerns about ink leakage on ballots that potentially revealed voters' choices, undermining the principle of secrecy. Additionally, she argued that the rights of Georgian citizens living abroad were inadequately safeguarded, preventing many from exercising their right to vote.

134 Under the Election Code and the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, the Temporary Mandate Commission cannot submit the names of MPs whose election has been legally contested, requiring at least two-thirds of all MPs—100 out of 150—to have their mandates recognized before the Parliament can convene. The President's complaint, which questioned the legality of the election of all 150 MPs, risked delaying the formation of Parliament until the Constitutional Court resolved the matter.

XIII. ELECTION DAY

On 26 October 2024, ENEMO deployed 88 international observers, who observed the opening procedures in 44 polling stations, voting in 483 polling stations, closing and counting in 44 polling stations, and the transfer of election materials to 44 DEC. Election day was marred by continuous reports of incidents and irregularities, which call into question the integrity of the voting process. Most notably, ENEMO observers reported a series of significant violations, such as the prevalence of an intimidation climate, several acts of violence against voters and observers, and major concerns regarding respect of the secrecy of the vote.

OPENING

Opening procedures started on time in 86% of the polling stations observed, with 14% starting with short delays (up to 30 minutes), due to the late arrival of PEC members. All polling stations were properly staffed, with all 17 members present. The presence of party representatives and local observers created some overcrowding, which hindered transparency in 4,5% of polling stations observed. Generally, the opening procedures were well followed (84,1%). However, ENEMO observers noted that the relevant data was not announced in 14% of polling stations, with PEC members rushing through the procedures. In 7% of polling stations, PEC members had difficulties operating the electronic devices, showing a certain lack of preparedness. Few violations were reported by ENEMO observers: the ballot box (1 case) or the mobile ballot box (2 cases) were not shown empty before being sealed. More than a quarter (27%) of polling stations finished the opening procedures with a 15-minute delay. While most of the PECs were assessed positively by ENEMO observers, 6,82% assessed their conduct negatively, due to overcrowding, lack of transparency, or negligence from the PEC members.

VOTING

ENEMO observers observed the voting process in 483 polling stations, covering 72 out of Georgia's 73 districts. 88,2% of polling stations observed were using election technologies, while 11,8% were traditional polling stations.

Throughout election day, ENEMO observers witnessed several violations in the vicinity of the polling stations, such as campaigning and organised transportation of voters (4 cases). Multiple cases of party representatives and/or unidentified individuals gathering outside polling stations were approaching and tracking voters, creating an environment of perceived surveillance (8 cases). More worryingly, ENEMO observers directly observed cases of pressure on voters (4 cases), intimidation and harassment (3 cases), vote buying (1) and acts of violence (1).

ENEMO observers noted that 28,16% of polling stations observed were not accessible for people with disabilities, while 23,19% were only accessible with some assistance. Tactile ballots were not available in 9,52% of the polling stations visited.

All polling stations observed were properly staffed, with the 17 PEC members present. 81,7% of PEC head officials were women. The presence of numerous party representatives (on average, 8 per polling station) and domestic observers created some overcrowding in many polling stations, sometimes hindering transparency. Most notably, observers were not always able to observe the work of the registrars, either due to overcrowding or the polling station improper setup.

Additional measures should be taken to ensure the adequacy of polling station premises and layouts, to prevent overcrowding and to allow for meaningful observation of all stages of the voting process.

The vast majority of polling stations observed functioned in an orderly manner throughout the day (84,4%), with the procedures generally well followed. However, some concerning violations were reported. Inking procedures, an important safeguard against multiple voting, were not always respected. In 2% of polling stations observed, voters were not checked for indelible ink at the entrance of the polling station, and voters were not marked after receiving their ballot in 1,2% of the polling stations observed. While the ID procedures and issuing of ballots were mostly followed, observers reported cases of voters being issued ballots without presenting identification documents (3 cases). In 17,6% of the polling stations observed, the PEC staff did not always explain to the voter how to mark their ballot properly.

ENEMO observers noted that the secrecy of the vote was directly compromised in 8,3% of the polling stations observed, witnessing multiple cases of family voting or abuse or assisted voting (14 cases), and voters revealing their vote or taking pictures of their ballot (13 cases). The secrecy of the vote was globally compromised in polling stations using election technologies (see election technology section), due to the fact that markers provided to the voters bled-through the ballot paper, making the voter's choice visible to all people standing near the ballot box. More than a third of voters (34,4%) required assistance from PEC members to properly place their ballot into the PCOS, which further compromised the secrecy of the vote.

In all polling stations, Georgian Dream representatives or members of NGOs closely affiliated to the ruling party had installed video cameras. While not against the law, the presence of recording devices created an intimidating environment, casting serious doubts on the voters' ability to cast their vote freely.

Supplementary measures should be taken in order to ensure the secrecy of the vote and promote a voting environment free from intimidation. In particular, consideration should be given to banning the use of recording devices inside polling stations.

CLOSING AND COUNTING

ENEMO observers observed the closing and counting process in 44 polling stations. The closing and counting process was generally orderly and well organized, with the procedures mostly adhered to. However, the preliminary results were not always transmitted immediately to the CEC (8,3% of polling stations observed), as prescribed by the election code, seemingly due to a lack of knowledge from the PEC members. In 11,4% of polling stations observed, the votes were not announced aloud during the counting. In polling stations using electronic devices, minor discrepancies between the results from the counting devices and the manual count generated delays. After completion of the counting procedures, a copy of the protocol was sent immediately to the CEC according to procedures in 88,6% of cases, while 11,4% of PEC members encountered difficulties. The protocols were not posted for public review in 11,7% of the polling stations observed, diminishing transparency. Overall, ENEMO observers positively evaluated the closing and counting processes in 95,4% of polling stations, while 4,6% were rated negatively due to negligence and insufficient procedural knowledge from the PEC members, leading to chaotic recounts and significant delays.

ENEMO strongly recommends that hand counting of votes be prioritized over electronic counting in Georgia's electoral processes. Hand counting should become a permanent and mandatory procedure, ensuring the highest level of transparency, accountability, and public confidence in election outcomes.

TRANSFER OF MATERIALS TO THE DECS

The transfer of materials to the DECs was generally done in an orderly manner (93,2%). ENEMO observers noted that 9,1% of the DEC premises observed were not suitable for the transfer of materials, the premises being too small. Overcrowding limited transparency in 6,8% of the DECs observed. Observers noted that the materials were not always properly sealed (1 case), and the protocols not checked for discrepancies (2 cases). However, in 95,6% of observed cases, all materials were delivered according to procedures.

