



European Network of Election
Monitoring Organizations
**Election Observation Mission to Moldova
Presidential Elections 2016**

Rețeaua Europeană a Organizațiilor
de Monitorizare a Alegerilor
**Misiunea de Monitorizare a Alegerilor
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Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions*

1 – 14 November 2016

Chisinau, 15 November 2016

Preliminary Conclusions

Run-off elections for the direct election of the President of the Republic of Moldova were held on 13 November 2016 between the two candidates who gathered the most votes in the first round held on 30 October, as none of the running candidates assured at least half of the votes of the voters participating in the first round.

The Election Observation Mission of ENEMO, established on 10 October 2016, remained in the country after the first round of the Presidential Elections to follow the run-off elections held on 13 November. Four teams of short observers were deployed and have observed the opening, voting, closing, counting and tabulation of results in 56 polling stations, as well as activity of three District Election Commissions. Moreover, five observers monitored Election Day in seven polling stations that were established to enable the Moldovan citizens residing abroad to vote. ENEMO observers have also monitored the activity of the Central Election Commission throughout Election Day.

In line with the trend observed in the first round, also during the campaigning for the run-off elections saw negative campaigning and attempts to undermine the image of both electoral contestants.



Kingdom of the Netherlands

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The legal framework has a sound legal basis for holding democratic elections; however, the provisions in the Electoral Code vaguely regulate procedures for the second round, and leave important aspects unaddressed and others open to subjective interpretations and inconsistencies in the application of the law.

Shortcomings were noted in the election dispute resolution process both in the CEC, which postponed adjudication of the complaints after the 2nd round in contradiction to the Electoral Code, and the law enforcement bodies to identify, investigate and prosecute the instances of election related violations and crimes.

Information on the CEC website about preliminary results, especially about the voter turnout and number of votes needed for the victory in the first round could be considered misleading for the public.

The Central Election Commission increased the number of the ballot papers for the second round, however due to high numbers of voters showing up in the polls abroad, some of the polling stations still faced shortage of ballot papers.

Students whose permanent residence is different from their place of study were not able to vote at the place of their study in these elections. Despite some initiatives organized between the first and second round, aiming at enabling this possibility, such as street protests, meetings with the CEC, and a legislative initiative, this was not made possible.

Strong media partisanship and biased coverage of the electoral campaign continued between the two rounds of elections. Failure to impose efficient and appropriate sanctions (i.e. timely and proportional to the gravity of the violation) for violations made by the media remains of concern, and it can be said to have limited the possibility of the public to receive impartial information, as well as equity of conditions for the candidates.

During Election Day, the Central Election Commission operated under normal conditions and in a transparent and open manner.

Election Day was generally well organized and conducted in an orderly manner, following the main procedures. However, in some polling stations, the PEBs ran out of ballot papers since the voters' participation exceeded the maximum number of ballots available. Due to this, there was a number of voters that could not exercise their voting right.

Cases of serious violations of fundamental rights – breach of secrecy of vote, intimidation, violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person that hindered full and effective exercise of their right to vote, were observed in the PSs in the psychiatric hospital and prison.

Preliminary Findings

Background

The run-off elections for the President of the Republic of Moldova were held on 13 November 2016, following the Decision No. 517 of 2 November 2016, of the Central Election Commission on announcing the second round, as none of the candidates gathered at least half of the votes of the voters who participated in the first round¹, held on 30 October.

On 13 November, Moldovan voters chose between the two candidates who gathered the most votes during the first round, Igor Dodon, representing the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) and Maia Sandu, representing the Party Action and Solidarity (PAS). For the second round, both candidates were endorsed by other political parties or former presidential candidates, besides the ones that nominated them for the office.

In line with the trend observed in the first round, also during the campaigning for the second round of elections was noticed negative campaigning and attempts to undermine the image of both electoral contestants.

Legal framework

The Electoral Code vaguely regulates procedures for the second round, as the law contains only one article specifically concerning the second round² and few specific provisions that can be found on other articles³. The lack of regulation for the second round was also noted as an issue by the stakeholders.

Any democratic election depends not only on the conduct of the election, but also on an adequate, stable and clear legal framework being in place before elections are called. Despite shortcomings, the legal framework provides a sound legal basis for holding democratic elections, as confirmed by the first round. However, the provisions in the Electoral Code concerning the second round

¹ Article 109, paragraph 1 of the Electoral Code.

