


INTERNATIONAL  
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION

**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS  
UKRAINE 2019  
FINAL REPORT**





**ENEMO** INTERNATIONAL  
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION

**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS - UKRAINE 2019**

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**FINAL REPORT**

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**ENEMO European Network of Election Monitoring  
Organizations  
Election Observation Mission  
Ukraine  
Early Parliamentary Elections, 21 July 2019**



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**Published by:**  
ENEMO - European Network of Election  
Monitoring Organizations

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**DISCLAIMER: This publication was produced with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Its contents are the sole responsibility of ENEMO and do not necessarily reflect the views of its donors.**

**ENEMO** INTERNATIONAL  
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION

**PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS - UKRAINE 2019**

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**FINAL REPORT**

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# I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the March and April 2019 presidential elections, Ukrainian voters were called again to the polls for the July 21st early parliamentary elections to determine the new composition of the Verkhovna Rada.

The expectations of Ukrainian citizens were high in this election regarding the new composition of parliament, in continuation of the trends observed during the presidential elections held earlier this year. The presidential elections 2019 showed that many citizens hoped for advances in the reform agenda, the fight against corruption, and a renewal of the political elite.

Parliamentary elections were held under the same legislation as for the previous early parliamentary elections in 2014. Although there is an overall legal framework for holding democratic and fair elections in Ukraine, the existing law on parliamentary elections did not provide effective mechanisms to cope with most shortcomings reported by ENEMO and other international and domestic election monitoring missions during previous elections, especially those related to ineffective oversight and sanctioning mechanisms for election campaigning and financing, the abuse of state resources, registration of candidates, double jurisdiction of election dispute resolution, media conduct, composition of lower levels of election administration, etc.

The Verkhovna Rada comprises 450 seats, with MPs elected for a five-year term. Under the current electoral legislation, 225 members of parliament are elected using a single nation-wide closed party-list proportional system with a 5% electoral threshold, and 225 MPs should be elected in single-mandate electoral districts. Due to the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, however, and the ongoing occupation of parts of territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, only 424 seats were elected: 225 through party lists and 199 in single-mandate constituencies.

On Election Day, ENEMO deployed 58 teams of multinational observers to follow the process of preparing and opening polling stations, the voting and counting process, and the transfer and intake of election materials by District Election Commissions (DECs). Observation teams, composed of 40 long term observers and 76 short term observers, monitored the opening procedures in 58 polling stations, voting in 763 polling stations, and closing and counting in 58 polling stations. In addition, ENEMO observed the intake of election materials and the tabulation of results in 57 DECs.

Election Day was, overall, calm and peaceful. The management of the polling and conduct of Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) and DEC members were assessed positively in the majority of cases, with slight procedural violations in some polling stations, which were assessed as not having negatively affected the legitimacy of the results.

The voter turnout, as announced officially by the Central Election Commission (CEC), was 49.84%, and the results of the election showed considerable support for the “Servant of the People” presidential party which obtained an absolute majority of 254 seats (124 through the party list, 130 through single-mandate constituencies).

The other four parties which obtained seats in the new Parliament through their party lists and single mandate constituencies were Opposition Platform – For Life (43 seats), Fatherland (26 seats), European Solidarity (25 seats), and Holos (20 seats). The remaining parties, Opposition Block, Svoboda, Samopomic, United Center, and Bila Tserkva Together, obtained a marginal number of seats through single-mandate constituencies. The remaining seats were filled by self-nominated candidates.

ENEMO notes that the results of the election suggest that 86 newly-elected MPs will be women, which is slightly over 20% of the Parliament’s composition, a positive increase in comparison with women’s representation under the VIII convocation of the Verkhovna Rada.

Elections were held in a competitively and generally peaceful environment, despite tight deadlines and remaining shortcomings in the legislation. The election administration functioned in an overall transparent and efficient manner.

The process of candidate registration revealed issues, particularly around the five-year residency requirement, registration/deregistration of candidates, and late inclusion of parties in the race, resulting in numerous court cases and additional pressure on the CEC.

There were a high number of DEC member replacements (including management positions), with approximately 56% of DEC members having been replaced by Election Day, while some positions were left vacant. Many of these changes occurred after training for DEC members had been conducted.

DEC members also struggled to find sufficient PEC members due to a deficit in the number of PEC nominations by parties, in addition to multiple replacements of PEC members. Replacement issues did not seem to significantly impact the professionalism of PEC members on Election Day, though ENEMO observed that some PEC members were not fully familiar with counting procedures.

The law does not provide a legal deadline for replacements of DEC and PEC members. ENEMO observers also reported on significant variances in the levels of the experience of electoral commission members. Changes in the composition of electoral commissions at the district and precinct levels on the eve of the elections and on Election Day additionally challenged the work of some of the electoral commissions.

No major concerns need to be raised with regard to the accuracy of voter lists, despite minor mistakes which were mostly corrected in time, and considerable queues at voter registration offices closer to the registration deadline, due to a large increase in requests. ENEMO notes that additional steps are required for access to persons with disabilities (PWDs) at voter registration offices and polling stations, and amendments to the legislation for the full enfranchisement of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The elections were overall competitive, and candidates were generally free to campaign without major obstacles. ENEMO observed a higher level of active campaigning by majoritarian single-mandate district candidates, with the visibility of campaigning at the local level surpassing campaigning on the national scale.

ENEMO observed that campaigning was ongoing on the “day of silence”, and on Election Day, with open campaigning on digital platforms, cases of newly replaced billboards, and signs of campaigning and campaign materials inside or in the vicinity of polling stations in isolated cases. Early campaigning also remains unsanctioned within the law.

Additional concerns should be raised with regard to the considerable number of “clone” candidates (i.e. candidates with the same names as other candidates), especially in single-mandate constituencies, with numerous cases being reported. ENEMO assessed this phenomenon as a considerable risk due to potentially confusing voters and thus affecting their actions. The use of charity organizations for campaigning, bearing names of parties and candidates, and vote buying were reported to ENEMO observers.

The presidential administration put significant effort into influencing the campaign by proposing to expand laws on lustration and the need to remove discredited politicians from power. This is illustrated by the frequent visits of President Zelensky to the oblasts and applying pressure to local officials regarding under-achievement under their mandate. Observers also reported cases where mayors were actively supporting candidates in single-mandate constituencies through campaign videos or campaign events.

Ineffective oversight and sanctioning mechanisms for election campaigning and financing were often misused by candidates and parties to influence the choice of voters, and in addition to the involvement of state officials in campaigning, pressure on voters and a large number of initiated cases of vote buying were reported, especially in favour of candidates in single-mandate constituencies.

The financial reports of parties revealed that the overwhelming majority of expenses from electoral funds were used on television advertising. ENEMO notes, however, that expenses for social network advertising used during the campaign period were often not reported in the financial reports of political parties and candidates.

NGOs were used as a means to finance political parties (NGOs are not required by law to publish financial reports) and third-party companies organized campaign events through expenses which do not appear in reports. ENEMO assesses this as a risk through the use of this opportunity as a means to conceal revenues and expenditures used for campaigning.

The media played a key role during these elections. Contestants spent more than two-thirds of their election funds on TV advertisements and paid outreach through social platforms. Voters were able to obtain information about the campaigns of election contestants, bearing in mind the diversity of media outlets and the level of usage of social media platforms.

Equal and impartial treatment by the media was not sufficiently insured, due to centralized media ownership and strongly influenced editorial policies. The principles of fairness, balance, and impartiality in the coverage of election campaigns lack effective control mechanisms and oversight. In addition, the public broadcaster is not provided with sufficient funding to counterbalance politicized private media reporting, limiting the ability of voters to make an informed choice.

Problems related to the adjudication of electoral disputes remain unsolved, although the right to an effective remedy is guaranteed in legislation. Regulations on electoral disputes are unnecessarily restrictive, as illustrated by the large number of submitted complaints that were returned to the complainants without consideration by the CEC.

ENEMO notes that there is no publicly available registry of all submitted complaints at any level of election administration, which limits the transparency of the process. Although a high number of complaints are reported to the police, the majority are not classified as a crime, nor an offence, and are still pending, which may limit effective legal remedy.

## II INTRODUCTION

The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) is a network of 21 leading election monitoring organizations from 18 countries in Europe and Central Asia, including two European Union countries.

ENEMO and all of its member organizations have endorsed the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations. Each ENEMO observer signs the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers, ensuring that the observation missions are performed under the principles of impartiality and objectiveness.

Following official accreditation by the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Ukraine, in addition to the eleven core team members based in Kyiv, ENEMO accredited and deployed 40 long term observers (LTOs) and 76 short term observers, in teams of two to all regions (oblasts) of Ukraine.

In total, throughout four weeks of deployment, 20 teams of ENEMO long-term observers conducted 1,817 meetings with various interlocutors, attended 90 DEC sessions, reported on 104 campaign events and covered all DECs. On Election Day, 58 teams of multinational observers were deployed to follow the process of the preparation and opening of polling stations, the voting and counting process, and the transfer and intake of election materials by DECs. Observation teams, composed of 40 long term observers and 76 short term observers, monitored the opening procedures in 58 polling stations, voting in 763 polling stations, and closing and counting in 58 polling stations. ENEMO also observed the intake of election materials and the tabulation of results in 57 DECs.

This final report is based on ENEMO mission observations and findings during the period of June-August 2019, including the pre-election period, election day, and post-election period. This report should be read in conjunction with the previous interim report and statement on preliminary findings available at: <http://www.enemo.eu/en/missions/ukraine-early-parliamentary-2019/>.

ENEMO has observed all elections in Ukraine since 2004, gathering substantial knowledge and experience, which contributed to the success of this mission.

The ENEMO mission for Early Parliamentary Elections 2019 would like to thank the authorities of Ukraine for their assistance and cooperation in the course of the observation, as well as all interlocutors for taking the time to meet with us and share their views. ENEMO would also like to acknowledge all the observers that have contributed to these findings.

ENEMO also takes this opportunity to express their highest appreciation to the United States Agency for International Development through the National Democratic Institute, the Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for their financial support of the election monitoring mission.

## III BACKGROUND

Early parliamentary elections were held on July 21st, 2019. Parliamentary elections were initially scheduled for October 27th, 2019, however, after Volodymyr Zelensky's landslide victory against Petro Poroshenko in the presidential election on April 21st, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) was dissolved and snap elections were announced on May 21st<sup>1</sup>. The constitutionality of the President's decision to dissolve parliament due to the absence of a majority coalition was challenged by 62 MPs in the Constitutional Court. On June 20th, however, the Court ruled that the decree was in line with the Constitution, enabling the elections to take place as announced.

Although the Verkhovna Rada adopted a new electoral code on July 11th, streamlining the provisions for presidential, parliamentary, and local elections and providing for fully proportional "open" party lists, the 2019 elections were held under the mixed parallel proportional-majoritarian system and essentially the same legal framework as in 2014. The new electoral code is expected to fully enter into force in 2023.

Due to the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, as well as the ongoing occupation of parts of the territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, only 423 mandates in the Verkhovna Rada were elected in 2014 parliamentary elections. In the 2019 elections, 424 seats were up for election, with 225 elected through party lists in the nation-wide constituency and 199 elected in single-mandate districts.

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<sup>1</sup>Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 303/2019 "On early termination of powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the appointment of early elections".

The electoral process, administered by the CEC, was primarily regulated by the 2011 “Law on the Election of People’s Deputies of Ukraine” (parliamentary elections law). The expectations of Ukrainian citizens were high in this election, regarding the new composition of the parliament, in continuation of the trends observed during the presidential elections held earlier this year. The presidential elections in 2019 showed that many citizens hope for advances in the reform agenda, the fight against corruption, and a renewal of the political elite<sup>2</sup>.

Although the overall conditions for holding democratic and fair elections are present in Ukraine, elections continue to be held in a tense and challenging security environment due to the hybrid-war with the Russian Federation in the East of the country. These elections were also conducted with short and strenuous deadlines, and issues in the legal framework that had remained unaddressed since 2014.

Despite these ongoing challenges, Election Day took place in an overall calm and peaceful atmosphere. The voter turnout, as announced officially by the CEC, was 49.84%. The results of the election showed considerable support for the presidential party and candidates from Servant of the People, which obtained an absolute majority of 254 seats (124 through the party list, 130 through single-mandate constituencies).

The other four parties which obtained seats in the new Parliament through their party lists and single mandate constituencies were Opposition Platform – For Life (43 seats), Fatherland (26 seats), European Solidarity (25 seats), and Holos (20 seats). The remaining parties, Opposition Block, Svoboda, Samopomic, United Centre, and Bila Tserkva Together, obtained a marginal number of seats through single-mandate constituencies. The remaining seats were filled by self-nominated candidates. As a consequence, the newly elected Parliament will be composed of a considerable number of MPs affiliated to Servant of the People, giving President Zelensky a comfortable majority in Parliament.

ENEMO notes that the results of the election suggest that 86 newly-elected MPs will be women, which represents slightly over 20% of the Parliament composition, a positive increase in comparison with women’s representation under the current convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. Although these proportions remain low in comparison with the number of male MPs, ENEMO highlights this increase as a positive trend in Ukrainian politics.

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<sup>2</sup> For instance, 59% of citizens declared they were “definitely in favor” of the dissolution of Parliament in May 2019 (source: “Rating” polling group, “Monitoring Ukraine’s electoral mood” (May 16th-21st))

# IV LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

## A. Legal framework

The legal framework that regulates parliamentary elections in Ukraine primarily consists of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law on the Election of the People's Deputies of Ukraine,<sup>3</sup> which includes the work of the election administration, pre-election campaign, financial activity with electoral purposes, and election dispute resolution. At the same time, certain segments of elections are regulated by the Law on the Central Election Commission;<sup>4</sup> Law on State Voter Register;<sup>5</sup> Law on Political Parties; Code of Administrative Proceedings;<sup>7</sup> Code of Administrative Offenses<sup>8</sup> and the Criminal Code.<sup>9</sup>

The existing legal framework, and specifically the parliamentary elections law, was adopted prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections, and was substantially amended ahead of the 2014 early parliamentary elections (more recent amendments were made in 2016 and February 2019, particularly with regard to political finance transparency and accountability). The vast majority of the provisions, however, need to be updated according to other existing legislation. For instance, current legal terms and procedures for public procurement exceed the terms of the election process, since the Law on Public Procurement does not provide for any exceptions for election procedures. According to the head of the CEC, the commission is consequently not able to properly hold tender procedures for the production and distribution of ballot papers, protocols, acts, and other documents under the current legislation.<sup>10</sup>

ENEMO further notes that many of the concerns regarding the legal framework raised in 2014 have not yet been addressed, including limitations regarding the five-year residency requirement, the exclusion of candidates who have a criminal record, rules of formation and composition of DEC and PECs, enfranchising of IDPs, etc. Campaign financing rules are also weak and lack effective institutional and public oversight, and penalties for noncompliance are missing.

Notwithstanding that substantial recommendations issued by international and domestic observers remain unaddressed (e.g. greater

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<sup>3</sup>No. 4061-VI, dated November 17, 2011 amended in 2019

<sup>4</sup>No. 1932-IV, dated June 30, 2004; amended in 2018

<sup>5</sup>No. 698-V, dated February 22, 2007; amended in 2016

<sup>6</sup>No. 2365-III, dated April 28, 2001; amended in 2017

<sup>7</sup>No. 2747-IV, dated July 6, 2005; amended in 2018

<sup>8</sup>No. 8073-X, dated December 7, 1984; amended in 2019

<sup>9</sup>No. 2341-III, dated April 5, 2001; amended in 2019

<sup>10</sup>Public statement of the head of the CEC: [https://www.cvk.gov.ua/news/news\\_27052019\\_1.htm](https://www.cvk.gov.ua/news/news_27052019_1.htm)

transparency of campaign finance; composition of the election administration; ensuring a clear system for handling election complaints and appeals, etc.), the existing legal framework provides sufficient grounds for the conduct of democratic elections.