PUBLICATION OF RESULTS BY THE CEC

The introduction of PCOS allowed for a fast transmission of preliminary results, which were promptly published on the CEC website, contributing to transparency. At 21:45, less than two hours after the closing of the polls, the results from 97% of polling stations using electronic devices had been made available. The use of tablets allowed for result protocols from all polling stations to be published on the CEC website shortly afterwards. However, the PCOS receipts and polling stations protocols were only published as individual PDF documents.

To further increase transparency, publishing consolidated election results in an open data format should be considered.

XIV. OBSERVERS

DOMESTIC OBSERVERS

The legislative framework for local observers in Georgia is defined by the Election Code, which stipulates that any local observer organization must be a non-profit, non-commercial legal entity registered in Georgia for at least one year prior to election day. Organizations must undergo an official accreditation process through the CEC, meeting criteria of neutrality, nonpartisanship, and demonstrated experience in democracy and human rights work¹³⁵. These legal requirements aim to ensure that local observers contribute to a fair and transparent electoral process.

Historically, NGOs in Georgia have played a pivotal role in safeguarding the integrity of elections, acting as independent watchdogs to uphold democratic standards. Their activities encompass election monitoring, voter education, and proposing electoral reforms, forming a cornerstone of the country's democratic framework. In the context of the 2024 parliamentary elections, the role of domestic observer organizations proved to be especially critical, particularly amid heightened tensions between civil society and the ruling Georgian Dream party.

Despite their importance, domestic NGOs face increasing challenges under the current political climate. Legal and political pressures have constrained their operations, contributing to a shrinking civic space. Of the 30,258 civil society organizations (CSOs) registered in Georgia as of 2024, only 4.3% remain active, reflecting the difficult operating environment. A key factor exacerbating this decline is the controversial Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which requires NGOs and media outlets receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as "foreign agents". Critics have heavily condemned this law, drawing parallels to similar legislation in Russia, which stifles civil society under the guise of transparency.

The backlash against this law has been significant, with approximately 200 Georgian NGOs pledging to defy its requirements, citing concerns over its detrimental impact on democracy and civic freedoms. For instance, on 24 September, the ACB designated Transparency International Georgia (TI Georgia) as a "subject with a declared electoral goal", leading the organization to temporarily suspend its election observation activities. Following intervention from the prime minister, the ACB revoked this designation on 2 October, allowing TI Georgia to resume its work¹³⁶. However, this incident underscores the growing pressure on civil society, as local NGOs face accusations of radicalism and have their credibility increasingly questioned.

¹³⁵ The organization's founding documents must indicate its commitment to election monitoring and/or the protection of human rights.

¹³⁶ See more in the *Political campaign and campaign finance* section.

Adding to these concerns is the government's crackdown on peaceful protests, further straining the already tense political climate leading up to the elections. This has created an environment where domestic observer organizations are not only tasked with monitoring elections but also defending their own legitimacy and ability to operate¹³⁷.

Legislation restricting constitutionally protected fundamental freedoms, such as assembly and expression, should be repealed or amended, including laws such as the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. Provisions that stigmatize NGOs as "foreign agents" must be removed to ensure transparency requirements do not undermine the legitimacy or independence of civil society organizations. Any restrictions on fundamental freedoms must be exceptional, strictly necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose and proportionate to the needs of a democratic society. Additionally, robust mechanisms should be established to protect NGOs from politically motivated designations and legal actions, safeguarding their ability to operate freely and uphold democratic principles.

Despite these challenges, the CEC accredited over 23,153 local observers from 101 organizations to oversee the 2024 elections. Prominent groups such as Transparency International Georgia, ISFED, GYLA, and PMMG are central to the observation process. Their participation underscores the resilience of Georgia's civil society in the face of mounting adversity, reaffirming the vital role of domestic observers in ensuring a transparent and democratic electoral process.

GONGOS

A concerning trend in the Georgian electoral landscape is the increasing presence of GONGOs¹³⁸. These organizations serve multiple purposes, including legitimizing government policies, diverting foreign funding away from genuine NGOs, and creating public confusion about the credibility of government critics versus supporters.

Key characteristics of GONGOs include their intentional replication of the structure and style of Western NGOs, often resembling professional associations, to obscure their ties to the government¹³⁹. This deception allows them to operate under the guise of

137 Physical attacks against NGOs and activists have often been associated with a lack of effective investigation or adequate police protection. NGOs particularly vulnerable to such attacks include those focused on human rights, minority rights, and watchdog activities, according to the Expert Council on NGO Law that analyzed stigmatization of NGOs in Europe. ([EXPERT COUNCIL ON NGO LAW CONF/EXP\(2024\)1](#))

138 GONGOs are "government-organized non-governmental organizations." Paradoxically named, these entities are designed to imitate independent NGOs, giving the impression of being autonomous grassroots organizations while, in reality, being created, funded, and controlled by the state.

139 For example, in 2023, the Regional Development and Promotion Center led by Davit Chikhelidze requested the State Audit Office to [investigate](#) opposition parties for illegal funding. Interestingly, the organization claims it has not undertaken any public projects or activities in recent years. This is despite having actively received numerous grants from the Election Administration of Georgia and the CEC for election-related activities and projects between 2019 and 2022. Additionally, Davit Chikhelidze is an outspoken supporter of the ruling party, as evident from his public posts on social media. This organization is closely tied to Youth Center – Our Generation 1921, which also receives substantial financial support by the government bodies.

neutrality, while advancing partisan interests—most often those of the ruling party¹⁴⁰. According to TV Pirveli, numerous public servants and local officials, including a district governor from Tbilisi, were accredited as observers. Founders of these organizations were unable to provide details regarding the sources of funding, the recruitment process for observers, or the specifics of their election observation training, which is cause for concern.

In recent years, the number, scope, and intensity of GONGOs' involvement in Georgia have noticeably increased. Yet, their activities remain alarmingly underregulated. Local observers have raised serious concerns about the damaging impact these groups have had on election processes, particularly at polling stations on election day. The current legal framework for registering election observer organizations does little to prevent such entities from gaining accreditation. Observer organizations are only required to declare their commitment to human rights and election monitoring in their founding documents, without any further verification of their actual activities. This loophole enables organizations that actively work to advance party interests, rather than electoral integrity, to register and operate as observer groups¹⁴¹.