² Article 109 prescribes that a presidential candidate is considered elected if s/he is supported by at least half of the voters who participated in elections. If no candidate obtains the required number of votes, a second round is held within two weeks after the first round between the two candidates who obtained the most votes. The candidate who is supported by the biggest number of votes in the second round is considered elected.

³ E.g. Article 114, paragraph 2, states that the second round of elections is valid regardless of the turnout.

leave important aspects unaddressed⁴ and others open to subjective interpretations⁵ and inconsistencies in the application of the law.

The Constitution and the Electoral Code do not contain restrictions on the right to vote of prisoners and mentally disabled persons, in line with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights⁶. However, it must be ensured that the rights guaranteed on paper are, in fact, enjoyable in practice. Upon visit in a polling station where persons with mental health problems in detention have voted, ENEMO observers noticed cases of serious violations of fundamental rights – breach of secrecy to vote, intimidation, violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person - that hindered full and effective exercise of their right to vote⁷. Moreover, they lacked a proper voter education and the campaign materials to make an informed choice.

In addition, the Electoral Code lacks clarity on campaign finance for the second round. Financial reports were submitted to the CEC by both candidates on 11 November. As required by the law, the CEC published candidate's financial reports on its webpage.

Election Administration

The information presented on the Central Election Commission (CEC) website regarding the preliminary results, especially about the voter turnout and number of votes needed for a candidate to be elected in the first round, could be considered to have been misleading for the public. Both these figures play a crucial role in presidential elections, as participation of no less than one third of the total number of voters included in the voter list is required for the elections to be considered valid, while gathering at least half of the votes of voters participating in elections is required for a candidate to be elected.

The CEC established the final results of the first round of elections by its Decision No. 516 of 2 November 2016. According to this decision, the turnout was presented at 50.95%, while the CEC official website showed the turnout at 49.18%⁸. The data presented by the Central Election Commission about the voter turnout was based on information processed by the State Automated Electronic System “Elections” and the discrepancy was due to the fact that the CEC only took into account 15,097 voters who were included in the supplementary lists because they had no official domicile registration. In the reported turnout figure, the CEC decided not to include the remaining number of 102,031 voters reflected on the supplementary lists, since they remain in the main

⁴ See Complaints and Appeals Section

⁵ Article 109, paragraph 7 regulates the situation when only one candidate remains at the second round due to other candidates' withdrawal. However, the situation when only one candidate remains at the second round due to others' death or de-registration remains unaddressed.

⁶ E.g. *Hirst v. the United Kingdom* and *Kiss v. Hungary*, prohibiting imposition of an automatic, blanket restriction on the franchise of imprisoned persons and of those with intellectual or mental disabilities, as a single class.

⁷ Polling station 1/217, especially Section No. 31 of the Psychiatric Hospital.

⁸ <http://www.cec.md/r/procese-verbale/prezidentiale2016/>.

voters' list. In addition, the data on the results for the first round, presented on the CEC website⁹, lacks clear information on the true percentage of votes that the running candidates have gathered, since the calculation is made based on valid votes cast, instead of number of voters who participated in the election, as the Electoral Code provides¹⁰.

No political affiliation has been noticed in the voting for the majority of the CEC decisions, especially the ones regarding procedural issues. However, some members of the CEC tend to align their votes along partisan lines while considering complaints¹¹.

In the period between the two rounds, the CEC has passed a number of decisions, which did not change the substance of legislative framework, but rather created a path for holding the second round, such as decision on prolonging the temporary exemptions of district election commissions (DEC) and precinct electoral bureaus (PEB) members from their main work places; decision on prolonging the validity of the most important decisions for the second round on participation of Moldova citizens living in Transnistria; participation of Moldova citizens living abroad and having expired passports; participation of Moldova citizens who do not have an official domicile registration; regulation of the presidential election campaign coverage in the media, etc.

After the first round the CEC has approved the format of the ballot and number of the ballots to be printed for the second round. Closer to Election Day, some members of the Central Election Commission suggested to increase the number of ballot papers both outside and inside the country. The argument used for this decision was requests of voters to the CEC. The final number of the ballots to be printed was established at 3,165,636 - 34,409 more than on the first round - ,414,492 of which in State language and the remaining in Russian.

On Election Day, there was a shortage of ballots, identified in at least 13 polling stations¹². This was due to the limitation of number of ballots supplied to out of country polling stations¹³. This resulted in complaints of voters¹⁴.