## B. Electoral system

The Verkhovna Rada is elected for a five-year term on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. Since 2011, elections have been held under a mixed system of proportional representation and single-member constituencies. Candidates can be elected either through party lists in a nationwide constituency, or in single-mandate constituencies, either by being nominated by a political party or through self-nomination. The Verkhovna Rada comprises 450 seats, with 225 MPs elected through a single nation-wide closed party-list proportional system with a 5% electoral threshold. The other 225 seats are elected via a single round first-past-the-post majoritarian system (the candidate with the highest total number of votes wins) in single-mandate constituencies.

Due to the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 by the Russian Federation, however, as well as the ongoing occupation of parts of territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, only 424 seats were contested, 225 through party lists in the nation-wide constituency and 199 in single-mandate districts. Two separate ballot papers with different colours and formatting were used to distinguish voting in the nation-wide constituency and the single-mandate constituencies, and are separately counted. Seats obtained in the 199 single mandate constituencies are directly allocated to the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes in their respective constituencies.

# V ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Parliamentary elections in Ukraine are administered using a three-tier hierarchy of electoral commissions: the CEC, which is a permanent body composed of 17 members nominated for a seven year renewable term; 199 District Election Commissions (DECs) with 18 members each; and nearly 30,000 Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) of from 10 to 18 members depending on the number of registered voters and size of polling stations. As of September 20th 2018, one seat in the CEC was still vacant (due to a failure to reach an agreement for nomination of the remaining member between former President Poroshenko and MPs).

Since the Crimean peninsula was annexed by the Russian Federation and certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are out of the effective control of Ukraine, 12 DEC in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in Sevastopol, 9 out of 21 DEC in Donetsk and 5 DEC out of 11 in Luhansk were not formed.

Out of 29,885 PECs, 28,637 regular polling stations were established, 102 polling stations for voting abroad (voters at foreign polling stations may vote only in the nation-wide proportional constituency), and 1,146 special polling stations (for prison, health facilities, etc.).

## A. Central Election Commission (CEC)

ENEMO observed that the CEC worked promptly and efficiently in organizing the process under a strenuous agenda and difficult deadlines. Its sessions were mostly open to the public, accessed by registered observers, and live-streamed by local civil society organizations. Official resolutions taken by the CEC were posted on their website in a timely manner.

The CEC operated in an overall transparent manner. ENEMO observed, however, that the CEC held preparatory sessions that were not publicly announced and not accessible to the public and journalists, on several occasions. ENEMO observers were allowed to observe those sessions, but only upon request.

The CEC encountered a high level of challenges in these elections. Due to a lack of provisions in the Law on Public Procurement regarding adequate timeframes for holding early elections, the CEC sought a solution by appealing to Parliament and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. In May, Parliament refused the adoption of a draft law facilitating tenders and procurement (including publication and delivery of election materials such as ballot papers, election related goods and services, activities of DEC, etc.). An effective remedy was found through an order of the Ministry of Economy, simplifying procurement procedures, as the Law on Public Procurement does not contain adequate provisions regarding the procurement measures essential to holding early elections. ENEMO notes the challenge caused by the lack of legislative amendments which would allow the CEC to follow procedures which match expected timeframes for the implementation of early elections.

The CEC also faced challenges due to the large number of candidate and party registration requests during the last few days before the legal deadline. A significant number of requests denied by the CEC were challenged in court, resulting in uncertainties which risked compromising the deadlines for electoral administration (for example, the printing and delivery of ballot papers on time).

The CEC issued bi-laws and resolutions in order to compensate for the gaps in the legal framework. By doing so, the Commission took liability upon itself and was exposed to legal proceedings, as shown by the considerable number of court cases initiated against its decisions.

By July 21st, the CEC had adopted a total of 879 regulatory acts since the start of the electoral process. Most of the resolutions were related to registration or of the refused registration of candidates and party lists, the formation of electoral commissions, procurement, approval of DEC decisions, registration of representatives of political parties, approval of form, text and colour of the ballot papers, approval of forms for financial reports on the receipt and the use of funds of election funds of political parties and candidates, and DEC member nominations and replacements.

## B. District Election Commissions (DECs)

ENEMO notes that despite constraining timeframes, the CEC formed all 199 DECs by the May 31st deadline. Each DEC comprised 18 members nominated by six political parties with mandates in the current Parliament (Fatherland, People's Front, Samopomic, European Solidarity, Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko, Opposition Block) and by any of the 29 political parties which had lists competing in the 2014 parliamentary elections. Each entity had the right to submit one candidate per DEC. All DECs were established with full-membership, composed of 3,582 members in total, and the CEC posted the list of DECs and their compositions on their website in a timely manner.

In total, 5,756 candidates were proposed - 4,577 nominated by 25 out of the 29 political parties from previous elections and attributed through the drawing of lots (one per DEC), and 1,179 members included from the six parliamentary factions (which all used their right to nominate members). ENEMO notes that overall the principle of proportionality was respected in accordance with the law. It should be noted that political parties which were newcomers in this election were not entitled to nominate candidates for DEC membership, and that some parties had two DEC members following the lot-drawing process.

As of June 20th, according to CEC data, there were a total of 3,549 DEC members (in total, 33 members less than full composition), implying that some DEC member positions were still vacant on the eve of the elections. Some members were dismissed close to Election Day, and 23 DECs were not operating under full membership composition (but had enough members nominated to operate, with no DEC having less than 14 members).

Approximately 59% of DEC members, 49% of DEC chairs, 55% of deputy chairs and 67% of secretaries were women.

There were a high number of DEC member replacements (including management positions), with approximately 56% of DEC members being replaced, and some positions were additionally left vacant. ENEMO assessed this high rate of membership turnover as problematic, since training for DEC members was conducted from June 20th to June 27th and there were a significant number of changes after those dates. An estimated 600-700 DEC members were replaced after June 27th, implying that those new members did not in fact undergo DEC training. This resulted in uneven levels of preparedness and knowledge of procedures by DEC members, although the phenomena did not seem to affect the process of tabulation of results at the DEC level overall. The graph below illustrates the number of changes which occurred regarding DEC members from May 31st up until July 15th .<sup>11</sup>





Figure 1. Number of changes of DEC members by date

The law does not provide a legal deadline after which replacements of DEC members are no longer allowed. ENEMO observers also reported significant variances in the levels of past experience of DEC members.

The highest number of changes were made by 5.10, Samopomic, and Opposition Block parties, but all parties entitled to nominate DEC members replaced at least one member, and most replaced several.

<sup>11</sup>Data collected by ENEMO, by examining CEC decisions on DEC member replacements on the official CEC website.



"Opposition Block" (parliamentary fraction)	50%
"European Solidarity" (parliamentary fraction)	19%
Samopomic (parliamentary fraction)	39%
"Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko" (parliamentary fraction)	38%
"People's Front" (parliamentary fraction)	24%
"Fatherland" (parliamentary fraction)	20%
"The Power of People"	60%
"People's Front"	64%
"5.10"	214%
Samopomic	200%
"Internet Party of Ukraine"	136%
"All-Ukrainian Agrarian Association" Zastup"	15%
"Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko"	121%

"Opposition Block"	152%
"United Country"	43%
"Ukraine of the Future"	19%
Strong Ukraine Party	29%
Ukrainian Party "Green Planet"	86%
"Civic Position"	59%
"Strength and Honor"	33%
Renaissance Party	69%
"New Politics"	134%
"European Solidarity"	56%
"Solidarity of women of Ukraine"	90%
"Fatherland"	65%
All Ukrainian Political Association "United Family"	23%
"Right Sector"	57%
"Svoboda"	48%
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	56%
People's Movement of Ukraine	53%
The Green Party of Ukraine	86%

Figure 2. Percentage of changes by political party/parliamentary faction (up until Election Day)

There were changes in DEC composition up until Election Day, for instance in Districts #70 and #79, and in PEC composition in District #94, with new nominations by political parties. The election administration faced the issue of one DEC Head (District #94) who refused to hold a meeting of the commission for considering changes in PEC composition in that district. The CEC issued a regulatory act ordering the DEC to hold a meeting to consider the replacements of PEC members requested by nominating parties, in line with the law. ENEMO observers reported that the DEC did not operate on Election Day due to this conflict and lack of a quorum.

ENEMO notes that DECs overcame a considerable challenge in their work with regard to the formation of PECs, since not all parties filled in all the nominations for PEC members. DECs successfully solved this issue by replacing staff by using databases from previous elections or personal acquaintances to delegate individuals to PEC membership (this was reported by observers in the Rivne and Volyn, Odesa, Chernivtsi and Ternopil, Zaporizhzhya, and Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts). Although there was considerable concern that political entities would not submit enough applications for membership in the PECs, they were all formed in time and without major obstacles (as reported by observers in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattia, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts).

ENEMO notes that changes in the composition of electoral commissions at the district and precinct level on the eve of the elections and on Election Day additionally challenged the work of some of the electoral commissions.

Isolated cases of issues in the work of DECs were noted, for example where DECs #201 and #50 failed to follow court decision orders to recount votes at the PEC level. The CEC was obliged to compel DECs to execute the court decision and redraw the protocol for the counting of results in several PECs in those districts.

## C. Precinct Election Commissions (PECs)

The main functions of PECs are to conduct polling, count votes and compile results protocols at polling stations, to receive voter lists and display them for familiarization by voters at the premises, to distribute invitations to voters, to consider complaints regarding the voters' list, voting, and vote count, and to display information posters regarding candidates and their programs.

PECs were composed of 10 to 14 members for small precincts (up to 500 registered voters), 12 to 16 members for medium precincts (between 500 and 1,000 registered voters), and 14 to 18 members for large precincts (between 1,500 and 2,500 registered voters). In precincts in

which the number of voters did not exceed fifty, PECs could consist of a chair, a secretary and two to four other members. Otherwise, each PEC consisted of a chair, a deputy chair, a secretary, and other commission members.

The principle of formation of PECs differs from DECs, in that PEC members are nominated by electoral subjects, with nomination granted to any political party whose parliamentary faction is registered in the current Parliament, to political parties which have candidates registered in the nation-wide constituency, and candidates in single-mandate districts.

If more candidates are nominated than required, DECs are responsible for drawing lots. If there are fewer nominations than needed, DECs appoint PEC members based on nominations by the DEC chairperson. The head, deputy head, and secretary of a precinct election commission should represent different nominating entities. Each entity nominating candidates to PECs had the right to a proportional share of each category of managerial positions in PECs.

Although an insufficient number of candidate submissions was foreseen as a challenge, PECs were all formed in time and without major obstacles (as reported by observers in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Odesa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattia, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts). PECs were formed by respective DECs by the legal deadline. Of the 29,885 PECs formed, 28,637 were ordinary PECs, 1,146 special PECs, and 102 PECs abroad<sup>12</sup>. Voting was not conducted in the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, or temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

The three regions with the most PECs formed were Lviv oblast (2,135), Dnipropetrovsk oblast (1,773), and Kharkiv oblast (1,673). The three regions with the fewest PECs formed were Luhansk oblast (521), Chernivtsi oblast (564), and Kherson oblast (773).

Training for PECs was held from July 10th until July 17th. Though PECs were formed on time in line with the law, ENEMO observers noted that several precincts were closed upon their arrival at the premises, and although PECs were mostly formed by the July 5th deadline, ENEMO observers noticed that in many cases first meetings and official working sessions of PECs only began on July 8th.

An insufficient number of candidate submissions was a challenge and considerable difficulties arose with regard to finding a sufficient number of PEC members. ENEMO observers frequently reported cases of closed, non-operating PECs during the period from their formation until Election Day.

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<sup>12</sup>Data from official CEC website: <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2019/wp001.html>

PECs faced the same challenge concerning the replacement of members as DEC. In many cases, a lack of nominations by electoral subjects forced DEC to find additional members, occasionally resulting in delays and PECs operating without full composition. This also created significant discrepancies in the level of experience of PEC members. Reasons given for insufficient members included lack of payment, members refusing to take oath, incorrect documents submitted for nominations, nominees unaware of their nomination by a party, cases of double-nominations, long travel distances and nominees living in different parts of the country, and unavailability due to the summer vacation season. PECs also reported additional difficulties due to a lack of material and financial support, and in some cases mentioned a lack of adequate premises.

In isolated cases, ENEMO observers reported allegations that some commission members nominated by less influential political parties or candidates were selling their loyalty to leading political parties and/or candidates.

ENEMO recommends that legislation should set deadlines for the replacement of members of lower-level commissions, as this has a negative impact on both the effectiveness of training and on the professionalism of commission members. The restriction that only commission members who have undergone training may be accepted as replacements should also be considered.

Sanctions should be included within the law for political parties that nominate commission members without their knowledge or consent, as this creates risk regarding the composition of electoral commissions and the electoral process in general.

ENEMO noted that a considerable number of PECs observed on Election Day had considerably fewer ballot papers than the number of voters on the list for the respective polling station. ENEMO recommends harmonizing the timelines for the printing of ballot papers, establishment of PECs, and temporary changes to places of voting, in order for each polling station to have a sufficient number of ballot papers, corresponding to the final number of voters registered to vote per polling station.

## VI CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

The rules for the eligibility of candidates in the parliamentary elections stipulate that they must have Ukrainian citizenship, be 21 years of age, have the right to vote, and have been residing in Ukraine for the previous five years before the election. Candidates were nominated by parties through lists in the nation-wide proportional constituency, and nominated by parties or self-nominated in single-mandate majoritarian constituencies. The following limit to being a candidate is inscribed within the law: a person who has

been convicted of committing a deliberate crime can neither be nominated nor elected as an MP, unless this criminal record has been cleared or cancelled pursuant to the procedure established by the law.

Candidate registration began on May 24th. The deadline for the submission of documents was June 20th. Documents for the registration of political party lists in the nation-wide constituency were submitted from June 12th to June 20th. The deadline for the registration of candidates by the CEC was June 25th. The deadline for the withdrawal of candidacies was July 8th.

The CEC registered 22 political parties in the nation-wide proportional constituency after the deadline for the registration of candidates and appeals. According to the CEC, 5,966 candidates were finally registered for the elections, of whom 3,220 candidates were in the majoritarian single mandate constituencies (1,404 nominated by political parties, 1,680 self-nominated, 136 deregistered), and 2,746 candidates included in the party lists for the nation-wide constituency<sup>13</sup>. The largest number of candidates were on the lists of Servant of the People, Fatherland, Opposition Block, and Svoboda (over 200 candidates).

307 MPs from the previous convocation of the Verkhovna Rada were running for re-election in the nation-wide and single-mandate districts (almost two thirds of the current Parliament). Approximately one third were on the party-lists (nation-wide district), and 192 MPs were candidates in single-mandate districts (mostly self-nominated).

ENEMO notes that only slightly more than half the parties with lists in the nation-wide district included 30% of women candidates (13 out of 22 parties), despite the legal obligation enshrined in the Law on Political Parties. Approximately 31% of candidates for party lists included were women. In total, approximately 22.5% of candidates in the election were women. The highest proportion of women candidates were in the lists of Social Justice (44%), Power of the People (43%) and the Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko (41%).

Nearly half the candidates in single-mandate majoritarian districts were registered by the CEC in the final two days before the deadline given in the law, with over 6,000 requests for registration in total. In addition to the challenges caused by the high number of candidates who submitted documents for registration in the final days, ENEMO observed that procedures for properly filing registration documents, as well as grounds for the rejection of applications, were at times unclear.