Some of the most active GONGOs during 2024 parliamentary elections were International Observatory for Barristers and Lawyers (IOBL)¹⁴² with 2,491 accredited observers and Observers of Politics and Law (OPL)¹⁴³ with 2,654 accredited observers, followed by Training and Development Institute of Georgia (TDIG)¹⁴⁴ with 1,364 accredited observers. IOBL and OPL are founded and led by a married couple, and even registered at the same address. Local observers reported that these particular GONGOs' observers

140 In 2020, the opposition [called out](#) Georgian Dream of financing GONGOs. Among the funded organizations was an NGO Public Advocacy that also observed the 2024 parliamentary elections, and previously under a different name - Democracy and Rights Protection Center. The organization is led by Irina Putkaradze, who is very close to Georgian Dream and was a Deputy Chair of the Public Broadcaster's Board of Trustees. The organization does not have an operating website or any public information about their activities.

141 An observer coalition composed of Club of Young Experts, Movement League of Voters and Union of Volunteers of Georgia with a combined number of 344 accredited observers, monitored election day at around 70 precincts during 2024 parliamentary elections. Shortly after election day, they held a joint [press conference](#) to announce that the elections were „held in a peaceful and competitive environment“, „there were no incidents in (observed) precincts“ and that the „process took place in a peaceful environment throughout the country“. Movement League of Voters' former director (still tied to the organization) is one of the [donors](#) of Georgian Dream.

142 The organization's chairperson, Grigol Gagnidze, is a lawyer who used to work for Georgian Dream and a candidate for the State Prosecutor in 2018, 2019 and 2024. During 2018-2020 he was a member of the selection commission for representatives of the CEC. Gagnidze's social media activity reveals his support for the Georgian Dream, as he frequently shares statements and propaganda from the party and its leaders while actively criticizing the opposition. IOBL observers have a [history](#) of voter mobilization and agitation during previous elections, as well as allegedly “working for the benefit of the Georgian Dream.”

143 OPL is led by Eka Agladze, who frequently shares statements from Grigol Gagnidze and posts photos of them together. No additional public information is available about either OPL or Agladze.

144 TDIG was founded in 2017 by Dima Karchava. There is no public information available about the organization's activities or Karchava.

were involved in the mobilization of Georgian Dream voters, actively created chaos at the polling station, pressured and intimidated voters, took over the counting process, intimidated other observers and journalists, and in some instances openly stated that they represent and/or support Georgian Dream¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁶.

With a total of 6,509 observers¹⁴⁷, the three largest GONGO organizations ensured continuous presence of approximately two observers at every polling station in Georgia. Despite such mass mobilization of observers, their observation efforts remained disproportionately undocumented, with no complaints filed by their observers on election day - nor any reports produced as a result of their intense engagement. These organizations do not have official or operating websites¹⁴⁸ and refuse to disclose any information regarding their observers, observation methodology, sources of funding, and whether their observers attended obligatory training sessions. Moreover, local media investigated some of these organizations and looked into the list of observers they accredited, only to recognize a number of Georgian Dream members, members of local councils, civil servants and party affiliates (donors, supporters, etc.).

Another relevant group of GONGOs¹⁴⁹, with a total of 1,127 accredited observers, operates in a coalition-like manner resembling a coalition, with intertwined memberships - individuals from one organization often holding executive positions in others¹⁵⁰. The group's political preferences are quite clear - for instance, one of their prominent members, Shorena Mirtskhulava, who is also a chairperson of Association of Free Generation¹⁵¹, openly supports the Georgian Dream party¹⁵².

On election day, the broad presence of these groups created a significant imbalance at polling stations, favoring the ruling party and undermining the principle of free and fair elections. These organizations, while posing as impartial observers, often interfered with the work of PECs and exerted undue influence over voters' decisions inside or in the close vicinity of polling stations. Some GONGO-affiliated observers were reportedly linked to semi-criminal groups and street enforcers who intimidated voters and, in some cases, physically assaulted them near polling station entrances, often successfully

145 April Media published a detailed [analysis](#) of IOBL and OPL and their activities regarding the 2024 Parliamentary elections.

146 Local observers also reported cases of voter mobilization, bribing the voters and interfering in the work of PECs by IOBL and OPL in 2022 and 2024.

147 In comparison, the largest independent domestic observation mission, My Vote, deployed 2,000 observers on Election day, while ISFED mobilized 1,500 observers.

148 For instance, TDIG's [Facebook page](#) resembles a troll account with no content related to their activities, while their website is out of function.

149 Association of Young Advocates (183 observers), Association of Advocates (297 observers), New Generation for Better Future (371 observers) and Justice and Development (276 observers).

150 Allegedly, some of their observers are [local council representatives](#) of Georgian Dream, while chairpersons of these organizations conducted some [joint briefings](#), publicly defending Georgian Dream. Aleksandre Kobaidze, head of Association of Young Advocates, was identified by TV Pirveli as one of the "captains" of the call centers that carried out a voter mobilization scheme in favor of Georgian Dream.

151 This organization accredited 666 observers for the 2024 parliamentary elections.

152 On Facebook, she openly [expressed support](#) to Davit Kodua, the Georgian Dream candidate from Zugdidi.

detering individuals from voting. Additionally, some of these observers escorted voters to the booths and supervised them while voting. The manipulation of voters' will, combined with disruptions to PEC operations, significantly contributed to undermining the credibility of 2024 parliamentary elections. While stricter legal regulations to address these issues have yet to be proposed, observer organizations stress the urgent need for more comprehensive research and dialogue.

To enhance transparency and accountability in election monitoring, ENEMO recommends implementing independent audits to verify CSOs' compliance with legal requirements for registering as domestic election observers in Georgia. Additionally, measures should be implemented to prevent politically affiliated individuals from exploiting the reputable institution of election monitoring for personal or political gain.

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS

The CEC registered 1,713 international observers from 76 organizations across the globe to monitor the 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Before election day, the CEC and DEC generally provided timely information, updates, and access to international observers. However, after the elections, several of ENEMO's repeated requests for information went unanswered by the CEC.

Following the 26 October parliamentary elections, ENEMO sought clarification on multiple occasions regarding potential instances of denied accreditation requests for the 2024 parliamentary elections. ENEMO specifically requested additional details about such cases, including the grounds for rejection, the frequency of denied requests, and general insights into the verification process for election monitoring organizations and their observers.