Voter education campaigning in audiovisual media continued during the second round also. The CEC ordered the production and broadcasting of five voter education spots, three Get-Out the Vote spots and two about election procedures. These public service advertisements were broadcasted in both State language and Russian, free of charge by the broadcasters.

During Election Day the CEC operated under normal conditions and in a transparent and open manner. The information on voters' turnout broken down by regions, gender and age of voters was provided to the public in real time. For the second round the CEC offered also information on

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Article 109, paragraph 1.

¹¹ See Complaints and Appeals Section of the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of ENEMO for the first round. http://enemo.eu/uploads/file-manager/EOMMoldova/2016_11_01-PFC_EN.pdf.

¹² Three in Italy, two in Russian Federation, two in United Kingdom, two in France, one in Belgium, one in Ireland, one in Germany and one in Romania.

¹³ Article 49, paragraph 6 of the Electoral Code provides that polling station abroad can receive a maximum of 3,000 ballot papers.

¹⁴ See Complaints and Appeal section.

turnout for out of country voting. The CEC held briefing sessions every three hours, with updated information on elections.

Overall, during Election Day the State Automated Electronic System “Elections” operated smoothly and without serious problems, which enabled the CEC to receive and announce the preliminary results of elections in a swift manner. However, in one of the polling stations, due to human mistake, according to the CEC, the results were swapped between the two candidates. According to the official protocols, Maia Sandu had received 608 and Igor Dodon 158 votes, however the SAES “Elections” data showed vice versa. The Central Election Commission has stated that the problem will be addressed upon receiving the results on paper and establishment of the final results.

Voter registration

The electronic voter’s list continued to be updated on a daily basis, but the paper voters’ lists used in the first round were also used in the second round. According to representatives of the State Register of Population there were over 6,000 personal data updates made to the Register on a daily basis. Changes in the State Registry of Population are updated automatically also at the electronic state voters’ list. The last changes introduced to the voters’ list were sealed three days before the run-off Election Day and transferred to the State Automatic Electronic System “Elections”.

1448 citizens of Moldova reached the voting age of 18 between the two rounds of elections (31 October – 13 November). These voters could vote in the second round of elections and were included in the supplementary lists.

Students studying away from their place of official registration could not vote at polling stations near their place of studies for these elections, a possibility that was provided to them in the parliamentary elections of 2014. Between the first and the second round there were some initiatives aiming at allowing students to vote near their place of study, including a protest organized in front of the CEC and a legislative initiative by the MP Valeriu Giletski. The parliament did not examine the draft-law presented by Giletski, on grounds that the rules for the voting could not be changed between the first and the second round. However, the Chairwoman of the CEC addressed the deans of universities with a letter, calling upon them to help students organize temporary residential registration.

Complaints and appeals

The Electoral Code insufficiently regulates the procedures to challenge the results of the first round, in case a second round is organized. Moreover, the two week period between the two rounds

overlaps with the timeframe for adjudication of the complaints in the CEC and the courts, leading to situations in which the appeals might still be pending on Election Day. This situation may pose a barrier to the right to appeal, which contravenes paragraph 5.10 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document¹⁵.

On both election days weaknesses were noted in the handling of complaints by the PEBs. Complainants were not always considered by the PEB as a collegial body and, at times, were just disregarded as inadmissible. As a result, most PEBs didn't take any decision or decisions were not properly reasoned, contrary to paragraph 5.11 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document¹⁶.

ENEMO EOM interlocutors expressed their dissatisfaction with efforts of law enforcement bodies to identify, investigate and prosecute instances of election related violations and crimes, undermining the right to an effective remedy¹⁷.

Following the 30 October Election Day, the CEC received seven complaints: in one case a voter wrongly contested the PEB rejection to exercise his right to vote to the CEC; one complaint was withdrawn, and one deemed outside the jurisdiction of the CEC and forwarded to the institution in charge of it. Four complaints alleged Election Code violations, and were filed by the presidential candidates against other candidates, out of them one was rejected, but in three cases the CEC postponed adjudication of the complaints after the run-off Election Day, in contradiction to the Electoral Code¹⁸.

There was no contestations of the results of the first round, nor any appeal on other grounds lodged with the Chisinau Court of Appeal.

On 13 November, the run-off Election day, the CEC received a complaint from the representative of the candidate Igor Dodon at the CEC on violation of the electoral silence by the broadcaster TVR Moldova. According to the complainant, the broadcaster had violated the Electoral Code¹⁹ by disseminating electoral propaganda on Election Day and the Regulation No. 181²⁰ adopted by the CEC on mass media coverage for the Presidential Elections, during a broadcast in which the two candidates' geopolitical positions and support or lack of international support were commented upon. The CEC deemed the complaint outside its jurisdiction and forwarded it to the Audiovisual Coordination Council, which is the body in charge for regulating the conduct of audiovisual media.