The CEC adopted 128 resolutions on the refusal of candidates, mostly due to a failure to comply with the five-year residency requirement, lack of mandatory documents, and non-payment of the financial deposit. In several cases the CEC's refusal to register candidates because they did not meet the five-year residency requirement was followed by a Court Order to the CEC to

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<sup>13</sup> <https://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2019/wp001.html>

reconsider candidate applications. Difficulties in obtaining residency data and public protests led to the successive registration and deregistration of candidates during the days following the Court Order, which created uncertainties in the process.

ENEMO also noted the issue of “clone” candidates and organizations (i.e. candidates or organizations with the same name as other, more prominent candidates or organizations, and hoping to benefit from their popularity). As a result of complaints about “clone” candidates by political parties, the CEC provided clarification on June 11th that name changes of candidates should be reported in their registration documents. Concerns should be raised with regard to name changes of candidates in bad faith, with the intention of confusing voters. ENEMO noted that recent name changes of candidates were not mentioned as such on the ballots.

ENEMO observers also reported that a high number of candidates were representing themselves as members of Servant of the People, for instance in Poltava, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Their candidate biographies reported them as members of various organizations with have similar names to Servant of the People (for instance “Sluha Naroda”, “Sluha-Narodu”, “SluhaNaroda!”, “Sluha Narodu – Ze”, etc.), with the possible intention of confusing voters. According to the law, it is not illegal to register an organization or a business entity with a similarly written or sounding appellation as an existing political party. Similarly, changing individual names in the civil registry is not illegal, and no mention was made of recent changes of names by candidates on the ballot papers. ENEMO raised concerns with regard to the use of this lack of regulation in bad faith by ill-intended candidates.

ENEMO also noted that the process of the successive registration and de-registration of candidates and parties caused considerable confusion during organization of the electoral process. For instance, the refusal to register candidates by the CEC on the grounds of candidates not meeting the five-year residency requirement in several cases, met by orders of the Court to register candidates, followed by the successive registration and deregistration of candidates on following days, created uncertainties in the process.

A related issue arose regarding the Movement of New Forces political party of Mikheil Saakashvili, which was refused registration by the CEC due to the submission of incorrect information. As a result of the incorrect information submitted, the CEC rejected the party’s registration to compete in the nation-wide constituency and to submit candidates in single-mandate constituencies. The party filed a lawsuit, and the court ordered the party to be included in the list of registered parties. The CEC filed a counter lawsuit to the Cassation Court of the Supreme Court which was rejected on June 29th, considering resolution of the CEC #1205 illegal, cancelling the resolution, and compelling the CEC to register the Movement of New Forces. In the meantime the CEC, due to legal deadlines, had already performed the drawing of lots to determine the order of appearance of the 21 registered parties on the ballots.

Since the inclusion of the party was necessary after the lottery drawing had already been concluded, the CEC gathered representatives of political parties to a consultative meeting. The solution proposed was to include the “Movement of New Forces” as Number 22 (last) on the ballot, as an alternative to avoid redrawing lots, which would have caused confusion for voters and delayed the process of ballot printing.

On July 2nd, however, a lawsuit was filed to the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeals stating a violation of Article 80 of the parliamentary elections law, and suggesting that the list of parties on the ballots should be re-drawn in accordance with the legislation. The Court accepted that the CEC had violated the rules of procedure, and ordered that a new draw should be conducted. The CEC raised concerns that no less than 5.2 million ballots had already been printed for the nation-wide constituency, and that a redrawing process followed by the printing of new ballots would cause delays in transferring the ballots to DEC and certainly compromise deadlines for the holding of election on July 21st. The CEC also noted a lack of funds from the State budget should a redraw be required. A counter lawsuit was filed to the Court of Cassation on July 5th in order to avoid the CEC having to reprint ballots, and obtained satisfaction on July 7th allowing the CEC to start transferring ballots to DECs in time.

ENEMO notes that though the Cassation Court ruled in favour of the CEC in the end, avoiding hindrance to the electoral process, the back and forth of court cases and legal proceedings linked to the registration of candidates and parties caused considerable uncertainty and confusion, and could have significantly compromised the integrity of the electoral process.

ENEMO considers that shortcomings in the electoral legislation - which does not provide any procedure to follow in cases not envisaged by the law - inevitably mean that the election administration has to find practical solutions which can be subject to legal proceedings for not being in line with the legal provisions. The CEC’s liability in such cases constitutes a risk, both for the institution and for the electoral process as a whole.

ENEMO also noted the presence of so-called “technical candidates”, as illustrated by the fact that 14 self-nominated candidates in single-mandate constituencies in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, for example, received zero votes (which implies that those candidates didn’t even vote for themselves). These candidates raise the issue of false or technical candidacies used to confuse voters or benefit other candidates through undeclared affiliations to other candidates and parties. Since candidates in single-mandate constituencies are also entitled to nominate PEC members, this can also be used as a means to increase representation at the PEC level.

As of July 20th, on the eve of the election, 136 single mandate constituency candidates had been deregistered in 86 electoral districts. Among those deregistered, 27 were “clone” candidates in districts situated in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zakarpattia, Kirovograd, Chernihiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts. Of 136 deregistered candidates, 43 were nominated by political parties and 93 were self-nominated candidates.

Of these 136 candidates, 129 candidates withdrew from the race and seven registrations were cancelled by the CEC. Candidates who decided to withdraw of their own will did so by submitting a statement refusing their participation in the election, three candidates were found to have violated the five year residency requirement, three candidates were deregistered following complaints from a political party (“Voice”, “Strength and Honour”, and “European Solidarity” parties), and in one case a candidate was deregistered for being registered in more than one district.

ENEMO recommends that the five-year residency requirement be reconsidered by the legislator, as international standards including the ICCPR (1966), CCPR General Comment No25: Article 25, and the Venice Commission’s ‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters’ (2002) provide that the requirements for being a candidate should not be excessive, and should not encroach on equal treatment nor violate the rights of citizens to be elected. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education or residence. The five year residency requirement is at odds with these international standards, as it appears overly restrictive. The practical issues which arose during this election with regard to candidate registration also illustrate the need to reduce or reconsider this requirement.

Candidates changing their names to resemble those of other existing candidates, although not a violation of the law, is a phenomenon which should be better framed to avoid the confusion of voters. Noting recent changes of names (i.e., less than six months before the election) on the ballot papers could be a possible solution.

Deadlines for the registration of candidates should be amended within the law for early elections, and all cases should be envisaged in the legislation (for example, in case of the registration of a political party following a court decision after the deadline for registration, and after the drawing of the order of parties on the ballot).

ENEMO additionally recommends increasing the quota for women on party lists, with effective sanctions for failure to comply with gender quota requirements, such as rejection of party lists by the CEC.

## VII VOTER REGISTRATION AND VOTER LISTS

The registration of citizens on voter lists in Ukraine is continuous and passive. The law grants the right to vote to all Ukrainian citizens who have reached 18 years of age by Election Day and have not been disenfranchised or incapacitated through a court decision. Documents confirming Ukrainian citizenship for voting may be one of the following: identity card; diplomatic passport; service passport; a military ticket; a temporary identity card; and a certificate issued by the penitentiary system for individuals held in penitentiary institutions.

The State Registry of Voters (SRV) is the legal body responsible for the management of voter lists, under the authority and oversight of the CEC. The SRV oversees 27 regional administration bodies, 756 registration maintenance bodies, and several thousand institutions providing information and residency updates to the voter lists on a monthly basis.

Due to the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the Eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, a considerable number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) could not participate in the elections for single mandate districts, as they are still electorally registered to those territories and are disenfranchised (approximately 4% of Ukrainian voters). Although registration at a temporary place of voting without changing electoral address allows voters to vote in the nation-wide district, IDPs have not yet been fully enfranchised and are excluded by residency requirements from participating in electing candidates for the single-mandate districts.

According to preliminary data from the CEC, as of June 30th, there were a total of 32,797,373 eligible voters on the lists who were eligible to vote in the election (this figure excludes voters on the lists in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol). The highest number of voters on the lists was registered in Donetsk oblast (approximately 3 million), Dnipropetrovsk oblast (nearly 2.5 million), Kyiv city (approximately 2 million), and Kharkiv oblast (approximately 2 million). Close to 55% of voters were women.

On July 1st, the CEC posted a note on its official website for the attention of voters regarding the potential to temporarily change the place of voting without changing electoral addresses. The procedures for doing so were explained in the document, and notified voters that the CEC had simplified the procedure for temporary changes, consisting of a writing an application request and presenting mandatory documents (passport or certificate of Ukrainian citizenship). ENEMO praises the

simplification of procedures, while criticizing the fact that even if the procedure is simplified for IDPs to register, they remain enfranchised to their former area of residence and unable to vote in both constituencies.

Voters were able to register at a temporary place of voting no later than five days before the day of voting (July 15th, inclusive) in accordance with the law. The CEC also called upon voters not to delay doing so, in order to avoid long queues in voter registration bodies. Voters were also provided with the opportunity to verify their information online, however they could modify their information only upon offline request to the SRV.

According to data from the CEC, 280,922 voters used this opportunity to register for these elections. Over 200,000 voters registered in the last few weeks leading to Election Day. The highest number of changes requested were in Donetsk oblast (34,840), Kyiv city (31,547), Kyiv oblast (18,964), and Odesa oblast (18,906).

According to observers, the work of voter registration bodies was assessed as positive in nearly every region, and they were provided with the necessary equipment. The simplified CEC regulation for the registration of IDPs (passport and filling of form) was assessed by observers as being consistently implemented. ENEMO interlocutors reported a high level of confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the voter lists overall, with minor mistakes being corrected in a timely manner.

According to ENEMO observers, the last few days of registration saw considerable queues and lines at voter registration offices due to the high increase in requests. Although voters were able to register in time in most cases, some offices seemed to be lacking human resources, and premises were not always accessible to persons with disabilities (situated on the second floor of buildings, for example).

The SRV transferred the preliminary voter lists to PECs by July 10th deadline. ENEMO notes that the CEC mobilized additional efforts to inform voters about the election and motivate citizens to participate through voter education campaigns and public service announcement videos (including sign language for people with disabilities).

ENEMO recommends that additional steps should be taken to provide access to PWDs at voter registration offices, as well as to polling stations, including: pedestrian paths, special parking lots for personal vehicles, the systematic placement of polling stations on the ground floor of buildings or the presence of elevators, wide doorways, the presence of ramps (if it is impossible to install a ramp, then a button which allows someone to call for assistance), flooring, adequate lighting, etc.

ENEMO also recommends that the legislation be amended in order to fully enfranchise IDPs in order for them to be able to vote in single-mandate constituencies. ENEMO finds that a lack of full IDP enfranchisement is one of the vulnerabilities of the current electoral framework which affects the inclusiveness of the voter registry. It also contradicts international standards, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21) which states that everyone has the right to take part in government and vote in elections by way of universal and equal suffrage<sup>14</sup>.

The lack of IDP enfranchisement is mainly due to the current requirement for formal contractual property ownership and tenancy which franchises IDPs to property ownership at the discretion of property owners. Due to the permission-based nature of residence registration in Ukraine, if property owners prefer not to attest to the residency of a tenant for the purposes of avoiding taxation, then the tenant cannot prove residency to the Ukrainian state. The Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (2002)<sup>15</sup> provides that: “If persons, in exceptional cases, have been displaced against their will, they should, provisionally, have the possibility of being considered as resident at their former place of residence”.

The overall system of residence registration should be reformed towards a declarative approach in order to avoid contradiction with international standards.

## VIII ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The rules and framework for campaigning are mainly described in Articles 68, 69, 70 and 74 of the parliamentary elections Law<sup>16</sup>, according to which candidates are allowed to begin their pre-election campaign the day after they are registered by the CEC. The electoral process officially started on May 24th, with candidates beginning to submit their documents for registration immediately after. According to the law, all campaigning should end twenty-four hours before Election Day.

ENEMO observers in nearly all oblasts reported that billboards and campaign materials were publically visible before the official start of

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<sup>14</sup>In addition, the UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Committee) has provided the following with regard to residency requirements and the right to vote: “States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right. Where registration of voters is required, it should be facilitated and obstacles to such registration should not be imposed. If residence requirements apply to registration, they must be reasonable, and should not be imposed in such a way as to exclude the homeless from the right to vote.” (General Comment 25, Paragraph 11).

<sup>15</sup>Venice Commission Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (2002), Explanation Report, Part I, Paragraph 1, Point c.

<sup>16</sup>Additional provisions are contained within the 2001 Law on Political Parties.

the campaign period, and in some cases, according to interlocutors, even before the start of the electoral process itself. As a consequence, these materials were not paid from the established campaign funds of candidates and parties, and were thus issued and published in violation of the law. There were several allegations of billboard space purchased in excess by parties to deny visibility to other parties or candidates ENEMO notes that the issue of early campaigning has not been resolved and remains unsanctioned within the legal framework.

The elections were competitive overall, and candidates were generally free to campaign without major obstacles. The 22 political parties competing in the nationwide constituency offered political diversity to Ukrainian voters, with different political views on tackling the challenges ahead.

ENEMO observers noted that, as of the end of June, the campaign was off to a slow start in most oblasts, partly due to the ongoing registration of party lists and candidate, and also to uncertainties about the constitutionality of the presidential decree calling elections (this issue was resolved by the Supreme Court's decision on June 20th). ENEMO raised concerns that voters may not have had sufficient time to familiarize themselves with candidate and party platforms due to the early nature of these elections and the short campaign period for registered candidates.

Despite the above, the visibility of the campaign increased during the first week of July, with ENEMO observer reports indicating an overall higher level of active campaigning in single-mandate constituencies, and in particular from MP candidates running for re-election. Various festivals and concerts were frequently held, directly or indirectly supported by political forces. On the other hand, campaigning in smaller settlements, or in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts for instance, was less visible.

All 22 political parties with lists in the nation-wide district published their programs on their official webpages. The main channels of digital campaigning were social networks (Facebook, Instagram), messaging applications Telegram and Viber (used for mass-texting), and the official webpages of candidates. Servant of the People, Opposition Platform - for Life, Party of Shariya, European Solidarity and Holos parties were the most visible in online outlets.

ENEMO observed a higher level of active campaigning by majoritarian single-mandate district candidates, with the visibility of campaigning at the local level surpassing campaigning at the national level. Festivals, concerts, sports events and other gatherings were frequently observed, directly or indirectly supported by political contestants in the election, as well as tents, billboards, door-to-door campaigns, and distribution of leaflets and newspapers. In contrast with its slow start, the campaign intensified considerably during the last weeks leading up to Election Day, with the number of billboards, campaign materials, and door-to-door activities greatly increasing.

Several instances of violence against candidates and campaigners were reported, along with the defacement or destruction of campaign materials. Cases of campaign materials (billboards, leaflets) containing hate speech against other candidates or parties were also noted in several oblasts. ENEMO also raised concerns with regard to the considerable number of illegal campaign materials (improperly branded, often lacking information on source of funding, entity responsible for publication, etc.), which were observed in most oblasts. Observers also reported cases of campaign materials placed in the premises of local public authorities or placed on public transport, and isolated cases of minors campaigning.

Candidates (especially in single-mandate districts) were also reported to engage in various forms of “charitable” activities, ranging from free picnics to the provision of goods and services, community repairs, and free concerts or festivals. Charity organizations often had recognizable names, either those of candidates or identified with a particular party. ENEMO raised concerns that a significant number of these campaign activities violated the law, as the expenditure was not from electoral funds. A considerable number of these activities were also ongoing before the registration of candidates.

ENEMO observer reports indicated that the most visible parties throughout the country were Servant of the People, Opposition Platform-For Life, Opposition Bloc, Holos, European Solidarity, Fatherland and the Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko. Depending on the region, and with variations, the Ukrainian Strategy of Groysman, Svoboda, Samopomic parties, and to a lesser extent Civic Position, Strength and Honour, the Agrarian Party of Ukraine, Movement of the New Forces of Mikhail Saakashvili and Strength of the People were also conducting visible campaigns in some of the oblasts.