XV RECOMMENDATIONS

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ENEMO recommends cross-party dialogue, mediated by external parties, to agree on resolving the current crisis. The dialogue should focus on:
 - establishing a pathway to address the key causes of distrust in the October 26 parliamentary election process and
 - identifying steps to ensure the legitimacy and transparency of future parliamentary elections.
2. To enhance public trust and strengthen the integrity of Georgia's electoral processes, ENEMO recommends conducting a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform incorporating broad public consultations. Future electoral reform should address key systemic gaps, limiting widespread amendments to the Election Code. Reform should address problems such as low political participation of women, insufficient impartiality of election management bodies, and preventive measures and provisions to avoid possible executive-legislative gridlocks. Reforms should fully align with international standards and recommendations from impartial international election experts (such as the Venice Commission, ENEMO, ODIHR, and others) and reputable domestic electoral stakeholders.
3. Legislation restricting constitutionally protected fundamental freedoms, such as assembly and expression, should be repealed or amended, including laws such as the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. Provisions that stigmatize NGOs as "foreign agents" must be removed to ensure transparency requirements do not undermine the legitimacy or independence of civil society organizations. Any restrictions on fundamental freedoms must be exceptional, strictly necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose and proportionate to the needs of a democratic society. Additionally, robust mechanisms should be established to protect NGOs from politically motivated designations and legal actions, safeguarding their ability to operate freely and uphold democratic principles.
4. ENEMO urges Georgian state authorities to refrain from retaliating against individuals and organizations advocating for repeat elections through peaceful protests, emphasizing that safeguarding freedom of assembly and expression is crucial for fostering meaningful political dialogue.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Parliament of Georgia

5. ENEMO emphasizes that regulatory bodies should refrain from excessively narrow interpretations of legal provisions related to pre-electoral alliances. Specifically, they should avoid treating any electoral list as a pre-electoral coalition. Such restrictive interpretations harm the electoral environment and limit the already constrained democratic space.
6. Candidates should be able to run on the party list of their choice without disclosing their party affiliation, following the right to freedom of association. The provision preventing candidates from running on any party list should be repealed.
7. To ensure universal suffrage, the denial of voting rights of persons recognized by a court to lack legal capacity on the grounds of mental disability should be reconsidered.
8. Undue restriction on the right to stand should be removed from the legal framework. The residency requirement for candidates should be significantly reduced or lifted.
9. To strengthen the CEC's independence and impartiality, ENEMO recommends reintroducing the election of the CEC Chairperson and non-partisan members by a qualified majority and reinstating the position of an opposition-nominated Deputy Chairperson.
10. To promote collegiality and consensus-based decision-making within election management bodies, ENEMO recommends introducing provisions requiring the CEC to make decisions in open plenary sessions by a qualified majority, and revoking the anti-deadlock mechanism.
11. ENEMO strongly recommends that hand counting of votes be prioritized over electronic counting in Georgia's electoral processes. Hand counting should become a permanent and mandatory procedure, ensuring the highest level of transparency, accountability, and public confidence in election outcomes.
12. ENEMO recommends strengthening the electoral legislation to more effectively address the misuse and abuse of administrative resources for campaign purposes, including campaigning by high-level officials.
13. ENEMO recommends thoroughly revising the system for allocating public funds to political parties to ensure more equitable access to campaign finance. Alternatively, limits on donations from private entities should be reviewed and increased.
14. Campaign finance legislation needs to be revised to address the currently underregulated third-party financing. The revised legislation should consider and

regulate recently developed and introduced digital financial platforms and systems. Furthermore, it should anticipate the inevitable evolution of the financial sector, allowing for swift adjustments to existing oversight tools to accommodate new developments.

15. Reintroducing gender quotas with stricter enforcement mechanisms, such as penalties for non-compliance—including rejecting candidate lists that fail to meet the required representation of the less-represented gender—would ensure that political parties nominate an adequate number of women for high-ranking positions. The implementation and impact of such measures should be closely monitored to assess progress and ensure alignment with constitutional principles and international standards on gender equality.
16. ENEMO recommends the creation of formal mechanisms to ensure the consistent and effective representation of national minorities in political and legislative bodies.

To political parties and candidates

17. ENEMO emphasizes that the ability of voters to make free and informed choices is a fundamental principle of democratic elections. Coordinated misinformation and disinformation efforts deliberately seek to distort voters' perceptions and influence their behavior. Therefore, ENEMO strongly urges the government and political parties to refrain from promoting or reinforcing false narratives and actively discredit any identified attempts.
18. ENEMO encourages the development of long-term strategies to integrate gender equality into Georgia's political and electoral framework. This includes mandatory gender-sensitive training for political parties and election officials and incentives for parties that actively promote gender-balanced candidate lists. Such incentives should encompass media campaigns to challenge societal stereotypes, targeted capacity-building initiatives to empower female candidates, and legal protections against harassment and violence directed at women in political and public life. ENEMO emphasizes that these measures are essential to creating an environment where women can fully participate in the political process without fear of marginalization or abuse.
19. ENEMO calls for a comprehensive strategy to address the barriers to political participation faced by ethnic minorities. This should include outreach programs to engage minority communities, capacity-building initiatives to empower minority candidates, and collaboration with political parties to promote the nomination of minority representatives.

To the election management bodies

20. To enhance the professionalism of election management bodies, certified training sessions should be provided for all commission members, including party appointees, with mandatory participation.
21. To achieve greater balance within election management bodies, legal provisions should be revised to prevent the dominance of any political group—even in cases of an overwhelming electoral majority. Well-balanced EMBs at all levels are essential for administering elections collegially and transparently, preventing one-sided decision-making, and ensuring a system of checks and balances.
22. Supplementary measures should be implemented in order to enhance the DEC's overall transparency further.
23. To increase transparency and public trust in the electoral process, consideration should be given to organizing the distribution of functions between PEC members on Election Day. The function of registrar should be opened to all PEC members instead of limiting it to non-partisan members.
24. To ensure higher-quality training for PEC members and avoid preparation gaps, ENEMO recommends training materials in minority languages and employing multilingual trainers to facilitate better understanding. Additionally, election authorities should conduct thorough needs assessments and pilot training sessions to identify and address potential inclusivity challenges before implementation, ensuring a more inclusive and effective electoral process.
25. ENEMO calls for actively including persons with disabilities in election management bodies, such as DEC's and PEC's, to enhance their representation and contribute to more inclusive electoral processes. This can be achieved by addressing misconceptions about their capabilities through targeted awareness campaigns and training programs to equip persons with disabilities with the skills needed to participate effectively in election administration. Including PWDs in decision-making roles will improve inclusivity and help address the unique barriers they face during elections.
26. Additional measures should be taken to ensure the adequacy of polling station premises and layouts, to prevent overcrowding and to allow for meaningful observation of all stages of the voting process.
27. Supplementary measures should be taken in order to ensure the secrecy of the vote and promote a voting environment free from intimidation. In particular, consideration should be given to banning the use of recording devices inside polling stations.
28. To further increase transparency, publishing consolidated election results in an open data format should be considered.