¹⁵ Paragraph 5.10 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides that "everyone will have an effective means of redress against administrative decisions, so as to guarantee respect for fundamental rights and ensure legal integrity."

¹⁶ Paragraph 5.11 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document provides that "administrative decisions against a person must be fully justifiable."

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Article 67, paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code states that complaints against electoral candidates are examined within 5 calendar days but not later than Election Day).

¹⁹ Article 47, paragraph 8.

²⁰ Article 56.

Election Day

ENEMO EOM deployed four teams of short-term observers in the Republic of Moldova, who monitored the opening, voting, closing and counting procedures in a limited number of polling stations throughout Election Day. Moreover, five short-term observers monitored the procedures in polling stations established in five cities outside Moldova²¹.

In total, ENEMO STOs observed the opening procedures in four polling stations in Moldova and five abroad; voting procedures in 48 polling stations in Moldova and seven abroad, and closing procedures in four polling stations in Moldova and five abroad.

STOs followed also the process of delivery and intake of electoral materials from the PEBs to the DEC in three DEC.

Election Day was generally well organized and elections took place in an orderly manner. Isolated cases of irregularities observed did not affect the electoral process. However, in some polling stations, both in Moldova and abroad, there were voters that could not exercise their voting right due to shortage of ballot papers, because the number of voters who arrived at the polls exceeded the number of available ballot papers²². Accordingly, a few complaints regarding restriction to exercise the right to vote were addressed to the CEC by email from out of country voters.

Opening

ENEMO STOs observed the opening process in four polling stations in the Republic of Moldova and five polling stations abroad. All polling stations observed were opened on time (07:00 AM) and with all needed materials for voting. Of the four polling stations observed in Moldova, two were open in the presence of all PEB members, while two of them were opened with partial presence of PEB members²³, but with the needed quorum.

Opening procedures were generally followed properly in the observed polling stations, both in Moldova and abroad, except two cases. In one of the polling stations it was observed improper sealing of the ballot boxes, using only three security seals instead of four²⁴, while in the other one²⁵ opening procedures were not transparent, the opening protocol seemed already filled in before the opening of the polling station, the PEB members allowed voters inside the polling station before

²¹ Bucharest and Brasov (Romania), St. Petersburg (Russian Federation), Kyiv and Odessa (Ukraine).

²² Such cases were observed in PS No. 1/390 in Bucharest and in PS No. 4/41 in Varnitsa. The latter was one of the polling stations assigned to voters residing in Transnistria.

²³ PSs No. 25/54 and 1/121.

²⁴ PS No. 1/112.

²⁵ PS No. 25/54.

the opening procedures were completed, and the setup of the polling station did not make it possible to observe all aspects of the voting process simultaneously.

Voting

ENEMO observers visited 48 polling stations in Moldova throughout Election Day and observed the voting procedures. Additionally, seven polling stations were observed abroad. The overall evaluation of observers was generally positive in 52 of 55 observed polling stations. However, observers reported some irregularities such as inappropriately sealed ballot boxes²⁶, instances of inadequate checking of voters IDs²⁷, and unsafe storage of ballot papers²⁸. The observers noted that secrecy of the vote was not compromised but could have been much better safeguarded with more adequate layout and design of voting booths.

PEBs were commended for good organization and efficiency, however, some room for improvement has been noted in the main procedural aspects, which are not clearly described in the framework or PEB instructions (e.g. sealing of ballot boxes, set up of polling stations, folding of ballot papers, lack of direction of voters to the operators' desk, candidate representatives allowed to stay near ballot boxes²⁹).

The electronic voter database functioned well both in country and abroad, with few cases of internet connectivity difficulties, that had to be resolved by operators entering voters in the electronic system after the connection was reestablished. Of concern remains the fact that these voters could not, however, be checked if they voted previously before being issued a ballot paper and allowed to vote, as the data were entered into the system after they voted.

ENEMO observer from out-of-country polling station No. 1/390 in Bucharest reported that thirty voters were denied the right to vote since the PEB ran out of ballot papers due to the fact that more than 3,000 voters turned up at this polling station. According to the information from the CEC, there were altogether thirteen polling stations abroad that encountered shortage of ballot papers since the interest of voters exceeded maximum of three thousands of ballots.