The main campaign themes emphasized a lack of reforms and the need to initiate new policies on economic and social issues; future alliances with NATO, the EU, or the Russian Federation; the establishment of new rules for the political life of the country; the fight against corruption and oligarchs; raising pensions and improving public services; and improving the accountability of Parliament.

ENEMO observed that campaigning was ongoing on the “day of silence” (twenty-four hours before the day of voting) and on Election Day, with cases of newly replaced billboards (with improper information), open campaigning on digital platforms, and, in a few cases, signs of campaigning and campaign materials inside or in the vicinity of polling stations.

Additional concerns should be raised with regard to the considerable number of “clone” candidates (i.e. candidates bearing the same name as others), especially in single-mandate constituencies, with numerous cases being reported. ENEMO assessed this phenomenon as a consid-

erable risk, potentially confusing voters and affecting their actions. ENEMO also noted that the presidential administration put significant effort into influencing the campaign by proposing to expand laws on lustration and the need to remove discredited politicians from power. This was seen in the frequent visits of President Zelensky to the oblasts and applying pressure on local officials regarding under-achievement under their mandates. Observers also reported cases of mayors actively supporting candidates in single-mandate constituencies through campaign videos or campaign events.

ENEMO recommends that the legislation should be amended to better frame cases of “clone” candidates, as well as the timeline for campaigning. Provisions and sanctions for early campaigning should be included in the law, as well as for campaigning on the day of silence. All political parties and candidates should adhere to the principles of fair campaigning, and refrain from using smearing methods and legal loopholes in bad faith. Cases of violations related to campaigning, and which constitute criminal or administrative offenses, should be systematically acted upon by police to ensure effective prosecution.

Incumbents should not use their mandates as a means to campaign in favour of a particular party or candidate. The “Joint Guidelines for Preventing and Responding to the Misuse of Administrative Resources during Electoral Processes” adopted by the Venice Commission in March 2016 recommends that legal frameworks should provide explicit requirements for civil servants to act impartially during the whole electoral process while performing their official duties<sup>17</sup>. The document also states that the legal framework “should provide effective mechanisms for prohibiting public authorities from taking unfair advantage of their positions by holding official public events for electoral campaigning purposes, including charitable events, or events that favour or disfavour any political party or candidate”.<sup>18</sup>

ENEMO recommends that clear instructions should be issued by the state to public officials and employees regulating their behaviour during elections to prevent the abuse of public office and administrative resources.

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<sup>17</sup>Part II, Section A, Paragraph 3.

<sup>18</sup>Part II, Section B, Paragraph 1.1

## IX CAMPAIGN FINANCE

ENEMO observed that the financial reports of political parties engaged in the election were posted in time on the CEC website, and available for public consultation, however, several parties and candidates began early campaigning in May, well before they were officially registered by the CEC, and the law does not contain any provisions to sanction this violation.

From their registration until July 10th, parties received donations of over 622 million UAH to their official campaign accounts, mostly from the parties themselves. The remaining funding was collected from donations from legal entities, and to a lesser extent individuals.

Political parties spent over 550 million UAH in campaign funds up until July 10th (the date until which interim financial reports were required to cover expenses). Most of these funds were used on television advertisement (over 70%). The parties which spent the most on television expenses were the Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko, the Agrarian Party of Ukraine, the Power of Law, and Fatherland parties. The remaining funds were used for outdoor campaigning, the printing of campaign materials, radio advertisement, and concerts and festivals. ENEMO notes that many parties did not report any expenses specific to the internet and social media advertising, or at times reported underwhelming low amounts of spending for that category of expense.

Many single-mandate constituency candidates did not systematically report their expenses to DEC's in time. In single-mandate districts particularly, some candidates were reported as engaging in various forms of "charitable" activities, mainly through the provision of goods and services, community repairs, and free concerts or festivals. These charity organizations often had recognizable names, either those of candidates, or identifying with a particular party. According to Ukrainian law, this type of practice may constitute indirect vote buying, or illegal expenditure from electoral funds. This concern is increased by the fact that a considerable number of these activities were ongoing even before the registration of candidates and lacked any form of regulation.

Improperly marked campaign materials were noted by ENEMO observers in all oblasts, more specifically without mention of financial origin. Allegations of vote buying and the misuse of administrative resources were noted, particularly in rural areas, taking the form of school buses used for the transportation of children and school teachers to campaign events, "volunteers" from universities and schools forced to distribute campaign materials (in exchange for remuneration, in violation of the law), and self-nominated candidates directly or indirectly buying the votes of state employees (from

hospitals or public institutions for instance). Allegations of bribing voters in exchange for remuneration (direct vote buying) or goods and services (indirect vote buying) were noted by ENEMO observer interlocutors from most oblasts. 676 cases related to vote buying were reported to the police (of which 111 criminal investigations were initiated), with an additional 20 cases from Election Day classified as vote buying under Article 160 of the Criminal Code.

ENEMO noted the lack of effective and dissuasive sanctions to candidates and parties for campaign finance violations and discrepancies between reported funds and levels of campaign activity, in particular digital campaigning.

The financial reports of parties revealed that the overwhelming majority of expenses from electoral funds were used on television advertising. ENEMO notes, however, that expenses for social network advertising used during the campaign period were often not reported in the financial reports of political parties and candidates.

Concerns may be raised with regard to the discrepancies between reported funds and observed levels of activity by parties and candidates on social networks, and to the fact that many of these expenses are not included within the reports submitted to the CEC. Given the amount of social media advertising during the last week of campaigning, a considerable amount of costs were necessarily incurred during the week leading up to the day of the election (and thus not covered in interim financial reports).

Due to the ongoing registration process, short campaign period and un-sanctioned early campaigning, and “hidden advertising” (jeansa), ENEMO considers that a non-negligible amount of expenses were not reported, even though the law does not distinguish political advertising on the internet as a separate form of campaigning.

Allegations were also made of NGOs used as a means to finance political parties without having to report on those funds (NGOs are not required by law to publish financial reports). ENEMO assesses this as a risk through the use of this opportunity as a means to conceal revenues and expenditures used for campaigning. Concerns should also be raised with regard to the funding of concerts and public shows, since many of these events were allegedly organized by third-party companies rather than political parties. Such companies are not subject to financial reporting requirements in the framework of campaign finance, and since they are not directly remunerated by parties from their electoral funds, these events are financially not considered campaign expenses, despite clearly providing platforms for campaigning as defined by the terms of the law.

Political parties which obtained over 2% of the votes will be compensated for their campaign expenses and will receive state funding during the new legislature (over the next five years).

ENEMO recommends that the framework for campaign finance should be reinforced, with sanctions against parties and candidates which do not comply with the rules for financial reporting. Provisions should also be added to the legal framework for the proper oversight and monitoring of the campaign to identify campaigning expenses which do not appear in financial reports. The definition of costs for campaigning should be broadened and extended to entities which organize events, activities, or provide platforms to candidates for campaigning.

The quality of analysis of financial reports should be improved, with an emphasis on violations and unreported expenses (“shadow funds”) which limit the fairness of the election. Additional resources should be allocated to the CEC and NAPC in order to do so.

Additionally, ENEMO recommends that the legislator should consider the introduction of campaign spending limits or restrictions, such as for TV advertising during elections and social media advertising.

## X MEDIA

### A. General media environment and legal framework

The Ukrainian media landscape is pluralistic and diverse, with a wide range of media outlets,<sup>19</sup> offering various content. The high number and accessibility of media outlets could provide voters with diverse information, however, the high concentration of media ownership and economic and the political interests of their owners are widely perceived as influencing editorial policies and journalists’ reporting, thus affecting the actual diversity of viewpoints in the media and voter abilities to make a truly informed choice.

The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and the right to information, and prohibits censorship. Defamation is a civil offence, and the media legal framework provides general preconditions for media freedoms. The main principles for media conduct during parliamentary elections are set out in the parliamentary elections law, which envisages that both state and private media should provide equal conditions to all contestants.

Television is the primary source of information for Ukrainian citizens, and is at the same time the most concentrated and polarized. Online sources of political information are growing in importance, offer more diversity and give contestants broader access to voters. Online media is also exposing users to a high level of unsourced information, however. Paid advertisement is allowed on both state and private media and is limited by the legal limitation of a contestant’s electoral funds<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> There is no official database of all media outlets in Ukraine. The total number of all media in the country is high, but the exact number of all media varies depending on the source.

<sup>20</sup> The parliamentary election Law, Article 48.

The law obliges public and private broadcasters to provide balanced coverage, and public media to provide free airtime and space to all contestants. At the same time, media outlets are obligated to determine and publish pricelists for a unit of air time and a unit of print space, which they have done in legally defined deadlines.<sup>21</sup>

The National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council (NTRBC) is the primary regulatory body for electronic media, with a mandate to oversee electronic media during elections, and the implementing body for the election period with regard to specific media issues, such as the allocation of free-of-charge airtime and space to contestants, is the CEC.

The NTRBC did not fully exercise its supervisory functions, and its capacity to ensure compliance of media content with the law was limited by an unclear system of sanctions and political influence. The NTRBC was not fully operational in the early stages of the campaign period, due to its inability to meet a six-member quorum for decision-making, and the Working Group for oversight of media during the pre-election period was formed only 18 days before the election day.

On the other hand, the NTRBC conducted in house media monitoring and reported on a number of media violations, but did not impose any sanctions or adequately respond to such violations<sup>22</sup>. The CEC adopted its decision on the allocation of free media airtime/space within the legal deadline and contestants were granted free airtime of up to 60 minutes, as well as free print space in public national and regional media. ENEMO observers reported that most candidates used this platform for promotion during the pre-election period.

The National Public Broadcasting Company of Ukraine (UA: PBC) started broadcasting pre-election political shows on June 17th, with the participation of the heads of two parties on each show, and a final broadcast on July 19th. Separate talk shows for single-mandate constituency candidates in the regions were broadcasted by the network's regional affiliates. The editorial board issued recommendations for media coverage of the parliamentary elections in order to ensure objective coverage of elections.

Even though the UA: PBC fulfilled its legal obligation and provided candidates with a platform to present their programs in specialized political TV shows, it did not sufficiently cover elections in the news or other program formats, which is why most of EOM interlocutors noted that they did not fully use its public service role in order to counterbalance biased private media reporting, by providing fair, objective and balanced information to voters. On the other hand, it should be noted that the UA: PBC has been chronically underfunded and thus prevented from serving as an alternative to private channels.

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<sup>21</sup>NTRBC reported that, out of 27 national TV channels and 15 nationwide radio stations, only three did not fulfil this obligation but they do not distribute political advertising.

<sup>22</sup>Article 16 of the Law of Ukraine "National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine" defines the authority of the NTRBC and obliges it to publish a report on television and radio broadcasting organizations' compliance with the procedure for broadcasting during election campaigns. Article 21 of the same law stipulates that the NTRBC shall impose sanctions on violators of television and radio broadcasting. Article

ENEMO notes that given the overall media environment, strongly influenced and shaped by the interests of its owners, the role and importance of the public service broadcaster is vital for citizens' access to comprehensive, objective and impartial information about the elections and contestants, and its independence should be strongly supported.

## B. Traditional media

The media played a dominant role during these elections as the contestants mainly focused their campaign on television, online media, social networks and messaging applications. Candidates spent more than two thirds<sup>23</sup> of their total election funds on TV advertisements and paid outreach through social platforms. Considering the diversity of media outlets, voters had the opportunity to obtain all necessary information about the campaigns of election contestant.

ENEMO observers across the country have consistently reported that, as well as numerous interlocutors, equal and impartial treatment by media was not sufficiently ensured for all contestants, and nor were the principles of fairness, balance and impartiality in the coverage of election campaigns.

The high level of centralized media ownership<sup>24</sup> has increased biased reporting, and continues to be one of the main obstacles to the fulfilment of election law provisions, which stipulate that both public and private media should offer balanced and unbiased coverage of all contestants.

Polarized and biased reporting was also officially confirmed following the monitoring of results by the media regulatory authority-National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council.<sup>25</sup> The NTRBC recorded more than 100 different media irregularities,<sup>26</sup> such as incorrectly marked and hidden advertisement, inadequately marked public opinion polls, campaign materials in news programs, biased reporting, etc., however, the media regulatory authority did not impose any sanctions or provide mechanisms to adequately respond to and prevent media violations in the pre-election period.

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<sup>23</sup>Financial reports of contestants published by the CEC have showed that contestants have spent more than 16 million EUR on media advertisements, or 84% of total election funds.

<sup>24</sup>The centralization of media ownership was additionally strengthened by the creation of the new media holding company "News", comprised of 112, NewsOne and ZIK TV channel and owned by "Opposition Bloc" politician Mr Taras Kozak.

<sup>25</sup>NTRBC noted that 61% of the airtime on "1 + 1" was devoted to the party "Servant of the People", "Channel 5" 68% to "European Solidarity", "Inter"; and "112 Ukraine" 61% to "Opposition Platform - for Life", "Direct" 43% "European Solidarity", TV channel "NewsOne" 79% for "Opposition Platform - For life" etc.

<sup>26</sup><https://www.nrada.gov.ua/monitoryngom-natsionalnoyi-rady-zafiksovano-majzhe-100-vypadkiv-politychnoyi-agitatsiyi-v-novynah-teleradioorganizatsij/>

EOM interlocutors noted that media coverage of the elections in general, as well as of contestants and their programs, lacked analytical and investigative reporting which, altogether, may have limited voters access to quality and fact-based information.

The media advertisement of certain contestants started before the official start of the campaign period. ENEMO notes that early campaigning remains a long standing unresolved and unsanctioned issue due to the inadequate legal framework. ENEMO further notes the absence of a code of conduct that would provide essential principles and guide the actions of media and journalists during the election period, as well as the lack of effective self-regulating mechanisms.

## C. Social media

Social media was widely used during the electoral campaign, with most contestants engaging directly with voters through social networks (Facebook, Instagram), messaging applications (Telegram and Viber), and official web-pages. These platforms continue to transform the traditional conduct of political campaigning in Ukraine, while efforts to ensure transparency regarding sources of paid advertisements have so far been insufficient to prevent disinformation.

Facebook's rules for political advertising and open advertisement library increased the overall transparency to some extent, by providing information on the total amount spent by specific contestants and the number of paid advertisements, but was not enough to have a positive effect. ENEMO observers were informed by a number of contestants that these platforms were dominantly used to create smear campaigns against their opponents, through online black PR tactics and comments by "troll farms" (paid campaigners).

ENEMO observers reported contestants' active campaigning on social platforms during the day of silence. ENEMO notes with concern that the lack of adequate regulations allows contestants to carry out direct or indirect campaigning beyond the legally prescribed timeframe.

# XI ELECTION OBSERVERS

In accordance with Ukrainian legislation,<sup>27</sup> both domestic and international organizations are allowed to observe the election process. All observer organizations are accredited by the CEC, provided that they fulfil the accreditation requirements by being officially registered, and having election-related activities and election observation in their statutory documents.

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<sup>27</sup>Article 77 and 78 of the Law on Parliamentary Elections

The deadline for the accreditation of domestic organizations was May 31st, and the deadline for international organizations was July 13th.

## A. Domestic Observers

The CEC accredited a total of 163 domestic observer organizations for the early parliamentary elections. The accreditation of individual observers was conducted by DEC's.<sup>28</sup>

ENEMO found that there is a continuation of the trend noted during the 2019 Presidential election. The number of accredited citizen organizations has increased in comparison to the previous presidential election<sup>29</sup> and even more so in comparison to the last parliamentary elections in 2014.<sup>30</sup>

Based on ENEMO's analysis, of the 163 organizations accredited, 105 do not have an existing website or social media page, and a number of these NGOs were only recently created. Of these 163, only 87 NGOs have accredited observers. The total number of accredited domestic observers was 27,901.