To the Government and other institutions involved in the electoral process

29. To enhance transparency and public trust in election technologies, ENEMO recommends legally mandating periodic audits of all implemented technologies and planned technological solutions. These audits should be carried out by independent and impartial experts, ensuring the process remains free from external influence or pressure.
30. Institutions responsible for implementing and overseeing election technologies should make serious efforts to enhance public trust in the system by increasing transparency.
 - Firstly, the public should be provided with a clear explanation of how all election-related technologies operate, enabling a full understanding of their electoral purpose.
 - Information on cybersecurity and safeguarding mechanisms implemented to protect sensitive and personal data collected and analyzed by election technologies should be publicly available, regardless of whether such concerns have been raised by the public.
 - Finally, any potential or identified technical shortcomings that occurred before or on election day must be openly addressed and discussed by the competent authorities, fully disclosing possible or expected impact, etc.

Until voters gain confidence in any newly introduced election technologies, the devices' performance should also be cross-checked and confirmed.

31. ENEMO recommends improving and modernizing the analytical tools for scrutiny and oversight over campaigning financing, which would allow more efficient detection of violations and enable effective implementation of the sanctions.
32. To enhance transparency and accountability in election monitoring, ENEMO recommends implementing independent audits to verify CSOs' compliance with legal requirements for registering as domestic election observers in Georgia. Additionally, measures should be implemented to prevent politically affiliated individuals from exploiting the reputable institution of election monitoring for personal or political gain.
33. Publicly available excerpts from the Unified List of Voters should ensure higher personal data protection. For example, information about voters' current whereabouts—particularly those abroad during elections—could be misused to compromise their safety or interfere with the voting process through impersonation.
34. To ensure universal suffrage, relevant authorities should urgently initiate a widely available, simple, and efficient protocol for requesting and replacing citizens' expired identification documents.
35. ENEMO strongly recommends further clarifying the ACB's mandate to clearly

distinguish its role during the election campaign from its responsibilities outside of it. This distinction should help prevent any potential misuse of campaign finance regulations to target individuals and entities outside the electoral period.

36. ENEMO further recommends that the scope of the ACB's monitoring function regarding the financing of election campaigns be clearly defined and limited to the period from the announcement of elections until the end of the campaign period.
37. For national elections, efforts should be made to allow voters to temporarily change the location of their polling station.

To judiciary and courts

38. ENEMO recommends removing or suspending the provision regarding subjects with a declared electoral goal from the legislation, as its potential negative impact on human rights during elections far outweighs its benefits for financial oversight. Alternatively, should the provision remain in place, ENEMO recommends excluding non-governmental organizations from applying Article 261, given that the nature of non-governmental organizations fundamentally contradicts the key condition for declaring individuals or entities subjects with a declared electoral goal, i.e. the intention to take power.
39. ENEMO advocates for greater transparency and inclusiveness in complaints handling by strengthening the role of election commissions as collegial bodies balancing the overly centralized role of chairpersons in the resolution of complaints to enhance transparency and collective decision-making. Additionally, it should be ensured that all stakeholders, including observers and political actors, can submit complaints without obstruction and participate meaningfully in the process.
40. ENEMO advocates for judicial reforms to enhance independence and impartiality.
41. Courts should avoid overly restrictive or formalist interpretations that undermine the protection of electoral rights.

To local authorities and other public authorities, including sector specific bodies

42. ENEMO recommends prioritizing the consistent implementation of accessibility measures for persons with disabilities, particularly in rural areas, by upgrading polling station infrastructure, ensuring the availability of tactile ballots, expanding re-registration options for accessible stations, and establishing monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance.
43. Whenever possible, persons with disabilities should be empowered to participate in elections and cast their votes independently, ensuring the confidentiality of their choices and preventing any potential external influence on their decision-making.

To media and media oversight authorities

44. Media outlets are encouraged to take joint action to uphold journalistic integrity and promote credible information by actively tackling and fact-checking false narratives intended to manipulate Georgian citizens.
45. ENEMO recommends that ComCom assume a proactive role in regulating hate speech in the media. ENEMO further suggests that, within this mandate, ComCom define an effective route for media to obtain legal advice on hate speech violations prior to applying financial sanctions against them.
46. ENEMO recommends that ComCom establish clear guidance on conditions for admissibility of opinion polls as the grounds for acquiring free airtime well in advance of future elections and ensure media outlets implement it uniformly and non-discriminatorily.
47. ENEMO recommends expanding ComCom's sanctioning mechanisms to enforce stricter and more consistent penalties on media outlets that fail to comply with debate-related obligations. The current sanctions, limited to warnings, have proven insufficient to encourage a change in practice.

ABOUT ENEMO

The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) is an international nongovernmental organization that represents a network of national nongovernmental civic organizations founded on 29 September 2001, in Opatija, Croatia. It consists of 21 leading domestic monitoring organizations from 17 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including three European Union countries. ENEMO seeks to support the international community's interest in promoting democracy in the region by assessing electoral processes and the political environment and offering accurate and impartial observation reports. ENEMO IEOMs use international benchmarks and standards for democratic elections to evaluate the electoral process and the host country's legal framework. ENEMO and all its member organizations have endorsed the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations. Each ENEMO observer signed the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers. ENEMO member organizations have monitored more than 250 national elections and trained more than 250,000 observers.