Vote Count

ENEMO observers visited nine polling stations during the closing of polling stations and the vote count. In one case the voting was extended up to 21:30 to allow voters in queue to vote, but not all of them were able to vote due to shortage of ballots³⁰. Seven of nine PEBs were assessed

²⁶ 6/48 polling stations in Moldova.

²⁷ 5/48 polling stations in Moldova.

²⁸ 2/48 polling stations in Moldova.

²⁹ PS No. 25/54

³⁰ PS No. 1/390

positively, however, some procedural shortcomings were noted during the vote count as the PEBs did not follow properly and in the right sequence all the counting procedures (stationary box opened before the mobile box, marks in the protocol not made after each step of count, each ballot not announced after sorting by candidates³¹). Nevertheless, observers reported that such shortcomings were caused by rushing through the vote count process and were due to negligence rather than intentional fraudulent behavior.

Transfer of Materials and DEC Activity

ENEMO observers followed transfer of materials from polling stations to the DEC in three cases. The STO team in Orhei reported that the PEB³² stopped at the courthouse first, to deliver the ballot papers and other electoral materials, before transferring the protocols to the DEC. Similarly to the first round, the DEC premises were quite small and not adequate for a transparent tabulation process open to all observers.

Participation of women and persons living with disability

Of the two candidates participating in the run-off elections, one was a man and one was a woman. Regarding PEB membership, again women constituted the majority in most polling stations visited by ENEMO observers throughout Election Day³³. Women were also in majority in leadership positions in the observed PEBs, although their number in the position of Chairperson was lower as compared to total number of woman PEB members or position of Secretary³⁴

Inclusion of persons living with disabilities (PLWD) in the electoral process needs more attention from state institutions. The CEC has undertaken some steps in this direction, in cooperation with NGOs working in this field, but these efforts are sporadic and depending on specific activities initiated by civil society organizations or international donations, while a structured and comprehensive strategy for the inclusion of persons living with disabilities in the electoral process is lacking.

³¹ A procedural breach was observed during the vote counting in PS No. 1/320, in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation. The PEB did not count the votes cast for both candidates, as the law provides, but instead decided to detract the number of votes cast for one of them and invalid votes from the total number of ballots cast and thus calculate the number of votes cast for the other candidate based on the result of deduction.

³² PEB 25/01

³³ Woman constituted the majority of PEB members in 7/56 PEBs visited during Election Day in Moldova. On average, 73% of the PEB members in the visited polling station were women.

³⁴ Respectively, 63% of the PEBs visited had a woman as Chairperson, 73% as Deputy Chairperson and 93% as Secretary.

Over 85% of the polling stations visited by ENEMO observers on Election Day lacked adequate structures that would facilitate access of persons with locomotor disabilities (especially persons on a wheelchair) to the polling station³⁵.

In 17% of the visited polling stations were available magnifying glasses for voters with slight visual impairment, but in no polling stations were available templates in Braille alphabet that would enable blind voters to cast their ballot independently. In three polling stations established in the country were available machines that made it possible for persons with serious visual impairment to vote independently. ENEMO observers visited one of these polling stations in Chisinau during Election Day and were informed that very few voters used it during Election Day. Moreover, in three polling stations were present sign language interpreters to assist voters with hearing impairment.

Media

Imbalanced and partisan media coverage of the electoral campaign continued also during the second round of elections, based on both the Audiovisual Coordination Council (CCA) reports and those of domestic media monitoring organizations, as well as other interlocutors.

Upon examination of the third monitoring report, covering the period 20 – 30 October 2016, on 11 November the CCA has sanctioned nine TV channels³⁶ for unbalanced and partisan coverage. For seven of the sanctioned TV channels³⁷ the violation was repeated and this was their third sanction. Nevertheless, the CCA decided to apply again the same sanction that was applied previously, on 28 October³⁸. These broadcasters received, thus, again the maximum fine prescribed by the law, which is very low³⁹, although the violation was repeated, in which case the legal framework allows for harsher sanctions. Two of the sanctioned TV channels⁴⁰ received a public warning as this was their first violation.

The electoral silence was not respected online, even for the second round, as electoral advertising was present both the day before and on Election Day. Moreover, the candidate Igor Dodon submitted a complaint to the CEC about violation of electoral silence from TVR Moldova during

³⁵ ENEMO observers evaluated accessibility for persons with locomotor disabilities at the polling stations as “requiring minor assistance” in 42% of the visited polling stations and as “inaccessible” in 43% of them.