Among the registered NGOs, only two accredited domestic observers' organizations – OPORA and the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) are members of the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors and signatories of the Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations. These two organizations are also member organizations of the ENEMO network. ENEMO observers noted that these two organizations were among the leading election observer groups with a presence in all oblasts during the pre-election period.

The organization with the largest number of accredited observers for the elections was OPORA, with more than 5,500 registered observers. The next was the All-Ukrainian NGO "Leading Legal Initiatives"/Всеукраїнська громадська організація "Передові Правові Ініціативи", with 3,954 accredited observers. CVU was fourth, with 1,738 registered observers.

ENEMO observers have raised concerns about the existence of clone NGOs<sup>31</sup>, previously accredited NGOs now running as political parties<sup>32</sup>, as well as heads of accredited organizations appearing on party lists in addition to being donors for the same party.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>27</sup>Article 77 and 78 of the Law on Parliamentary Elections

<sup>28</sup>List of accredited domestic organizations

<sup>29</sup>For the 2019 presidential election 139 domestic organizations were accredited.

<sup>30</sup>Only 37 domestic organizations were accredited in 2014.

<sup>31</sup>In Dnipro, some organizations register themselves using the organization and name "Sluha" (e.g. in DEC 37 there are five such organizations).

<sup>32</sup>"Power of Law", which was registered for the Presidential elections as an NGO observing the elections, is now registered as a political party with the same name, and the head of the NGO's regional office, Michail Grek, is in the party list now (Sumy).

<sup>33</sup>One is the Public Community Organization Ukrainian Strategy "Ukrainian Strategy"/ ГРОМАДСЬКА ОРГАНІЗАЦІЯ "ГРОМАДСЬКИЙ РУХ "УКРАЇНСЬКА СТРАТЕГІЯ" which has the same name as the Ukrainian Strategy party led by V. Hroysman and is the third organization with the greatest number of accredited observers (total of 1899). The Head of the Organization is in the party list of Hroysman's party, under number 29.

The three NGOs with the highest presence of observers on Election Day were the Civil Network Opora<sup>34</sup>, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine<sup>35</sup>, and the Centre for Professional and Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons of the Judiciary System<sup>36</sup>.

Although citizen observation of elections should be encouraged, its misuse can negatively impact the perception of impartiality and the important role it can have in the electoral process. ENEMO urges all domestic observer organizations to use credible methodologies and maintain impartiality and accuracy at all stages of the electoral process, in respect to the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations and Code of Conduct for Non-Partisan Election Monitor Observers and Monitors.

ENEMO also notes that the legislation does not provide sufficient prerequisites to ensure domestic observers adhere to internationally recognized principles of election observation.

## B. International Observers

For the early parliamentary elections, the CEC accredited 21 international organizations with 1,602 observers, as well as 117 observers from 12 foreign countries.<sup>37</sup>

Following a decision of reinstatement of Russia's parliamentary delegation at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), on July 2nd the Ukrainian Speaker of Parliament signed a letter of dis-invitation of PACE election observation mission for the upcoming early parliamentary elections.<sup>38</sup>

Citizens of the Russian Federation are still prohibited from observing elections in Ukraine based on the amendment to the election laws adopted in February 2019. ENEMO reiterates that the decision negatively affects the work of ENEMO, as one of its member organizations GOLOS is not allowed to send its members for the ENEMO EOM in Ukraine. Members of GOLOS are human rights defenders and political dissidents from the Russian Federation.

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<sup>37</sup> List of official observers from foreign states and international organizations

<sup>38</sup><https://www.unian.info/politics/10604157-ukraine-disinvites-pace-election-observation-mission.html>

# XII ELECTION DAY

On Election Day, ENEMO deployed 58 teams of multinational observers to follow the process of preparation and opening polling stations, the voting and counting process, and the transfer and intake of election materials by DEC. Observation teams, composed of 40 long term observers and 76 short term observers, monitored the opening procedures in 58 polling stations, voting in 763 polling stations, and closing and counting in 58 polling stations. ENEMO observed the intake of election materials and the tabulation of results in 57 DECs.

Election Day was, overall, calm and peaceful. The management of the polling and conduct of PECs and DECs was assessed positively in the majority of cases, with slight procedural violations in some polling stations, which were assessed as not having negatively affected the legitimacy of the results.

All data, numbers and infographics provided below are based on polling stations observed by ENEMO STOs in the framework of their deployment.

## A. Opening procedures

ENEMO observed the preparatory meeting and the opening procedures in 58 polling stations.

The preparatory meeting started on time (7:15 AM) in 94.8% of the observed polling stations, and in 3.6%, it started with delays of up to 30 minutes, and in one polling station, started earlier than 7:15. All observed polling stations opened on time (08:00 AM) or a very few minutes before or after 8:00 AM<sup>39</sup> and in the presence of the minimum number of PEC members required by law<sup>40</sup>.




Figure 3. Time of preparatory meeting and opening of polling stations observed

<sup>39</sup> Up to five minutes delay or early opening was observed in a limited number of polling stations.

<sup>40</sup> ENEMO observers noted the absence of one or more PEC members during the opening procedures in 34.5 % of the observed polling stations

All observed polling stations were equipped with all essential materials for voting at the time of opening,<sup>41</sup> however, ENEMO notes that the phenomenon observed during this year's Presidential Elections, of providing PECs with fewer ballot papers than the number of voters in the rolls, also persisted during these elections<sup>42</sup>. 22.9% of observed polling stations had received fewer ballot papers for the nationwide constituency than there were voters on the voter list<sup>43</sup>, and 37.9%<sup>44</sup> of the polling stations received fewer ballot papers for the single-mandate constituency than the number of voters registered in the relevant polling stations<sup>45</sup>.

The procedure for sealing stationary and mobile ballot boxes was followed properly in all observed polling stations, however, again, ENEMO noted a continuation of the same trend as in the Presidential Election, of sealing ballot boxes with sheets of paper stamped with the stamp of the PEC, instead of using the plastic seals<sup>46</sup>.

The arrangement of the premises of polling stations was assessed as adequate in 94.8% of the observed polling stations, while in three the observers assessed the arrangement as inadequate<sup>47</sup>.

ENEMO observers were able to properly monitor the opening procedures in all observed polling stations, except for one, where they were not allowed to enter during the preparatory meeting<sup>48</sup>. No complaints related to the opening were observed in any of the observed polling stations.

In 82.7% of polling stations observed, only authorized persons were present while opening procedures were being carried out<sup>49</sup>. In 10.3% of the observed polling stations, observers noted the presence of police officers inside the polling stations and in 8.6% the presence of other unauthorized persons<sup>50</sup>.

Procedural violations were noted in two of the observed polling stations during the opening, however, in 96.6% of observed polling stations, the opening procedures were assessed positively (very good or good). Observers assessed the opening procedures as poor in only two of the observed polling stations, due to the negligence of PEC members.

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<sup>41</sup>Ballot papers, voting booths, ballot boxes, PEC stamp, protocol, voter lists, and seals.

<sup>42</sup>Although these numbers are lower than the Presidential Election, ENEMO notes that this is a continuation of the trend.

<sup>43</sup>The difference was significant in only one polling station out of 11 (difference higher than 50 ballot papers).

<sup>44</sup>The number of ballot papers that the polling stations should have received for single-mandate constituencies is calculated as a sum of the number of voters on the list and number of requests for temporary voting.

<sup>45</sup>The difference was significant (higher than 50 ballot papers) in five polling stations out of 22.

<sup>46</sup>Reportedly, this was due to a shortage of seals received by the PEC in most polling stations.

<sup>47</sup>In two of the three polling stations assessed as inadequate, the reason was that the arrangement of the polling station could, potentially, jeopardize the secrecy of the vote.

<sup>48</sup>With the claim that the meeting had already started, although the observers were present at the polling station before 7:15 AM.

<sup>49</sup>This represents a significant decline from the second round of the Presidential Elections, held on April 2019, during which this number stood at 91%.

<sup>50</sup>(e.g. directors of schools in which polling stations were located, firefighters, or voters before the voting had started).

<sup>51</sup>In one polling station, the PEC did not announce out loud the serial numbers of the seals and in one they did not recount the received ballot papers.



Figure 4. Polling station set up and materials at polling stations observed during opening procedures

## B. Voting process

ENEMO observers monitored the environment around polling stations and the voting process in 763 polling stations, throughout 118 constituencies<sup>52</sup>.

The environment around polling stations was assessed as orderly in 99.3% of the observed polling stations, with the exception of a few cases, where the organized transportation of voters<sup>53</sup>, or presence of campaign materials at the entrance of polling stations<sup>54</sup> was observed and reported.

All observed polling stations operated with the minimum number of PEC members required by the law . Women were well represented in the precinct election commissions, with over three fourth of PEC members in the observed polling stations being female<sup>56</sup>, including in leadership positions<sup>57</sup>.




Figure 5. Gender composition of PECs at observed polling stations

<sup>52</sup>In all 24 oblasts where elections were held and in Kyiv City.

<sup>53</sup>Observers reported that in one polling station, in DEC 85, the Chairperson informed them that the local administration had organized transportation for voters. In another polling station, ENEMO observers noticed a van transporting voters to the polling station.

<sup>54</sup>In two polling stations campaigning posters were noticed near the entrance of the polling station.

<sup>55</sup>However not all PEC members were present at 32.2 % of polling stations during the moment of observation, 5677.7%.

<sup>57</sup>78.1% of the PECs had a female chairperson, 77.3% female deputy chairperson, and 89% a female secretary.

The presence of unauthorized and/or unidentified persons inside the polling station was noted in 5.9% of the observed polling stations, including police officers at 3.7%, local authorities at 2.9%, and others<sup>58</sup>.

97.5% of the observed polling stations were assessed as having an adequate arrangement for voting, although 2.5 % of those observed were assessed as not adequate, mainly due to inadequate premises, which sometimes led to overcrowding, the potential to jeopardize the secrecy of the vote, or it being impossible for all PEC members and observers to have a clear view of the entire voting process<sup>59</sup>. Polling stations' accessibility for persons with mobility disability was assessed as suitable in 46,8% of the observed polling stations<sup>60</sup> and as requiring assistance or completely inaccessible in 53.2%.

Essential materials for the conduct of voting were present in all observed polling stations, however, in line with the trend noted above, of providing polling stations with fewer ballot papers than eligible voters, 14% of the observed polling stations received fewer ballots for the nationwide constituency than voters in the voter list and 33.7% received fewer ballot papers for the single-mandate constituency than eligible voters. 61.2% of the observed polling stations used fewer stationery ballot boxes and 23.2% fewer mobile ballot boxes<sup>61</sup>, while 34.7% had fewer voting booths than required by the law<sup>62</sup>.

Information materials on voting procedures and candidates were present at 97% of the observed polling stations. At 2.5%, the information on voting procedures was missing, and at four of the observed polling stations, information on candidates was missing or not posted on the walls of the precinct.




Figure 6. Polling station set up and materials at polling stations observed during voting

<sup>58</sup>Firefighters, Director of Schools where the polling station was located, or representatives of the media not accredited or not wearing their accreditation badge visibly.

<sup>59</sup>Overly small polling station and/or polling station located in hallways, ballot boxes located too close to observers or ballot booths.

<sup>60</sup>Equipped with ramps and/or other facilities.

<sup>61</sup>Small election precincts should have no less than two stationary and two mobile ballot boxes, medium precincts no less than four stationary and two mobile ballot boxes, and large precincts no less than six stationary and two mobile ballot boxes.

<sup>62</sup>Small election precincts should have no less than two, medium precincts no less than four, and large precincts no less than six voting booths.

Observers didn't notice any breach of the secrecy of the vote in 96.5% of the observed polling stations, however, several cases of more than one individual in the voting booth<sup>63</sup>, voters revealing their vote<sup>64</sup>, voters not being able to vote in secrecy due to the improper set up of the booths or transparent curtains<sup>65</sup>, and breach of the rules for assisted voting<sup>66</sup>, as well as one case of a voter taking a photo of a marked ballot paper, were reported.

In 93.8% of observed polling stations, observers did not notice, nor were reported, cases of voters not included in the voter list, and at 5.1% of polling stations they observed or were reported voters not finding their names on the list. Voters for whom the information in the voters' list was inaccurate were noted at 1% of the observed polling stations, and at two polling stations, voters reported the presence of deceased persons in the voter list.




Figure 7. Presence of voters' names on the lists at observed polling stations during voting

ENEMO observers were able to observe properly in 98.6% of the polling stations visited<sup>68</sup>, while in 1.3%, observation was difficult due to the improper arrangement of the polling station, small premises of the precinct, or overcrowded polling stations<sup>69</sup>.

ENEMO observers noted the presence of observers accredited by election contestants in 99.3% of the polling stations<sup>70</sup>, while in 42.3% of the polling station non-partisan observers (domestic or international) were present. The three NGOs with the highest presence of observers on Election Day were the Civil Network Opora<sup>71</sup>, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine<sup>72</sup>, and the Centre for Professional and Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons of the Judiciary System<sup>73</sup>.

<sup>63</sup>In seven polling stations.

<sup>64</sup>In six polling stations.

<sup>65</sup>In nine polling stations.

<sup>66</sup>Two cases.

<sup>67</sup>This is a significant increase in reported or observed cases of voters not included in the list from the second round of Presidential Elections, held on April 2019, during which this figure stood at 88.5%.

<sup>68</sup>It should be noted that, in line with a noted trend, especially during the second round of the Presidential

<sup>69</sup>Elections, on April 2019, several cases of police officers were reported as requesting to take pictures of the accreditations of ENEMO observers.

<sup>70</sup>On average, there were six observers by election contestants per polling station, with most polling stations having four observers.

<sup>71</sup>6.2% of the polling stations.

<sup>72</sup>3.9% of the polling stations.

<sup>73</sup>3% of the polling stations.

ENEMO observers noted that observers from candidates or political parties were not acting according to the law at three polling stations<sup>74</sup>, and at three polling stations they were wearing t-shirts that could be perceived as affiliated with a political contestant<sup>75</sup>.

In 97.9% of observed polling stations, observers indicated that no formal complaints had been filed. In 1.6% there were minor complaints and in two polling stations the PEC had received substantial complaints.

95.3% of the observed polling stations were assessed to be functioning and managed properly by PEC members, and 2.6% were somewhat crowded, but still managed adequately. At five polling stations, ENEMO observers assessed the process as disorganized and confusing. The overall assessment of the voting process was positive (very good<sup>76</sup> or good<sup>77</sup>) in almost all polling stations observed (98,4%). In 12 of the 763 observed polling stations, the observers assessed the process as poor, due to negligence.




Figure 8. Assessment of functioning and management at polling stations observed

## C. Counting process

ENEMO followed the closing and vote-counting procedures in 58 polling stations. All observed polling stations closed on time and no voters were reported in the queue in any of the polling stations at the time of closing.

The procedures that preceded the counting process were followed properly in 93.1% of the observed polling stations, and in four some deviations from the procedures were noted<sup>78</sup>.

<sup>74</sup>Observers were instructing voters on voting procedures.

<sup>75</sup>Observers were obliged by the police, on the request of PEC members and other observers, to hide the logo on their t-shirt, to be able to continue to observe inside the polling station.

<sup>76</sup>56.1%.

<sup>77</sup>42.3%.

<sup>78</sup>In two polling stations, the PEC did not count the unused ballot papers, in one they did not announce the number of voters that had voted based on number of signatures, and in one did not announce the number of unused ballots.