To date, ENEMO has organized 43 international election observation missions to 11 countries:

1. Georgia 2024, parliamentary elections
2. Moldova 2024, presidential elections
3. Hungary 2024, municipal elections
4. Moldova 2023, local elections
5. Serbia 2022, presidential and early parliamentary elections
6. Hungary 2022, parliamentary elections
7. Kosovo 2021, local elections
8. Georgia 2021, local elections
9. Moldova 2021, early parliamentary elections
10. Albania 2021, parliamentary elections
11. Serbia 2020, parliamentary elections
12. Montenegro 2020, parliamentary elections
13. Moldova 2020, presidential elections
14. Ukraine 2020, local elections
15. Moldova 2019, local elections
16. Ukraine 2019, early parliamentary elections
17. Ukraine 2019, presidential elections
18. Moldova 2018–19, parliamentary elections
19. Armenia 2018, early parliamentary elections
20. Moldova 2016, presidential elections
21. Ukraine 2015, regular local elections

22. Ukraine 2014, parliamentary elections
23. Ukraine 2014, presidential elections
24. Ukraine 2013 – rerun of parliamentary elections 2012 in five DECes
25. Kosovo 2013, local elections, first round
26. Ukraine 2012, parliamentary elections
27. Kosovo 2011, rerun of parliamentary elections
28. Kosovo 2010, parliamentary elections
29. Kyrgyzstan 2010, parliamentary elections
30. Ukraine 2010, presidential elections, second round
31. Ukraine 2010, presidential elections, first round
32. Kosovo 2009, local elections
33. Moldova 2009, parliamentary elections
34. Georgia 2008, presidential elections
35. Kyrgyzstan 2007, parliamentary elections
36. Ukraine 2007, parliamentary elections
37. Ukraine 2006, local elections in Poltava, Kirovograd and Chernihiv
38. Ukraine 2006, parliamentary elections
39. Kazakhstan 2005, presidential elections
40. Albania 2005, parliamentary elections
41. Kyrgyzstan 2005, presidential elections
42. Kyrgyzstan 2005, parliamentary elections
43. Ukraine 2004, presidential elections

ENEMO member organizations are:

COUNTRY		ORGANIZATION
1	Albania	KRIIK Association
		Society for Democratic Culture (SDC)
2	Armenia	Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center (TIAC)
3	Azerbaijan	Election Monitoring and Democratic Studies Center (EMDS)
4	Belarus	Belarussian Helsinki Committee (BHC)
5	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI)
6	Croatia	Gong
7	Georgia	International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy – ISFED
8	Kazakhstan	FSCI
9	Kosovo	Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI)
10	Kyrgyzstan	Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society
11	Macedonia	Citizens Association MOST
12	Moldova	Promo-LEX
13	Montenegro	Center for Democratic Transition – CDT
		Centre for Monitoring and Research – CeMI
14	Poland	Political Accountability Foundation
15	Serbia	Center for Free Elections and Democracy – CeSID
		Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA)
16	Slovakia	Obcianske OKO (OKO)
17	Ukraine	OPORA
		Committee of Voters of Ukraine

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. Local organizations registered by the CEC to observe 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia

#	NAME OF THE ORGANIZATION	NUMBER OF OBSERVERS REGISTERED
1	Civic Development and Monitoring Center	105
2	Civil Alliance for Development	101
3	Regional Development and Promotion Center	12
4	International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy - ISFED	1,664
5	Georgian Professional Educational and Qualification Staff Trade Union of Workers and Students	7
6	Georgian Young Lawyers' Association	650
7	Free Voice	1,610
8	Shame Movement	
9	Monitoring Center - Society	1,038
10	Caucasus Open Space	649
11	Georgia's Future Academy	1,228
12	International Transparency Georgia	975
13	Mishgov Larda	
14	Election laboratory	2,491
15	International Observatory of Advocates and Lawyers	2,491
16	Civil society of Meskheta	584
17	Georgia's European Orbit	72
18	Public Movement Multinational Georgia	416
19	Democracy and Rights Defense Centre	2
20	Media and Rights Defense Centre	2
21	American Supporters League	234
22	12 Floors for the EU	86
23	The Reforms and Research Group	512

24	Observer of Politics and Law	2654
25	Professional Union of Education	237
26	Unanimity for Rights of Society	2
27	Youth Center - Our Generation 1921	1
28	Former political prisoners - for human rights	50
29	New generation - for democratic Georgia	29
30	Center of Democratic Initiatives	7
31	Analytical Compilation Center for Electoral and Political Technologies	17
32	Hub for Protection of Democracy	30
33	Society of Georgian Parliamentarians	36
34	Civic Idea - Civic Initiative for democratic Euro-Atlantic Elections	56
35	Public Monitoring of Public Institutions and Municipal Activity	41
36	Development Fund of Georgia Kadagi	42
37	Georgia - democracy and civil society	
38	Liberty Institute	3
39	Voter Education Society	
40	Youth for Youth and Future	6
41	Prevention for Progress	5
42	Organization of IDPs and Socially Vulnerable Persons 'Tanadgoma'	69
43	International Network of Civil Development	25
44	Center for Monitoring Public Procurements	321
45	International Center of Civil Culture	10
46	Center of Development and Democracy	18
47	Institute of Democracy Research	8
48	Public Advocate	4
49	Association of Independent Journalists - Free Press	
50	New Word	
51	Civil Union	309

52	Training and Development Institute of Georgia	1,364
53	Association of Young Advocates	183
54	Association of Advocates	297
55	European Change	5
56	NEO TV	9
57	Eurasia Institute for Conflict Analysis and Management	
58	Union of United Youth of Georgia	11
59	International Association Protect Your Share Motherland	86
60	Institute of Georgian Emigration and Diaspora	24
61	Institute of Georgian Emigration and Diaspora	34
62	Civil Advocacy Center	5
63	A critical citizen	314
64	Youth initiative for the future of Georgia	376
65	Public Opinion Research Center	254
66	Young Experts Club	78
67	Association Free Generation	666
68	Association of Women Entrepreneurs of Khashuri	386
69	Center for Democracy and Monitoring	2
70	Georgian Order	78
71	Initiative for Civil Society	18
72	Young people for the European future	133
73	Alternative NGO	73
74	Immigrants House	35
75	The light of the future	401
76	APM Georgia	
77	Social Environment	206
78	Association of Women Entrepreneurs	4
79	I Will Be Back	42
80	Movement of the League of Voters	137

81	Freedom Foundation	33
82	Association of Volunteers of Georgia	159
83	Association of Public Initiatives	43
84	Center for Democratic Governance	76
85	Union of Young Intellectuals of Georgia - Lazarus	39
86	Initiative group of Khoni IDPs	308
87	A new generation of democratic elections	4
88	Protected and Informed Society	41
89	Rule of Law Center	
90	Resources of Democracy and Integration	1
91	Center for Protection of Georgian Language	
92	Human Rights Center	17
93	Free Democratic Institute	106
94	Justice and Development	276
95	New Generation for Better Future	371
96	Europe-Georgia Institute	7
97	Public Administration Development Fund	3
98	Women and Development	-
99	Civil Society Development Center (CSDC)	4
100	Progress	20
101	Platform Salam	6
Total: 23,153		

Organizations marked in green also registered for observing Sakrebulo (Municipality Representative Body) elections.