³⁶ “Prime”, “Canal 3”, “Canal 2”, “Publika TV”, “Accent TV”, “NTV Moldova”, “Jurnal TV”, “TV7”, and “Ren Moldova”.

³⁷ “Prime”, “Canal 3”, “Canal 2”, “Publika TV”, “Accent TV”, “NTV Moldova”, and “Jurnal TV”.

³⁸ Refer to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of ENEMO EOM issued on 1 November 2016, after the first round of elections. http://enemo.eu/uploads/file-manager/EOMMoldova/2016_11_01-PFC_EN.pdf.

³⁹ 5,400 MDL.

⁴⁰ “TV7” and “Ren Moldova”.

a broadcast on Election Day, complaint which the CEC decided to forward to the Audiovisual Coordination Council⁴¹.

Failure to impose efficient and appropriate sanctions (i.e. timely and proportional to the gravity of the violation) for the media remains of concern, and it can be said to have limited the possibility of the public to receive impartial information, as well as equity of conditions for the candidates.

Election observation

In the period between the first and the second round, the Central Election Commission has accredited 197 additional domestic observers, eight of whom were accredited to observe polling stations abroad. Additionally, 74 international observers were also accredited by the CEC, from three embassies, one non-governmental organization, three parliamentary groups, and three international election observation missions. The domestic NGO Promo-LEX was again present with their observers countrywide, covering all polling stations.

ENEMO observers have not reported obstruction of their right to observe in any of the visited polling stations.

Mission information and acknowledgements

The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) is an international network of 23 leading non-profit, non-partisan and non-governmental organizations⁴² from 18 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including three European Union countries, founded on 29 September 2001.

Following an invitation from the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, on 10 October 2016 the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe and assess the Presidential Elections of 30 October. The EOM is composed of six core team members, based in Chisinau. The EOM remained in the

⁴¹ Refer to Complaints and Appeals section.

⁴² ENEMO member organizations are: Center for Civic Initiatives - Bosnia and Herzegovina; Center for Democratic Transition – Montenegro; Center for Free Elections and Democracy – Serbia; Center for Monitoring and Research CeMI – Montenegro; Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society – Kyrgyzstan; Committee of Ukrainian Voters - Ukraine; Election Monitoring Center – Azerbaijan; GONG – Croatia; ISFED – Georgia; It's your choice – Armenia; Citizens Association MOST – Macedonia; Pro-Democracy Association – Romania; Republican Network of Independent Monitors – Kazakhstan; Golos – Russia; Obcianske Oko – Slovakia; Belarusian Helsinki Committee – Belarus; Society for Democratic Culture – Albania; Promo LEX – Moldova; KRIIK Albania Association; Human Rights Centre "Viasna" – Belarus; Foundation for Support of Civic Initiatives – Kazakhstan; Kosovo Democratic Institute – Kosovo; OPORA – Ukraine.

country after the first round to follow the run-off elections held on 13 November. Four teams of short observers were deployed and have observed the opening, voting, closing, counting and tabulation of results in 56 PEBs, as well as activity of three DEC. Moreover, five observers monitored Election Day in seven polling stations established to enable the voting of Moldovan citizens residing abroad⁴³. ENEMO observers have also monitored the activity of the CEC throughout Election Day.

The conclusions and findings for the run-off elections are based on findings of the Core Team and short-term observers, in reference to compliance with international standards for democratic elections, national legislative framework, and OSCE commitments. This Statement does not render a final assessment of the elections and it should be considered in conjunction with the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on 1 November⁴⁴, after the first round of voting. The EOM will defer its final assessment until the end of the process and issue a final comprehensive report, including recommendations for potential improvement, within 60 days from the run-off Election Day.

ENEMO's International Election Observation Mission for the Presidential Elections of 30 October 2016 in Moldova is financially supported by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, within the Accountability Fund Program; and the Black Sea Trust, a Project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

**The English version of this Statement is the only official document.
An unofficial translation is available in Romanian.*

⁴³ Bucharest and Brasov (Romania); St. Petersburg (Russian Federation); Kyiv and Odessa (Ukraine).

⁴⁴ ENEMO EOM for the Presidential Elections of 30 October 2016 in the Republic of Moldova. *Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 1 November 2016.* http://enemo.eu/uploads/file-manager/EOMMoldova/2016_11_01-PFC_EN.pdf.