In almost all observed polling stations counting procedures were followed properly<sup>79</sup>, although in one polling station ENEMO observers noted that two valid ballot papers were deemed invalid. In four polling stations there were some deviations in the procedures for filling in the protocol, however, observers assessed that these deviations did not damage the legitimacy of the process or affect the results. In one polling station, observers reported that there was chaos and tension during the process of filling in the protocols, due to claims of party observers and PEC members that the chairperson was attempting to manipulate the election results. An official complaint was filed with the police on the case, however, the protocols process was completed and materials sent to the DEC. No other formal complaints on the counting process were recorded in the observed polling stations.

In 94.4% of the observed polling stations, the protocols were promptly posted in the polling station premises and provided to all persons entitled to receive them, except in three polling stations, where protocols were not provided to ENEMO observers.

All ENEMO observers could observe the counting procedures properly. In 96.5% of the observed polling stations, only authorized people were present during the counting procedures, although in two polling stations, police officers were inside the polling station during the counting.




Figure 9. Presence of individuals in polling station premises during counting and posting of protocols at observed polling stations

The overall assessment of the counting procedures by ENEMO observers was positive (very good or good) in 84.5% of the observed polling stations<sup>80</sup> and in 15.5%, the counting process was assessed as poor; however, all cases of negative evaluation were attributed to negligence. The process of counting and filling in the protocols was very slow in almost all observed polling stations<sup>81</sup>.

<sup>79</sup> In 98.3%.

<sup>80</sup>Which is a great difference from the evaluation for the same process during the second round of the Presidential Elections, held on April 2019, during which this figure stood at 96%.

<sup>81</sup>In one case, the counting process finished at 9:00 AM on the next day (22 July)

## D. Transfer of materials to district election commissions (DEC) and DEC activity

ENEMO observers monitored the transfer of election materials and respective intake in 57 DECs<sup>82</sup>. The transfer of materials was made in an orderly manner and following the procedures in all polling stations in which ENEMO observed this process.<sup>83</sup>

The observers assessed that 96.5% of observed DECs were acting transparently and straightforwardly, although the work of DECs was assessed as disorganized and confusing in two DECs. Most of the observed DECs did not receive any official complaints, except for two, in which complaints, deemed as non-substantial by the observers, were filed. In 89.5% of observed DECs, most protocols were processed under 30 minutes, and most protocols were processed between 30 and 60 minutes in six DECs.

DEC premises were assessed as spacious and adequate for the delivery of election materials in 89.5% of observed DECs, although six DECs were assessed as overcrowded. Authorized observers were able to observe properly in all DECs.

The work of the DECs was evaluated by ENEMO observers as positive (very good or good) in almost all the observed DECs. Only one DEC was assessed as poor, due to negligence.




Figure 10. Evaluation of the work and set up of electoral commissions at observed DECs

<sup>82</sup>DEC 94 did not operate on Election Night due to a lack of quorum (see the Section on District Election Commissions, in this Statement).

<sup>83</sup>The transfer of materials was made the next day due to the DEC schedule for the intake of materials, in three polling stations.

# XIII COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS

The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees the right to challenge the decisions, actions, or inactivity of state or local authorities and their officials in courts. Election complaints and appeals for parliamentary elections are primarily governed by the Law on Parliamentary Elections and Code of Administrative Proceedings. The right to seek legal remedy is granted to parties and candidates and their proxies, official observers, election commissions and voters when their personal rights are violated.

The majority of election-related complaints can be brought to the election administration or the courts, or to both, which may create double jurisdiction. The parliamentary elections law prescribes that when a court initiates consideration of an administrative complaint concerning the same issue, and on the same grounds as the complaint considered by a respective election commission, such election commission should reject the complaint without consideration no later than the day after receiving the court notification. The Venice Commission and the OSCE guidelines, however, stress the need for the election law to set a clear hierarchical appellate procedure for the handling of election-related complaints and appeals, and clarify the overlapping jurisdiction of courts and election commissions' vis-à-vis electoral disputes.<sup>84</sup>

From the beginning of the election campaign up to July 20th the CEC received around 378 complaints related to the electoral process. Among 378 complaints, 290 were returned to the complainants without consideration because, according to the CEC, the complainants did not fulfil formal requirements. However, the complaints returned to the complainants are not publicly available, which significantly limits the transparency of the process. Of the 117 complaints considered by the CEC, 8 were satisfied or partially satisfied, 74 were not satisfied and 35 were left without consideration.

The high number of rejected and returned complaints has frequently been attributed to the complexity of the process, as complainants need to fulfil several different criteria and attach multiple copies of evidence and documents in order to qualify for consideration by an election commission.

On Election Day and in the post-election period, some DEC's reported receiving written complaints, however, the registration process for formal complaints to DEC's and PEC's lacks transparency, since there is no regis-

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<sup>84</sup>The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, p.II.3.3.C.c. 89. See also, Resolving Election Disputes in the OSCE Area: Towards a Standard Election Dispute Monitoring System at p. 14.J (48) "Where a dual complaint and appeals process applies, both institutions should clarify their respective areas of competence and those of the lower level courts and election commission."

try of complaints available publicly at any level of election administration. Moreover, several ENEMO interlocutors stated that DEC's are reluctant to accept or consider formal complaints.

On August 1st, the CEC announced that 74 complaints were filed to 23 DEC's, of which 42 were rejected, five were dismissed, 14 were satisfied and 13 complaints were still pending.

As of July 31st, the courts had received some 1055 cases featuring election-related disputes, of which 57 cases were further appealed. The majority of the complaints were related to the clarification of voters' lists (763 cases). 140 cases were related to the registration of candidates; 13 cases were related to the formation of DEC's and PEC's; 111 complaints were filed related to the election campaign and election information support.

Some 144 cases were left without consideration based on a failure to meet the court deadlines and inadequately submitted appeals. An inconsistent application of the law was notable in a number of cases mostly related to the registration of candidates.

The courts mostly followed the legally prescribed deadlines, and considered complaints received before the Election Day within two days, but no later than two hours before the beginning of voting.<sup>85</sup> For example, the last decision of the Supreme Court on the registration of candidates was made in the early morning of the July 21st election day.<sup>86</sup>

Based on the information received by ENEMO from the Sixth Appellate Court of Kyiv, a special workshop on electoral dispute resolution was organized before the beginning of the election campaign and information on the timing and peculiarities of consideration of such disputes was provided to judges.

Several judgments related to the registration of candidates showed that the courts cancelled the CEC resolutions about the refusal of registration of candidates based on excessive formalism in submitted documents such as technical inaccuracies related to figures, dates, biography details etc. The Sixth Appellate Court, or Supreme Court, considered such decisions as excessive formalism and obliged the CEC to register the candidates.<sup>87</sup>

ENEMO notes that the Supreme Court lacked a uniform approach to the obligation of the CEC to register candidates. On June 18th, in Case No. 855/150/19, the Supreme Court cancelled the first instance court decision which obliged the CEC to register a candidate, stating that the court does not have the authority to oblige the CEC to register a candidate, but

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<sup>85</sup>Article 273.11 of the Administrative Code of Proceedings of Ukraine.

<sup>86</sup>The Supreme Court upheld the CEC appeal and canceled a decision of the Sixth Administrative Court of Kyiv, which ordered the CEC to register Oleksandr Onyshchenko in Election District #93.

<sup>87</sup>See cases # 855/213/19; # 855/196/19; #855/204/19; #855/198/19

<sup>88</sup>Law of Ukraine on Election of the People's Deputies of Ukraine article 69 on Information Posters and Election Campaign Materials, paragraph 7.

can only instruct the CEC to reconsider the issue of registration of a candidate. This legal reasoning was changed ten days later by the same court in Case No. 855/157/19, where the Supreme Court directly obliged the CEC to register a candidate.

It should also be noted that in some cases when the courts only obliged the CEC to reconsider the documents, the Commission again took the same decisions about rejection of candidates.

Several complaints alleging violations of campaign rules were rejected by local administrative courts, however, in some instances court decisions appeared to lack sufficient legal reasoning. For example, the Administrative Court of Chernihiv rejected a candidate's complaint about an opposing candidate's failure to include legally-mandated information on campaign materials,<sup>88</sup> stating that the materials were produced by a company and not the candidate himself.

There were around 28 cases related to a recount of votes in single mandate electoral districts #50, #119, #198, #210, #69, #105. Notably, the DEC #210 and #50 failed to execute court decisions on recounting the voting. The CEC thus exercised the power of the DEC No. 50 to execute court decisions on the recounting of votes at 14 polling stations in this district and drew up the relevant protocol.<sup>89</sup> During the recounting of votes, the CEC found that several sensitive electoral materials were missing, and applied to law enforcement agencies for investigation.

The election results were not established within the deadline (August 5th) in District #210.<sup>90</sup> On August 16th, the CEC thus terminated the power of DEC #210 and established the results of the voting in light of the court ruling.

From the beginning of the election campaign, as of August 5th, the national police received approximately 11,103 complaints on violations of the electoral legislation.<sup>91</sup> Of 11,103 complaints, the police drew up 1,437 administrative protocols and initiated 516 criminal investigations. It should be noted that the majority of the cases were declined or are still pending, since the police did not find sufficient evidence, or no signs of offences were revealed.

The majority of the administrative protocols drawn up were related to producing or distributing pre-election campaign printed materials which did not contain information about the entity that published them, their

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<sup>88</sup>Law of Ukraine on Election of the People's Deputies of Ukraine article 69 on Information Posters and Election Campaign Materials, paragraph 7.

<sup>89</sup>Recounting was conducted at PECs # № 140760, 140762, 140766, 140767, 140769, 140771, 140773, 140774, 140775, 140756, 140782, 140784, 140787, 141065 of the Single-mandate Constituency #50.

<sup>90</sup>The DEC 210 transferred clarified protocol to the CEC twice without accurate information as of August 6. moreover, the decision of the Chernihiv District Administrative Court of August 10, which was left unchanged by the decision of the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal of August 14, has declared the actions of the DEC #210 in drafting clarified protocol in this district on August 6, unlawful, and obliged the DEC to invalidate the voting at polling station No. 740243 of this district.

<sup>91</sup>Official statistics by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine: <https://vybory2019.mvs.gov.ua/statistics>

quantity and information about the persons responsible for the issue,<sup>92</sup> and violation of the order of placing campaign materials or political advertising or placing them in prohibited places. Of the 1,437 administrative protocols, 476 were submitted to the courts for consideration, of which 103 persons were sanctioned in the amount of 18,037 UAH.

According to statistics provided by state judiciary administration, five criminal cases were sent to the courts for consideration, of which three cases are still pending, and one criminal case was closed by the court where one person was found guilty under article 158.1 of the criminal code of Ukraine and imposed a fine of 1700 UAH.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>Article 212.13 of the law on administrative offences.

<sup>93</sup>Unlawful use of the ballot paper, the ballot for voting in a referendum; voting by a voter, a referendum participant more than once.

# XIV RECOMMENDATIONS

## A. Priority recommendations

### Recommendations for the Parliament

- » The law on parliamentary elections needs comprehensive review in order to eliminate existing inconsistencies and uncertainties related to election campaign rules, media regulations, composition of election administration, complaints and appeals process, campaign financial activities, etc. ENEMO emphasizes the importance of the prospective unified law on elections in the form of an Electoral Code for presidential, parliamentary, and local elections, which passed in the Verkhovna Rada's second reading, however, there is a further need to continue with a transparent and inclusive electoral reform, with the participation of various stakeholders, including experts and civil society, to provide for improved electoral legislation that is harmonized with all international standards.

## B. Other recommendations

### Recommendations for the Parliament

- » ENEMO recommends that the five-year residency requirement be reconsidered by the legislator, as international standards including the ICCPR (1966), CCPR General Comment No25: Article 25, and the Venice Commission's 'Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters' (2002) provide that the requirements for being a candidate should not be excessive, and should not encroach on equal treatment nor violate the rights of citizens to be elected. The five-year residency requirement is at odds with these international standards, as it appears overly restrictive.
- » The legislation should set deadlines for the replacement of members of lower-level commissions, as this has a negative impact on both the effectiveness of training and on the professionalism of commission members. The restriction that only commission members who have undergone training may be accepted as replacements should also be considered.
- » Sanctions should be contained within the law towards political parties that nominate commission members without their knowledge or consent, as this creates a risk to the composition of electoral commissions and to the electoral process in general.

- » The timeframes for the printing of ballot papers, establishment of PECs, and temporary changes to place of voting should be harmonized, in order for each polling station to have a sufficient number of ballot papers corresponding to the final number of voters registered to vote per polling station.
- » ENEMO recommends that lawmakers eliminate the existing gaps and inconsistencies between different laws and thus reduce the scope for the non-uniform application of the law to the election dispute resolution process. The lack of clarity regarding procedures left the election administration with broad discretion regarding the consideration of complaints. The CEC should consider all complaints as a collegial body and adopt relevant decisions for each complaint. Moreover, ENEMO urges all levels of election commissions and judiciary to ease and unify the system of presenting information to the public.
- » Candidates changing their names to resemble those of other existing candidates, although not a violation of the law, is a phenomenon which should be better framed to avoid the confusion of voters. Mentioning recent changes of names (i.e., less than 6 months before the election) on the ballot papers could be a possible solution.
- » Deadlines for the registration of candidates should be amended within the law for early elections, and all cases should be envisaged in the legislation (for example, in the case of registration of a political party following a court decision after the deadline for registration, and after the drawing of the order of parties on the ballot).
- » ENEMO additionally recommends increasing the quota for women on party lists, with effective sanctions for failure to comply with gender quota requirements, such as rejection of party lists by the CEC in cases of non-compliance.
- » Additional steps should be taken to provide access to PWDs at voter registration offices, as well as to polling stations. ENEMO also recommends that the legislation be amended in order to fully enfranchise IDPs to vote in single-mandate constituencies. ENEMO assesses that the lack of full IDP enfranchisement in one of the vulnerabilities of the current electoral framework which affects the inclusiveness of the voter registry. It also contradicts international standards, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21) which states that everyone has the right to take part in government and vote in elections by way of universal and equal suffrage.
- » The legislation should be amended to better frame cases of “clone” candidates, as well as the timeline for campaigning. Provisions and sanctions on early campaigning should be included in the law, as well

as for campaigning on the day of silence. Cases of violations related to campaigning, and which constitute criminal or administrative offenses, should be systematically acted upon by police to ensure effective prosecution.

- » ENEMO recommends that clear instructions should be issued by the state to public officials and employees regulating their behaviour during elections to prevent the abuse of public office and administrative resources. The legal framework should provide effective mechanisms for prohibiting public authorities from taking unfair advantage of their positions by holding official public events for electoral campaigning purposes, including charitable events, or events that favour or disfavour any political party or candidate.
- » The framework for campaign finance should be reinforced with sanctions against parties and candidates who do not comply with the rules for financial reporting. Provisions should also be added in the legal framework for the proper oversight and monitoring of the campaign to identify campaigning expenses which do not appear in financial reports. The definition of costs for campaigning should be broadened, and extended to entities whom organize events, activities, or provide platforms to candidates for campaigning. Additionally, ENEMO recommends that the legislator should consider the introduction of campaign spending limits or restrictions, such as for TV advertising during elections and social media advertising.

## Recommendations regarding candidates and political parties

- » All political parties and candidates should adhere to the principles of fair campaigning, and refrain from using smear methods and legal loopholes in bad faith. The use of vote-buying, “charity” acts, and other methods such as those aiming to confuse voters (i.e. name changes by candidates and organizations using similar names as existing political parties) should be avoided.
- » Recommendations regarding the CEC, NAPC, judiciary institutions and law enforcement bodies:
  - » The CEC should ensure a publicly available registry of complaints at all levels of commissions and publish all decisions including the legal basis of the rejection of complaints.
  - » Criminal and administrative offences reported to the police should be professionally investigated and the persons responsible should be adequately sanctioned, in line with the legal provisions.
  - » The quality of financial reports analysis should be improved, with emphasis on violations and unreported expenses (“shadow funds”) which limit the fairness of the election. Additional resources should be allocated to the CEC and NAPC in order to do so.