ANNEX 2. International observer organizations registered by the CEC to observe 26 October 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia

#	NAME OF THE ORGANIZATION	NUMBER OF OBSERVERS REGISTERED
1	International Republican Institute (IRI)	75
2	The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)	54
3	European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO)	183
4	New Synergy for African Solidarity (SNAS AFRICA)	3
5	International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)	11
6	Central Election Commission of the Republic of Armenia	3
7	The U.S. Election Assistance Commission	1
8	Fijian Elections Office (FEO)	2
9	The U.S. Embassy in Georgia	95
10	Central Election Commission of the Republic of Moldova	2
11	Central Election Commission of the Republic of Latvia	1
12	National Election Office of Hungary	2
13	Supreme Election Council of the Republic of Turkey	2
14	State Election Commission of Montenegro	2
15	The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania	2
16	Central Election Commission of Ukraine	2
17	Electoral Commission of the Republic of Uganda	2
18	OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA)	75
19	Elections Commission of Maldives	2
20	International Center for Parliamentary Studies (ICPS)	2
21	State Electoral Office of Estonia	2
22	National Electoral Institute of Mexico	1
23	OSCE - ODIHR	691
24	National Electoral Commission of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe	1
25	Central Election Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijani	2

26	Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan	2
27	Transparencia Electoral	4
28	Central Election Commission of the Republic of Albania	2
29	Department of Elections, Referendum and Political Parties of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Slovak Republic	1
30	European Dialogue and Democracy Association (EDDA)	44
31	Commission on Elections of the Republic of Philippines	2
32	Election Commission of the Republic of Serbia	2
33	Helsinki Citizens' Assembly - Vanadzor	21
34	Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands in Georgia	8
35	General Election Commission of Mongolia	2
36	British Embassy in Georgia	22
37	Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC)	5
38	International Society for Human Rights (ISHR)	10
39	Embassy of the Kingdom of Denmark in Tbilisi	6
40	Independent Election Commission of Jordan (IEC)	2
41	Embassy of Latvia in Georgia	3
42	Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom	36
43	Albanian Institute of Electoral Systems Development (AIESD)	2
44	Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in Georgia	4
45	Election Commission of Thailand	8
46	Electoral Commission of South Africa	1
47	State Election Commission of North Macedonia	4
48	Embassy of Switzerland in Georgia	5
49	Embassy of the Czech Republic in Georgia	4
50	Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in Tbilisi	5
51	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe	67
52	International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR)	10

53	Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC)	2
54	Embassy of Hungary in Tbilisi	15
55	Embassy of Kazakhstan in Georgia	1
56	Union of Informed Citizens	8
57	Central Electoral Department of the Kyrgyz Republic Referendum Commission	2
58	European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE)	39
59	Embassy of the Republic of Estonia in Tbilisi	3
60	Members of the European Parliament and the Hungarian Parliament	7
61	Centrist Democrat International (IDC-CDI)	7
62	Parliamentary Assembly of NATO (NATO PA)	38
63	UDRUZENJE ALTERFACT	16
64	Embassy of Japan in Georgia	6
65	National Party of the Parliament of Andalusia, the Senate of Spain, and Basque	5
66	Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Georgia	3
67	Embassy of Israel in Georgia	3
68	Delegation of the European Union to Georgia	13
69	Georgian Diaspora	2
70	Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tbilisi	18
71	Embassy of Sweden in Tbilisi	5
72	Members of the Knesset (Parliament of Israel)	3
73	Embassy of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia	4
74	Members of the Milli Majilis of the Republic of Azerbaijan	9
75	European Parliament	12
76	Independent High Authority for Elections of the Republic of Tunisia	2
Total: 1,713		

Organizations Marked in green – International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Helsinki Citizens' Assembly - Vanadzor – are registered for Sakrebulo (Municipality Representative Body) Elections too.

ANNEX 3. Election results¹⁵³

Total number of registered voters	3,508,294
Voters registered for voting abroad	95,910
Total number of votes cast (turnout)	2,111,834
Voter turnout	60.20%
Number of valid votes	2,076,779
Number of invalid votes	34,974
Percentage of invalid votes	1.66%

CANDIDATE LIST ¹⁵⁴	VOTES RECEIVED	PERCENTAGE OF VOTES	ATTRIBUTED SEATS
No. 3 Party of Georgian Unity and Development	3,892	0.19%	--
No. 4 Coalition for Change	229,161	11.03%	19
No. 5 Unity – National Movement	211,216	10.17%	16
No. 6 European Democrats	7,955	0.38%	--
No. 8 Alliance of Patriots of Georgia	50,599	2.44%	--
No. 9 Strong Georgia – Lelo, For People, For Liberty!	182,922	8.81%	--
No. 10 Georgian Labour Party	15,103	0.73%	--
No. 12 Our United Georgia	1,845	0.09%	--
No. 16 Change Georgia	12,528	0.60%	--
No. 17 Georgia	2,780	0.13%	--
No. 20 Free Georgia	4,145	0.20%	--
No. 21 Tribuna	2,483	0.12%	--
No. 23 Us	2,593	0.12%	--
No. 25 Gakharia For Georgia	161,521	7.78%	12
No. 26 Left Alliance	1,260	0.06%	--
No. 27 Georgian Unity	4,500	0.22%	--
No. 36 Girchi	62,223	3.00%	--
No. 41 Georgian Dream	1,120,053	53.93%	89

153 Derived from the [CEC Summary Protocol of Results](#) for the 26 October 2024 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia, finalized on 16 November 2024.

154 Candidate lists are presented in order of the appearance on the ballot paper.

ANNEX 4. List of EOM members

CORE TEAM		
1	Zlatko Vujović	Montenegro
2	Kristina Kostelac	Croatia
3	Dubravka Popović	Montenegro
4	Beatrix Boonekamp	France
5	Peter Nemeth	Slovakia
6	Lazar Keskinov	North Macedonia
7	Milena Kalezić	Montenegro
LONG-TERM OBSERVERS		
8	Mladen Kobašević	Croatia
9	Ana Lakić	Montenegro
10	Aygul Jafarova	Azerbaijan
11	Vladimir Simonović	Montenegro
12	Dragan Nikodijević	Serbia
13	Meri Minasyan	Armenia
14	Paulo Ferreira	Portugal
15	Timur Mikhaylovskiy	Ukraine
SHORT-TERM OBSERVERS		
16	Alketa Lamani	Albania
17	Antuela Male	Albania
18	Ardit Saliaj	Albania
19	Artemon Cukalla	Albania
20	Dajan Shatraj	Albania
21	Eglantina Alliaj	Albania
22	Erjon Lushi	Albania
23	Ermir Cota	Albania
24	Ferdinand Mara	Albania
25	Gabriel Merko	Albania
26	Gazmend Agaj	Albania