## Recommendations regarding media

- » The election law should define a clear system of sanctions related to violations of its media-related provisions, and indicate the competent body to address them. Furthermore, consideration should be given to reinforcing the NTRBC as an independent regulatory body and to increasing its capacity to oversee and fully ensure the broadcast media compliance with the legislation, as well as addressing media-related complaints and imposing sanctions for possible violations during the election campaign. The decisions of the independent regulatory body should be taken in a timely manner and made public.
- » Current legislation should be improved, with the aim of clearly differentiating election campaigning from the voters' informing, and clearly define and introduce effective mechanisms for sanctioning cases of hidden advertising and paid materials ("jeansa").
- » Introduce restrictions or prohibit the placement of unmarked campaign materials on television and radio news programmes, as well as posting incomplete information about the results of opinion polls.
- » UA: PBC should be funded in accordance with the law, and its independence should be strongly supported. A strong and independent public service could counterbalance biased private media reporting, by providing fair, objective and balanced information to voters.
- » Strengthen self-regulatory mechanisms in the media sphere in order to counter pressure from media owners on editorial policy. A Code of Conduct could provide essential principles and guide the actions of the media and journalists during the election period.
- » The authorities, in consultation with civil society, media and academic institutions, could consider developing mechanisms to increase digital literacy among voters and other electoral stakeholders. Consideration could be given to enhancing the regulation of online campaigning with the aim of ensuring a level playing field for all contestants and an informed choice for voters.

## XV ABOUT ENEMO

The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) is an international non-governmental organization that represents a network of national non-governmental civic organizations, founded on September 29, 2001 in Opatija, Croatia. It consists of 21 leading domestic monitoring organizations from 18 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including two European Union countries.

ENEMO seeks to support the international community's interest in promoting democracy in the region by assessing electoral processes and the political environment and offering accurate and impartial observation reports. ENEMO's international observation missions use international benchmarks and standards for democratic elections to evaluate the electoral process and the host country's legal framework. ENEMO and all of its member organizations have endorsed the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations. Each ENEMO observer has signed the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers. ENEMO member organizations have monitored more than 250 national elections and trained more than 240,000 observers.

To date, ENEMO has organized 28 international election observation missions to eight countries: Armenia (2018), Albania (2005 parliamentary elections), Georgia (2008 early presidential elections), Kazakhstan (2005 presidential elections), Moldova (2009 parliamentary elections, 2016 presidential elections and 2019 parliamentary elections), Kosovo (2009 municipal elections; 2010 parliamentary elections, 2013 municipal elections), Kyrgyzstan (2005 presidential elections; 2005 parliamentary elections; 2007 early parliamentary elections; 2009 presidential elections and 2010 parliamentary elections), and Ukraine (2004 presidential elections; 2006 parliamentary elections; 2006 mayoral elections in Chernihiv, Kirovograd and Poltava; 2007 parliamentary elections; 2010 presidential elections, 2012 parliamentary elections, 2013 parliamentary repeat elections in five districts, 2014 early presidential elections, 2014 early parliamentary elections, and 2019 presidential elections).

**The ENEMO member organisations are:**

**Centers for Civic Initiatives CCI** - Bosnia and Herzegovina,  
**Center for Democratic Transition CDT** – Montenegro,  
**Center for Monitoring and Research CeMI** – Montenegro,  
**Center for Free Elections and Democracy CeSID** – Serbia,  
**In Defence of Voters’ Rights GOLOS**– Russia,  
**GONG** – Croatia,  
**International Society for Fair Elections And Democracy ISFED** – Georgia,  
**KRIIK Association** – Albania  
**Citizens Association MOST** – Macedonia,  
**Promo LEX** – Moldova,  
**Civil Network OPORA** - Ukraine  
**Society for Democratic Culture SDC** – Albania,  
**Transparency International Anti-Corruption Center TIAC** - Armenia  
**Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center EMDS** – Azerbaijan,  
**Belarusian Helsinki Committee BHC** - Belarus,  
**FSCI** - Kazakhstan  
**Kosovo Democratic Institute KDI** - Kosovo  
**Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society** – Kyrgyzstan,  
**Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability CRTA** - Serbia  
**Obcianske Oko OKO**– Slovakia,  
**Committee of Ukrainian Voters CVU** - Ukraine

**The English version of this report is the only official document.**  
**An unofficial translation is available in Ukrainian.**

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# ANNEX I: FINAL RESULTS OF EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

## 1. Overview of key election data

Single-mandate constituencies	<b>199</b>
Polling stations, including:	<b>29885</b>
Ordinary	<b>28637</b>
Special	<b>1146</b>
Abroad	<b>102</b>
Members of district election commissions	<b>3505</b>
Political parties having a faction, subjects of nomination for DECs and PECs	<b>6</b>
Political parties - subjects of the electoral process, including nominated candidates:	<b>65</b>
In the nationwide district	<b>22</b>
In single-mandate districts	<b>58</b>
Total number of registered candidates	<b>5966</b>
Candidates in the electoral lists of parties	<b>2746</b>
Candidates on the lists whose registration was canceled before election day	<b>18</b>
Candidates on the lists whose registration was canceled after the election	<b>0</b>

Registered candidates in SMCs	<b>3220</b>
SMC candidates whose registration was canceled before election day	<b>136</b>
Candidates in SMCs participating in the election, including those nominated:	<b>3084</b>
By political parties	<b>1404</b>
By self-nomination	<b>1680</b>
Representatives of parties in the CEC with the right of advisory vote	<b>22</b>
Authorized party observers	<b>3783</b>
Candidate proxies	<b>3945</b>
Non-governmental organizations authorized to have official observers	<b>163</b>
Official observers from foreign countries and international organizations	<b>1719</b>
Official observers from NGOs	<b>27879</b>
Official observers from SMC candidates	<b>93323</b>
Official Party Observers	<b>105994</b>
Accredited media	<b>103</b>
Observers of accredited media	<b>866</b>

Official data from the CEC website.

## 2. Elections results

### In the nation-wide constituency (proportional party lists, 225 seats)

POLITICAL PARTY	Percentage	Number of votes
"SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE"	43.16	6 307 793
OPPOSITIONAL PLATFORM - FOR LIFE	13.05	1 908 111
"FATHERLAND"	8.18	1 196 303
"EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY"	8.10	1 184 620
POLITICAL PARTY "VOICE"	5.82	851 722
RADICAL PARTY OF OLEG LYASHKO"	4.01	586 384
STRENGTH AND HONOR	3.82	558 652
OPPOSITION BLOC	3.03	443 195
"UKRAINIAN STRATEGY OF GROYSMAN"	2.41	352 934
THE SHARIA PARTY	2.23	327 152
ALL-UKRAINIAN ASSOCIATION "FREEDOM"	2.15	315 568
"CIVIC POSITION"	1.04	153 225
"GREEN UKRAINE PARTY"	0.66	96 659
"SAMOPOMIC ASSOCIATION"	0.62	91 596
AGRARIAN PARTY OF UKRAINE	0.51	75 509
MIKHAIL SAAKASHVILI'S NEW FORCE MOVEMENT POLITICAL PARTY	0.46	67 740
THE POWER OF PEOPLE	0.19	27 984
THE POWER OF LAW	0.13	20 340
"PATRIOT"	0.11	16 123
"SOCIAL JUSTICE"	0.10	15 967
INDEPENDENCE	0.05	7 970
"ALL-UKRAINIAN ASSOCIATION" POLITICAL PARTY	0.05	7 739

<b>POLITICAL PARTY</b>	<b>Number of mandates received</b>
<b>SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>FATHERLAND</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>VOICE (HOLOS)</b>	<b>17</b>

## In the single-mandate constituencies (majoritarian candidates) (199 seats)

POLITICAL PARTY/SELF-NOMINATION	Number of mandates received
<b>POLITICAL PARTY "SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE"</b>	<b>130</b>
<b>SELF-NOMINATED</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>OPPOSITION BLOCK</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE</b>	<b>6</b>
<b><i>HOLOS</i></b>	<b>3</b>
<b>FATHERLAND</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>UNITED CENTER</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>BILA TSERKVA TOGETHER</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>"SAMOPOMIC"</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>ALL-UKRAINIAN UNION "SVOBODA"</b>	<b>1</b>

# ANNEX II STATISTICAL REPORT ON EVALUATION OF PECs DONE BY ENEMO STOs

## OPENING

Polling Stations Accessibility for Persons with Disabilities	Number of Answers	%
Easy	25	43.1
Requires minor assistance	18	31.03
Not suitable	15	25.86

PEC Chairperson	Number of Answers	%
Man	19	32.76
Woman	39	67.24

PEC Deputy Chairperson	Number of Answers	%
Man	16	27.59
Woman	42	72.41

PEC Secretary	Number of Answers	%
Man	9	15.52
Woman	49	84.48

Observers from domestic organizations	Number of Answers	%
None	9	15.52
All-Ukrainian NGO "Civil Network OPORA"	3	5.17
NGO "All-Ukrainian NGO "Solidarity Youth"	2	3.45
NGO "Centre for Professional and Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons of the Judiciary System"	2	3.45
All-Ukrainian NGO "Committee of Voters of Ukraine"	1	1.72
NGO "Civil Movement "Ukrainian Strategy"	1	1.72
NGO "International Peace League"	1	1.72
NGO "Association of Political Lawyers"	1	1.72
NGO "All-Ukrainian Movement "Ours"	1	1.72
NGO "Municipal and Legal Initiatives"	1	1.72
NGO "Strategy of Ukraine"	1	1.72
NGO "Kyiv Starts with You"	1	1.72
NGO "Democratic Platform"	1	1.72
NGO "Institute of Peace and Development"	1	1.72
NGO "Opposition Bloc"	1	1.72
NGO "Joint Community Affair"	1	1.72

Observers from International organizations	Number of Answers	%
None	15	25.86
OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)	4	6.9
NGO "CANADEM"	2	3.45
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America	1	1.72
NATO Parliamentary Assembly	1	1.72
Other	1	1.72

<b>Polling Station set up</b>	<b>Number of Answers</b>	<b>%</b>
Acceptable	55	94.83
Unacceptable	3	5.17

<b>Preparatory meeting</b>	<b>Number of Answers</b>	<b>%</b>
The preparatory meeting started on time (7.15)	55	94.83
The preparatory meeting started with delay between 15 and 30 minutes	2	3.45
The preparatory meeting started earlier	1	1.72

<b>Essential Materials</b>	<b>Number of Answers</b>	<b>%</b>
All essential materials are present	58	100

<b>Informational Materials</b>	<b>Number of Answers</b>	<b>%</b>
All informational materials are present	57	98.28
Information on voting procedures is missing	1	1.72

<b>Stationary ballot box sealing</b>	<b>Number of Answers</b>	<b>%</b>
Stationary ballot boxes properly sealed according to procedures	58	100

<b>Mobile ballot box sealing</b>	<b>Number of Answers</b>	<b>%</b>
Mobile ballot boxes properly sealed according to procedures	58	100

<b>Control sheet</b>	<b>Number of Answers</b>	<b>%</b>
Control sheet filled out properly and procedure was transparent	57	98.28
Control sheet seemed to be already filled out	1	1.72

<b>Ballots' format</b>	<b>Number of Answers</b>	<b>%</b>
Ballots are in the prescribed format	58	100

Opening time	Number of Answers	%
PS was opened on time or with slight delays of up to 5 minutes (between 8:00 AM and 8:05 AM)	58	100

Observation	Number of Answers	%
All authorized observers able to observe properly	57	98.28
Observers were deliberately denied access to crucial aspects of opening procedures	1	1.72

Formal (official) complaints submitted on the opening procedures	Number of Answers	%
There were no formal complaints	58	100

Presence of unauthorized persons inside PS	Number of Answers	%
None (only authorized persons present)	48	82.76
Police	6	10.34
Other	5	8.62
Unknown non-accredited persons (e.g. persons that didn't have observation badge)	1	1.72

PEC Conduct	Number of Answers	%
PEC generally conducted opening in order and according to the procedures	56	96.55
PEC was rushing through the opening process and did not care for transparency	2	3.45

Evaluation of PEC	Number of Answers	%
Very good	29	50
Good	27	46.55
Bad	2	3.45

Observers from domestic organizations	Number of Answers	%
None	85	11.14
All-Ukrainian NGO “Civil Network OPORA”	47	6.16
All-Ukrainian NGO “Committee of Voters of Ukraine”	30	3.93
NGO “Centre for Professional and Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons of the Judiciary System”	23	3.01
NGO “Opposition Bloc”	20	2.62
NGO “Association of Professional Political Consultants”	18	2.36
NGO “Strategy of Ukraine”	15	1.97
NGO “Civil Movement “Ukrainian Strategy”	15	1.97
NGO “Institute of Peace and Development”	13	1.7
NGO “All-Ukrainian NGO “Solidarity Youth”	13	1.7
NGO “Association of Political Lawyers”	12	1.57
All-Ukrainian NGO “Leading Legal Initiatives”	11	1.44
International Rights Advocacy NGO “Continent”	11	1.44
NGO “Stop Corruption”	10	1.31
NGO “Development of United Territorial Communities”	9	1.18
NGO “Atlantic Council”	9	1.18
NGO “All-Ukrainian Association “Movement of Free Farmers”	9	1.18
NGO “Kyiv Starts with You”	9	1.18
NGO “Joint Community Affair”	9	1.18
People’s Democratic Youth League	9	1.18
NGO “European Platform”	7	0.92
NGO “Centre for Control over Pre-Elections Programs”	6	0.79
NGO “Centre of Influence”	6	0.79
NGO “People’s Servant”	6	0.79
NGO “Voters League”	5	0.66
NGO “2019 Election Monitoring Mission in Ukraine”	5	0.66
All-Ukrainian Youth NGO “Student Republic”	5	0.66
NGO “Institute of Democracy Development and Promotion”	5	0.66

NGO "National Squads"	4	0.52
NGO "Free Choice of Ukraine"	4	0.52
NGO "Institute of Electoral Studies"	3	0.39
NGO "All-Ukrainian Movement "Power of Law"	3	0.39
NGO "Strong Country"	3	0.39
NGO "Election Platform "Experience"	3	0.39
NGO "National Platform "Women for Peace"	2	0.26
NGO "Podil United League of Initiative Students and Youth"	2	0.26
NGO "ATO-Combatants in the Donetsk Oblast"	2	0.26
NGO "Ukrainian Centre of Democratic Society"	2	0.26
NGO "Vitaliy Klytchko's UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms)"	2	0.26
NGO "Servants of the People"	2	0.26
NGO "Department for Combating Corruption and Abuse of Official Position"	2	0.26
All-Ukrainian NGO "Women of Motherland"	2	0.26
NGO "Electoral Control"	2	0.26
NGO "E-Democracy"	1	0.13
NGO "Centre for Social Studies"	1	0.13
NGO "Ukrainian Information Resource Centre"	1	0.13
NGO "Democratic Pressure Group"	1	0.13
NGO "National Monitoring"	1	0.13
NGO "Academy of Electoral Race"	1	0.13
NGO "Civil Platform for Protection of Constitution of Ukraine and Citizens Rights"	1	0.13
NGO "All-Ukrainian Association "Common Case"	1	0.13
NGO "All-Ukrainian Alliance of ATO Combatants and Volunteers"	1	0.13
NGO "Democratic Platform"	1	0.13
NGO "Control over Elections"	1	0.13
NGO "Municipal and Legal Initiatives"	1	0.13
NGO "Independent Country"	1	0.13

NGO “Chernihiv Human Rights Advocacy Alliance”	1	0.13
NGO “All-Ukrainian Association “Successful Watch”	1	0.13
NGO “For the Successful Khmelnytskyi Region”	1	0.13
NGO “All-Ukrainian NGO “Young Popular Movement”	1	0.13
Other	40	5.24

Observers from International organizations	Number of Answers	%
None	235	30.8
OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR)	45	5.9
NGO “CANADEM”	32	4.19
International Republican Institute	7	0.92
Committee for Open Democracy	3	0.39
Ukrainian World Congress	3	0.39
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	2	0.26
International Human Rights Commission	2	0.26
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America	1	0.13
NGO “Coordination Resource Center”	1	0.13
NATO Parliamentary Assembly	1	0.13
Other	3	0.39

Polling Station set up	Number of Answers	%
Acceptable	744	97.51
Unacceptable	19	2.49

Essential Materials	Number of Answers	%
All essential materials are present	763	100

Informational materials	Number of Answers	%
All informational materials are present	740	96.99
Information on voting procedures is missing	19	2.49
Information on candidates is missing	4	0.52

Stationary ballot boxes sealing	Number of Answers	%
Stationary ballot boxes properly sealed	735	96.33
Stationary ballot boxes not properly sealed	28	3.67

Mobile ballot box sealing	Number of Answers	%
Mobile ballot boxes properly sealed	684	89.65
Mobile ballot boxes were not present at the PS (mobile voting is ongoing)	65	8.52
Mobile ballot boxes not properly sealed	18	2.36
One or more of the mobile ballot boxes were not sealed at all	6	0.79

Voter list	Number of Answers	%
All voters found their names on the list	705	92.4
Some voters did not find their name on the list	39	5.11
N/A (no voters voted while the team was in the PS)	11	1.44
Information about some of the voters was wrong or incomplete	8	1.05
Non-eligible voters included in the voter list (e.g. deceased persons still included in the list)	2	0.26

Voters identification / issuing ballots	Number of Answers	%
Identification procedures always followed properly	751	98.43
N/A (no voters voted while the team was in the PS)	13	1.7

Secrecy of the Vote	Number of Answers	%
Secrecy of voting respected	723	94.76
N/A (no voters voted while the team was in the PS)	13	1.7
Voters could not vote in secrecy due to set up of booths (e.g. transparent curtains, curtains not covering the hands of the voter, etc.)	9	1.18
More than one person in the booth (except assisted voting to disabled voter)	7	0.92
Voters were revealing their vote	6	0.79
Other violations of the secrecy of the vote	5	0.66
Breaches of rules for assistance to disabled persons	2	0.26
Voters taking photo of marked ballot paper	1	0.13
Voters did not vote in secrecy due to overcrowded PS	1	0.13

Serious violations (inside polling station)	Number of Answers	%
No serious violations observed	749	98.17
N/A (no voters voted while the team was in the PS)	12	1.57
Other	3	0.39

Organization of PS	Number of Answers	%
Polling station is managed properly and PEC functions orderly	727	95.28
Polling station is somewhat crowded, but PEC seems to manage it well	20	2.62
N/A (no voters voted while the team was in the PS)	11	1.44
PS disorganized and process is confusing	4	0.52
PS is overcrowded, disorganized, makes it impossible to properly monitor the voting process	1	0.13

Campaign	Number of Answers	%
There were no campaigning or campaign materials inside PS	759	99.48
Other forms of campaigning inside PS	4	0.52

Observation	Number of Answers	%
All authorized observers able to observe properly	752	98.56
Observers could not observe properly due to set up of the polling station (e.g. sitting too far, PS in a hallway, etc.)	9	1.18
Observers could not observe properly due to overcrowded PS	1	0.13
Observers were deliberately denied access to some aspects of voting by the PEC	1	0.13

Work of other official observers	Number of Answers	%
Observers were observing in accordance with the law	739	96.85
N/A (no other observers present at the polling station)	18	2.36
Other	6	0.79

Formal (official) complaints submitted on the voting or opening	Number of Answers	%
There were no formal complaints	747	97.9
There were some minor, not substantial formal complaints	12	1.57
There were some unfounded formal complaints	2	0.26
PEC received substantial formal complaints	2	0.26

Presence of unauthorized persons inside PS	Number of Answers	%
None (only authorized persons present)	718	94.1
Police	28	3.67
Other	22	2.88
Local Authorities	2	0.26

PEC Conduct	Number of Answers	%
PEC generally conducted voting in an orderly fashion and according to the procedures	750	98.3
NA (no voters voted while the team was in the PS)	12	1.57
Other	2	0.26
PEC intentionally deviated from the procedures	1	0.13

Evaluation of PEC	Number of Answers	%
Very good	428	56.09
Good	323	42.33
Bad	12	1.57

## COUNTING

Closing time	Number of Answers	%
Polling station closed in time (20:00)	56	96.55
Polling station did not close in time	2	3.45

Voters at closing time	Number of Answers	%
No queue of voters at closing	58	100

Starting of Counting	Number of Answers	%
PEC started counting procedures immediately after closing PS	53	91.38
PEC had a short break (10-15 min) before starting counting	4	6.9
PEC did not start counting for more than 40 minutes	1	1.72

Pre-Counting procedures	Number of Answers	%
Pre-Counting procedures were followed properly and in the right sequence (process was legitimate)	54	93.1
PEC did not count the unused ballots	2	3.45
Other	2	3.45
PEC did not announce the number of voters who had voted based on the number of signatures in the voter list	1	1.72

Counting procedures	Number of Answers	%
Counting procedures were followed properly and in the right sequence (process was legitimate)	57	98.28
Valid ballot papers considered invalid and not counted	1	1.72

Completion of protocol	Number of Answers	%
Protocols were filled out in accordance with the law	54	93.1
PEC somewhat deviated from procedures, without affecting the results	4	6.9

Protocol distribution	Number of Answers	%
Protocols given to all entitled individuals to receive them and posted in PS immediately	55	94.83
Protocols not given to all entitled to receive them	3	5.17

Election material	Number of Answers	%
All election material was packed and sealed in full accordance with the law	57	98.28
Election material was mostly packed and sealed in accordance with the law (slight procedural deviations)	1	1.72

Observation	Number of Answers	%
All authorized observers able to observe properly	58	100

Formal (official) complaints submitted on the counting, voting or opening	Number of Answers	%
There were no formal complaints	58	100

Presence of unauthorized persons inside PS	Number of Answers	%
None (only authorized persons present)	56	96.55
Police	2	3.45

PEC Conduct	Number of Answers	%
PEC generally conducted counting in order and according to the procedures	57	98.28
PEC was rushing through the counting procedures and did not care for transparency	2	3.45

Evaluation of PEC	Number of Answers	%
Very good	27	46.55
Good	22	37.93
Bad	9	15.52

## DEC

DEC activity	Number of Answers	%
DEC activity was transparent and straightforward	55	96.49
DEC activity was disorganized, confusing and chaotic	2	3.51

Adequacy of DEC premises	Number of Answers	%
DEC premises were spacious and adequate for delivery of the materials	51	89.47
DEC premises were not spacious enough for adequate delivery of the materials	6	10.53

Overcrowding	Number of Answers	%
DEC was not overcrowded	34	59.65
Long lines of persons in the DEC, however it was easy to enter and move about	17	29.82
DEC was too overcrowded, it was very hard to move about	6	10.53

Observation of DEC	Number of Answers	%
All authorized observers able to observe properly	57	100

Pace of processing protocols by the DEC	Number of Answers	%
Most protocols were processed under 30 minutes	51	89.47
Most protocols were processed between 30 and 60 minutes	6	10.53

Formal complaints	Number of Answers	%
There were no formal complaints about DEC activity	55	96.49
There were some minor, not substantial formal complaints	2	3.51

Evaluation of DEC	Number of Answers	%
Very good	29	50.88
Good	27	47.37
Bad	1	1.75

# ANNEX III ENEMO EOM UKRAINE 2019 - COMPOSITION

Core Team member and position	Country	Member organization
<b>Zlatko Vujovic</b> Head of Mission	Montenegro	CeMI
<b>Teodora Pop Trajkov</b> Deputy Head of Mission	North Macedonia	MOST
<b>Pierre Peytier</b> Election Expert	France	FCDCS
<b>Nino Rizhamadze</b> Legal Expert	Georgia	ISFED
<b>Ana Nenezic</b> Media Analyst	Montenegro	N/A
<b>Kristina Kostelac</b> LTO Coordinator	Croatia	GONG
<b>Mariam Chubabria</b> LTO Coordinator and Security Officer	Georgia	ISFED
<b>Teodora Gilic</b> Finance Officer	Montenegro	CeMI
<b>Maja Milikic</b> PR and Logistics Officer	Montenegro	CeMI
<b>Dritan Taulla</b> Data Analyst	Albania	KRIIK
<b>Ana Mihajlovic</b> STO Coordinator	Serbia	CeSID

LTOs	Organization	Country
Vasil Sankovic	BHC	Belarus
Pavel Levinau	BHC	Belarus
Maja Vlajić Suljić	CCI	Bosna and Herzegovina
Nikolina Stepanović	CeMI	Montenegro
Marjana Krsmanović	CeMI	Montenegro
Nemanja Đukanović	CeMI	Montenegro
Nina Kecojević	CeMI	Montenegro
Miloš Antić	CeSID	Serbia
Dragan Nikodijević	CeSID	Serbia
Bojana Kaplja	CeSID	Serbia
Raushan Sadyrbaeva	Coalition KG	Kyrgyzstan
Myrzagul Kulmatova	Coalition KG	Kyrgyzstan
Almaz Esengeldiev	Coalition KG	Kyrgyzstan
Dušan Ivanović	CRTA	Serbia
Zibar Huseynova	EMDS	Azerbaijan
Aygul Jafarova	EMDS	Azerbaijan
Talgat Otemis	FSCI	Kazakstan
Mladen Kobašević	GONG	Croatia
Milan Soldatić	GONG	Croatia
Filip Korač	GONG	Croatia
Tamar Bartaia	ISFED	Georgia
Tamta Danelia	ISFED	Georgia

<b>Teona Gogishvili</b>	ISFED	Georgia
<b>Nana Devidze</b>	ISFED	Georgia
<b>Marsel Rexha</b>	KRIIK	Albania
<b>Hergys Dividi</b>	KRIIK	Albania
<b>Elidon Lamani</b>	KRIIK	Albania
<b>Filip Filipovski</b>	MOST	North Macedonia
<b>Daniel Kerekeš</b>	Obcianske Oko	Slovakia
<b>Peter Učen</b>	Obcianske Oko	Slovakia
<b>Peter Nemeth</b>	Obcianske Oko	Slovakia
<b>Mariana Focsa</b>	Promo-LEX	Moldova
<b>Alexandru Ghetan</b>	Promo-LEX	Moldova
<b>Mihail Gorincioi</b>	Promo-LEX	Moldova
<b>Mariana Novac</b>	Promo-Lex	Moldova
<b>Rigers Bena</b>	SDC	Albania
<b>Gazmend Agaj</b>	SDC	Albania
<b>Ermir Cota</b>	SDC	Albania
<b>Sargis Ghonyan</b>	TIAC	Armenia
<b>Naira Khachikyan</b>	TIAC	Armenia

STOs	Country	Member organization
<b>Ales Plotka</b>	Belarus	BHC
<b>Yuliya Khlashchankova</b>	Belarus	BHC
<b>Dmitry Chernyh</b>	Belarus	BHC
<b>Iryna Tratsiakova</b>	Belarus	BHC
<b>Slavica Biljarska Mircheski</b>	North Macedonia	CA MOST
<b>Filip Popovski</b>	North Macedonia	CA MOST
<b>Dance Biljarska</b>	North Macedonia	CA MOST
<b>Zlatko Dimitrioski</b>	North Macedonia	CA MOST
<b>Emir Kustura</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina	CCI
<b>Danijel Stjepanovic</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina	CCI
<b>Jelena Tanaskovic Micanovic</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina	CCI
<b>Aleksa Matic</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina	CCI
<b>Katarina Kovačević</b>	Montenegro	CDT
<b>Dijana Grdinić</b>	Montenegro	CDT
<b>Danilo Papović</b>	Montenegro	CDT
<b>Maja Radenović</b>	Montenegro	CDT
<b>Vladan Radunovic</b>	Montenegro	CeMI
<b>Violeta Vujovic</b>	Montenegro	CeMI
<b>Svetlana Filipovic</b>	Montenegro	CeMI
<b>Ana Saveljic</b>	Montenegro	CeMI
<b>Marko Cvetkovic</b>	Serbia	CeSID
<b>Bratislav Rakovic</b>	Serbia	CeSID
<b>Jelena Milosevic</b>	Serbia	CeSID
<b>Luka Perkovic</b>	Serbia	CeSID

<b>Adlet Mamyrov</b>	Kyrgyzstan	Coalition KG
<b>Cholpon Babalieva</b>	Kyrgyzstan	Coalition KG
<b>Asema Murzalieva</b>	Kyrgyzstan	Coalition KG
<b>Aliaskar Kiiizbaev</b>	Kyrgyzstan	Coalition KG
<b>Marija Pešić</b>	Serbia	CRTA
<b>Marko Nikolić</b>	Serbia	CRTA
<b>Branislava Kozlina</b>	Serbia	CRTA
<b>Bojan Lazić</b>	Serbia	CRTA
<b>Mammad Mammadzada</b>	Azerbaijan	EMDS
<b>Turan Ismayilov</b>	Azerbaijan	EMDS
<b>Sanubar Heydarova</b>	Azerbaijan	EMDS
<b>Murad Rustambayli</b>	Azerbaijan	EMDS
<b>Mirjana Grbac</b>	Croatia	Gong
<b>Monika Valečić</b>	Croatia	Gong
<b>MatejSever</b>	Croatia	Gong
<b>Josipa Dika</b>	Croatia	Gong
<b>Nino Khitarishvili</b>	Georgia	ISFED
<b>Nika Nanobashvili</b>	Georgia	ISFED
<b>Elene Nizharadze</b>	Georgia	ISFED
<b>Dimitri Chikovani</b>	Georgia	ISFED
<b>Nino Gvilia</b>	Georgia	ISFED
<b>Vangelt Duni</b>	Albania	KRIIK
<b>Ardit Saliaj</b>	Albania	KRIIK
<b>Blerta Selenica</b>	Albania	KRIIK
<b>Antuela Male</b>	Albania	KRIIK
<b>Jana Paukova</b>	Slovakia	Občianske oko
<b>Jozef Majchrák</b>	Slovakia	Občianske oko

<b>Patrik Dubovsky</b>	Slovakia	Občianske oko
<b>Peter Novotný</b>	Slovakia	Občianske oko
<b>Cristina Chebes</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Sorina Bodiu</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Anna Grigorencu</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Inga Stegarescu</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Maria Cazacu</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Ion Ciobanu</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Mihaela Duca-Anghelici</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Calin Apostol</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Nicolai Cazacu</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Alina Bujor-Luca</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Constantin Turuta</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Pavel Postica</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Daniela Angheluta</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Alexei Munteanu</b>	Moldova	Promo-LEX
<b>Luciana Balla</b>	Albania	SDC
<b>Albano Doko</b>	Albania	SDC
<b>Denisa Hila</b>	Albania	SDC
<b>Eglantina Alliaj</b>	Albania	SDC
<b>Narek Sukiasyan</b>	Armenia	TIAC
<b>Aleksey Petrosyan</b>	Armenia	TIAC
<b>Mariam Hoveyan</b>	Armenia	TIAC
<b>Anzhela Amirjanyan</b>	Armenia	TIAC
<b>Harutyun Harutyunyan</b>	Armenia	TIAC





EUROPEAN  
**E**  
NETWORK  
**N**  
OF ELECTION  
**E**  
MONITORING  
**M**  
ORGANIZATIONS  
**O**