27	Isida Verija	Albania
28	Klesta Kola	Albania
29	Sylvania Bylyku	Albania
30	Anahit Hovakimyan	Armenia
31	Armine Khachatryan	Armenia
32	Garik Miskaryan	Armenia
33	Lusine Manvelyan	Armenia
34	Lusine Stepanyan	Armenia
35	Mariam Hoveyan	Armenia
36	Mikhyael Pambukchyan	Armenia
37	Shushanik Avagyan	Armenia
38	Yuri Avagyan	Armenia
39	Anita Podvorec	Croatia
40	Anton Finderle	Croatia
41	Isabel Putinja	Croatia
42	Ivan Rukavina Blajda	Croatia
43	Ivor Fuka	Croatia
44	Josipa Brajković Dika	Croatia
45	Lucija Vulić	Croatia
46	Svjetlana Knežević	Croatia
47	Toni Erdfeld	Croatia
48	Zdravko Peternel	Croatia
49	Adlet Mamyrov	Kyrgyzstan
50	Akylbek Esengulov	Kyrgyzstan
51	Atyr Abdrahmatova	Kyrgyzstan
52	Baktygul Chalgynchieva	Kyrgyzstan
53	Cholpon Babaly	Kyrgyzstan
54	Erik Iriskulbekov	Kyrgyzstan
55	Murat Atagoziev	Kyrgyzstan

56	Nurbek Abdrazak Uulu	Kyrgyzstan
57	Cristina Timbur	Moldova
58	Daniela Angheluta	Moldova
59	Inga Stegarescu	Moldova
60	Mariana Novac	Moldova
61	Mihaela Ciobanu	Moldova
62	Olga Manole	Moldova
63	Radu Mereniuc	Moldova
64	Valeria Butorina	Moldova
65	Valeria Cataraga	Moldova
66	Andrea Rovčanin	Montenegro
67	Elma Ljuca	Montenegro
68	Gordana Mitrović	Montenegro
69	Katarina Prelević	Montenegro
70	Luka Pavičević	Montenegro
71	Marija Latković	Montenegro
72	Milica Kovačević	Montenegro
73	Nemanja Stankov	Montenegro
74	Siniša Gazivoda	Montenegro
75	Teodora Gilić	Montenegro
76	Teodora Skero	Montenegro
77	Zoran Rakočević	Montenegro
78	Goce Borovski	North Macedonia
79	Zlatko Dimitrioski	North Macedonia
80	Boris Junković	Serbia
81	Emir Škrijelj	Serbia
82	Ivan Mihajlović	Serbia
83	Ljiljana Bjeličić	Serbia
84	Maria Sretenović	Serbia

85	Nenad Rakić	Serbia
86	Risto Marić	Serbia
87	Branislav Solović	Slovakia
88	Jozef Majcharek	Slovakia
89	Mia Lujza Holikova	Slovakia
90	Patrik Dubovsky	Slovakia
91	Peter Novotny	Slovakia
92	Stanislava Dzurikova	Slovakia
93	Veronika Basta	Slovakia
94	Alina Zelenko	Ukraine
95	Maksym Borysov	Ukraine

ANNEX 5. List of Abbreviations

#	ABBREVIATION	MEANING
1	CEC	Central Election Commission
2	DEC	District Election Commission
3	PEC	Precinct Election Commission
4	ENEMO	European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations
5	EOM	Election Observation Mission
6	LTO	Long-Term Observer
7	STO	Short-Term Observer
8	OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
9	ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
10	PCOS	Precinct Count Optical Scanner
11	VID	Voter Identification Device
12	ULV	Unified List of Voters
13	PSDA	Public Service Development Agency
14	ICC	International Criminal Court
15	ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
16	EU	European Union
17	CT	Core Team
18	GD	Georgian dream (political party of Georgia)
19	MP	Member of Parliament
20	EMB	Electoral management body
21	NGO	Non-governmental organization
22	GEL	Georgian Lari
23	ACB	Anti-Corruption Bureau
24	UDS	United States Dollar
25	ISFED	International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (NGO in Georgia)
26	PWD	Person with disabilities
27	GYLA	Georgian Young Lawyers' Association
28	CSO	Civil society organization

29	TI Georgia	Transparency International Georgia
30	GONGO	Government-organized non-governmental organization
31	OPL	Observers of Politics and Law
32	TDIG	Training and Development Institute of Georgia
33	IEOM	International Election Observation Missions
34	SDI	Society for Democratic Culture (organization in Albania)
35	TIAC	Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center (organization in Armenia)
36	EMDS	Election Monitoring and Democratic Studies Center (organization in Azerbaijan)
37	BHC	Belarussian Helsinki Committee (organization in Belarus)
38	CCI	Centers for Civic Initiatives (organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
39	IFSED	International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy
40	KDI	Kosovo Democratic Institute (organization in Kosovo)
41	CDT	Center for Democratic Transition (organization in Montenegro)
42	CeMI	Centre for monitoring and research (organization in Montenegro)
43	CeSID	Center for Free Elections and Democracy (organization in Serbia)
44	CRTA	Center for Research
45	OKO	Obcianske OKO (organization in Slovakia)
46	IRI	International Republican Institute
47	NDI	The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
48	IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
49	FEO	Fijian Elections Office
50	OSCE PA	OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
51	ICPS	International Center for Parliamentary Studies
52	EDDA	European Dialogue and Democracy Association
53	PABSEC	Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
54	ISHR	International Society for Human Rights
55	IEC	Independent Election Commission of Jordan
56	AIESD	Albanian Institute of Electoral Systems Development
57	IPHR	International Partnership for Human Rights

58	NHC	Norwegian Helsinki Committee
59	EPDE	European Platform for Democratic Elections
60	IDC-CDI	Centrist Democrat International
61	NATO PA	Parliamentary Assembly of NATO

CIP - КАТАЛОГИЗАЦИЈА У ПУБЛИКАЦИЈИ
НАЦИОНАЛНА БИБЛИОТЕКА ЦРНЕ ГОРЕ, ЦЕТИЊЕ

ISBN 978-9940-8861-3-4
COBISS.CG-ID 32303364

EUROPEAN
NETWORK
OF ELECTION
MONITORING
ORGANIZATIONS

ENEMO